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INTRODUCTION 
During the 1990s several civil society organizations were founded in Kosovo. The 
formation of CSOs was intended to meet some of the basic social needs for Kosovo 
Albanians and it was seen as a manifestation against the public isolation that was 
caused to Albanians by the Serbian regime. Meanwhile, the establishment of Albanian 
political parties and their political activity was interlinked with many of the civil society 
organizations. With the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, Albanian political platform 
was expended by developing in what was identified as the Albanian peaceful 
resistance. 
The period under the circumstances of Serbian apartheid is identified as the 
beginning of the process through which the development of civil society in Kosovo 
took its first modest forms. Being politically coordinated with Albanian political 
parties, CSOs through their various activities gradually became integrated within the 
'civil resistance movement' and thus contributed to the creation of parallel institutions 
of Kosovo. 
In the aftermath of the conflict in Kosovo and the establishment of the United Nations 
Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK), with the initiative of various international 
organizations combined with local support, the establishment of tens of hundreds of 
CSOs began. 
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This period marks another phase of civil society development in Kosovo, but this time 
with an incomparable dynamic with that of the pre-war circumstances. Consequently, 
the civil society in Kosovo grew through two main development phases: the pre-war 
and post-war circumstances. This study elaborates the development of the Kosovo's 
civil society during the pre-war period, by focusing on the analyzes on how the 
Albanian CSOs operated under the Serbian occupation, as well as the evolution of the 
civil society in the postwar circumstances (under the UNMIK administration), and later 
on its relationship with the institutions of the Republic of Kosovo. 
Following the declaration of independence, the role of civil society was important for 
the process of building the new institutions of Kosovo. Civil society can perform a 
variety of contributions through their civic activities, from giving inputs to public 
policies and serving as watchdog whilst Kosovo's economy is regenerated and its 
institutions mature. 
The focus of this study is to explore the development of Kosovo's civil society within 
the framework of complex political circumstances between the years of 1989-1999, by 
continuing with the analysis for their potential roles and contributions towards the 
development of the democratic system of governance in the post- war and in 
Independent Kosovo. The study is divided into six chapters which in the end are 
followed by the main conclusions. 
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In the first chapter, I will analyze existing discourses, potential definitions and various 
meanings in the scholarly debates for the notion of civil society, while in the second 
chapter a short history of Kosovo will be introduced. 
In the first part of the third chapter I will give a brief picture regarding the idea for the 
civil society discourses in ex-Yugoslavia, while main focus will be to analyze the 
historical roots of the development of civil society in Kosovo between the years of 
1989 and 1999. Whereas the fourth chapter it will address the development of the 
NGO sector after the war of 1998-1999. The reason why NGO sector will receive 
special emphasis is because like in most of the post-conflict societies the idea of civil 
society was so often identified with NGO's as it became interchangeable with that of 
the NGO sector. This sector has received consistent support from the international 
donors after the war in Kosovo. Both UNMIK and other powerful international 
agencies have targeted their support towards local NGOs which later became 
important actors in order to implement certain political agendas of the international 
presence in Kosovo. 
 
In the chapter five the role and contribution of educators and religious leaders in their 
capacities as civil society representatives, will be analyzed. This is important having in 
consideration that Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) represent more than an NGO 
(especially when compared to the western type of NGO which was largely supported 
by many international donors in Kosovo) as CSOs among other include CBOs 
 4 
 
(community-based organizations), trade unions, federations, family associations, 
educational organizations, religious communities, etc. The segregated education 
system in Kosovo accompanied with contradictions between the two main ethnic 
groups where ethnic identity prevails, among others is the reason for the failure of 
democracy in Kosovo. During the process of providing education, training and 
information educators can give a significant contribution on identity formation for the 
main ethnic groups in Kosovo based on the idea and the concept of citizenship, while 
religious leaders can act as mediators and moderators in their communities and get 
involved in their efforts to foster democracy. 
I will finish chapter five by analyzing the possibilities of softening some of the 
authoritarian tendencies of the main representatives of the Islamic community in 
Kosovo in order to gradually converge their role within the civil society. By analyzing 
their status based on the above parameters I will aim to examine more thoroughly 
their roles and contributions in order to foster democracy. 
Chapter six will provide a synthesis of all the analyzes developed in this study by 
referring to the potential challenges that all those who represent civil society must 
overcome in order to meaningfully increase their roles and contributions towards the 
development of a democratic system of governance in Kosovo. 
I will conclude by emphasizing how important it is for Kosovo as a fragile state to 
develop a sustainable civil society which could positively impact the quality of 
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governance and how democratic processes are negatively affected when certain 
representatives of the civil society are not present as forces of democracy. 
 
 
CHAPTER I 
History of Civil Society 
1.1. Origins of civil society 
There’s no broad consent in academic debates in terms of clear and precise definition 
of the civil society. Literature research on the concept of civil society shows that this is 
a rather divers and controversial concept.‘ It is important to observe the historical 
trajectories of the development of civil society in order to better understand how the 
concept was seen in different periods and contexts’ (Spurk, 2010). 
Civil society organizations foundations are traced mainly in the West, although now 
days it relates to majority of societies and different civilizations. The „societas civiilis“is 
a notion first introduced by Cicero of the Romans.  Going back to Socrates, who 
viewed it as a way to resolve conflicts within society through public debate, and 
Plato's ideal society in which citizens serve the common good, and way to Aristotle 
who saw the ruling and being ruled, as a virtuous task shared by the citizens, and 
enabled from the ‘polis’ as the ‘association’ (O’Brien, 1999). Nevertheless, there was 
no difference between the society and the state in neither of civilizations, Rome nor 
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Greece. There was no mention of civil society until the eighteenth century and the 
attack on absolutism by liberals, all as an aftermath of the absolutism of Europe and 
the victorious Enlightenment period. Before that, there was only the formation of the 
states with a territory and sovereignty, as a product of the Treaty of Westphalia, and 
formation of the national armies by the Monarchs, and their establishment of control 
over the public life (Edwards, 2004). Ideas of separation between the state and the 
civil society was disputed with firmness from John Locke and Thomas Hobbes, the 
later supporting that even the idea of separation between the society and the state of 
the medieval ought to be challenged in the light of religion having a potential of 
conflict only, thus only the power of sovereign can hold the society together, if it is to 
be held at all.  Locke, however, held a stand, that falls into a modern way of 
differentiation, which involved the concept of voluntary association as laid in his work, 
‘Two Treatises of Government’ (1963). Both, Hobbes and Locke, were opting for a 
peaceful coexistence, the basis that lies in social contracts and pacts.   In order to 
protect itself, the society has created and it can change its political institutions, as it 
benefits the society (Warren, 1996).  As the first ones to make distinction between the 
state and society, having the state as a part of “civil society” and making a clear 
division between the community and the political order, whereas the “community”, 
namely society, gives consent that the ethics falls on the political order.  This is the 
concept of the state protecting the human interactions in the moral sphere of the civil 
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society (O’Brien, 1999). Other concepts, such as Tocqueville's, had the idea of strong 
democracies due to the network of non-political social organizations, as part of the 
civil society and his notion of subsidiary, where civil society is part of the governance, 
preserving the energy of the society within civic activism of associations and keeping 
it outside the state (Tocqueville, 1969). 
Hegel initially made the difference between the state and the market. In his view, the 
economy becomes part of civil society by being identified through its relationships 
with the market, while Marx has remained loyal to the argument that class 
antagonisms are the ones that shape civil society. Gramsci saw the state and 
economy differentiated from the civil society and on this basis he developed its own 
concept for the civil society (Gramcsi, 1971). 
Rousseau's analysis indicates two main objectives of the civil society concept: that of 
securing property rights and providing peace for everyone. At the same time, 
Rousseau is committed for the absorption of state within the civil society (Rousseau, 
1950).  
Apart from the classical period, every aspect of society which was not included either 
institutionally or by service within the state was defined as civil society.  A new chapter 
of great significance opened in seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, with the state 
and society division, which allowed new definitions of the theorists for the society, 
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such as a social space, from where the citizens are able to oppose the oppressive 
state, just by viewing the acts of the society.   
 
1.2 The theoretical dimensions of civil society 
 In the views of many scholars, civil society as a definition sometimes remains 
meaningless, due to its ambiguous nature.  Civil society is integrated with the group 
of sociological and political theories where the demarcation between the concepts of 
freedom, justice and equality are not so clear.   From the theoretical aspect and 
normative aspect, the concept of the civil society's roles can be summarized as: 
theoretical way of analyzing  social values, social life, where the key actors are the 
citizens and the civil organizations -and from the normative, through motivating and 
mobilizing citizens, and other actors, in determining and developing the essence and 
forms of civil activities.   These two dimensions have a critical role in states where the 
civil society is traditionally embedded and has played a marginal role, while the 
normative dimension specifically, is a characteristic of transitions periods of less or 
more stronger democracies (Cohen & Arato, 1995).  Today the notion of civil society 
is introduced as the popular trend among academia, international agencies and 
politicians, who particularly emphasize the states and market demands for the civil 
society.   
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Consequently, most of the political and social theorists see its role as of a particular 
importance during the processes of social transformations and of the democratic 
changes. Civil society should stand between the state and citizens, serving as a 
median of governance, preventing public coercion and offering the proper problem 
solution.  In the modern history, the idea of civil society could mean different state-
society relation perspectives, where among these perspectives, the state as the 
organizing and binding principle of political order should be distinguished from civil 
society, where organizations and individuals are part of it, only in proportion of their 
activity and participation.   Political theorists and social theorists conceptualize the 
civil society and defend their theories on civil society differently. The term civil society 
today, in scientific terms means a normative or non-normative tool, and not a 
widespread or common definition.   
 Another  working definition, which is used from the London School of Economics 
and Political Science's Centre for Civil Society adds family as the fifth model sector, by 
which: ‘Civil society refers to the arena of collective action around common purposes, 
interests and values“.  (Centre for Civil Society, 2017). 
Edwards has suggested addressing the issue of too much state intervention on the 
society but also the human exclusive reliance in the markets. He noted that this 
should be received as one of the new ideas for achieving social progress and 
identified it as 'societies that are civil’ (Edwards, 2004). This is the role known as 
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the counter-balancing of the state through very strong diverse non-governmental 
institutions. ‘In civil society, the division between polity and the economy consists in 
that polity is useful but it checks extremes of individual interests, whereas when 
economic-based institutions exercise control over the state, the polity relies on 
economic growth, which increases cognitive growth, thus prevents or make 
impossible  the ideological monopoly’ Gellner,1994). Most of these formulations share 
the common definitions of terminology related to the separation of state and the civil 
society, whereas a number of them do not include ordinary religious and economic 
spheres. 
 
1.2.1 The concept and idea of civil society 
The concept of civil society, along its perspectives of development, was defined by 
great Enlightenment figures, from French, German and Scottish decent, who shared 
the analyses of the key civil society issues, which is the link between the public and 
private, the social and the individual, and between public concerns and individual 
desires. Driven from this context, the civil society, although governed by the state, is 
autonomous and independent. We focus therefore not on the balance of power 
between civil society and the state, but precisely in the division and independence. 
Within the above, civil society is seen as independent from the state sphere, but 
regulated by the state. The concepts of civil society are balances of power between 
 11 
 
the state and the civil society, but the independence between them, where civil 
society is a platform for independent thinking. 
Consequently, the prevailing normative definition is replaced from the functional 
definition of civil society: "as civil society should be positively defined in the context of 
good ideas and practices in the function of trust and cooperation in social life, and 
not from negative premises as opposition to the state (Shills, 1991). 
 
1.2.2 Civil society and the role of democracy 
Contemporary democracies are a reference point for many problems and challenges, 
and civil society is the only one that through political activism gives citizens a voice, 
more precisely it gives a voice to the citizens who do not feel represented. Citizens 
participate in decision –making and are essential part of democracy.  
In order for citizens to become identified with their political system their participation 
in the system is very critical. This helps in creating and developing positive 
experiences for them. Active participation reduces citizens' dissatisfaction and this is 
how civil society helps to strengthen democracy. 
However, not always the civil society organizations share same mission and goals. In 
fact, often programs and activities of many civil society organizations are in their 
essence undemocratic.  We have seen how a number of them apply illegal, 
irresponsible and often violent actions, this way motivating their members' disruptive 
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behaviors, which are diametrically opposed to the principles based on which 
democracy develops and functions. Referring on objectives of their platforms and 
following that with such irresponsible actions they only contribute to the degradation 
of the democratic processes. 
Many aspects or challenges of democracy are a threat to democratic regimes. Not 
every CSO develops sincere objectives for the democracy in one country. Such an 
attitude towards all civil society organizations would be misleading (Forbrig,2002).  
Compared with contemporary democracies, the life of civil society in communist 
regimes was conditioned by freedom of expression, rarely developed in someone's 
presence, but often in churches or cafes (Brinton, 1990).  The independent civil 
society, in the form of civic activism, was a way of organization of civil society in 
communist regimes. The broad civil society as well as independent civil society 
representatives through different means and forms played an active role in 
overthrowing the communist regime and transition to democracy (Skovajsa, 2008).  
 
1.2.3 Civil society and promotion of democracy 
As mentioned previously, the antonym of conception of positive contribution to good 
civil society in a democracy is a civil society that in the worst case may be a cause for 
undermining democracy in one country. In its best civil society can make important 
contribution to foster democracy, but at worst it may expose serious risks to 
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democracy. Consequently, there are some key functions through which civil society 
contributes to strengthening democracy:  ‘The Lockean Function: Control of State 
Power, The Pluralist Function: Social Integration, The Hegelian Function: Interest 
Mediation the Non-Profit Function: Service Provision and The Tocquevillean Function: 
Political Socialization’ (Forbrig, 2002).  
A look at the democratic functions of civil society according to different authors 
includes: The basic function, in the limitation of state power, is accomplished by two 
attempts or interrelated roles, where: Civil society's obligation  is to constantly 
monitor the abuse of state power, such as fraud and vote corruption, where it plays 
the active role of mobilizing the society in protests where the voice of citizens against 
abductions is raised and this undermines the legitimacy of governments. ‘Another link 
is to monitor the misuse of state power - such as corruption or vote fraud, and at the 
same time to mobilize society to protest, thus it plays a key role in to undermine the 
legitimacy of undemocratic regimes;  The other interrelated role is to supplement the 
role of political parties in order to stimulate political participation.’(Diamond, 1994).  
 
Civil society carries out various functions that serve in the function of the 
maintenance and amalgamation of democracy, in the spirit of fulfilling the primary 
tasks, such as the building of a democratic culture in society, where the foundation of 
this culture is made in the community, family and school. Civil society does this 
through integration of groups and individuals. In a migration flow from remote rural 
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areas to urban areas, people who are looking for better education and employment 
opportunities are constantly changing demographics in their respective countries.  
This has its own negative consequences for some of the individuals, especially when 
talking about children who feel alone in the countries they have migrated. They often 
end up abusing narcotic substances, by suicide or by working for the organized crime 
groups or violent extremist groups with ideological or religious beings. These findings 
are the end of many sociologists. One way to overcome such problems for these 
phenomena is the membership of individuals in trade unions, various professional 
and religious organizations, in order to become an open and comprehensive 
discussion and factual for all public affairs. In this sense, the role of Civil Society is very 
important with its programs and its activism towards targeting these phenomena and 
efforts to find an impact solution in society where it plays the role of the mediator 
between the citizen and the state (Shills, 1991).  
The valuable contribution that civil society brings to the country is the development 
and strengthening of democratic citizenship. Civil society must not stop only on the 
contribution of the voting procedures. Such a citizen does not strengthen the 
foundations of democracy, moreover leaves them unstable. Social cohesion and 
participation are the characteristics of a genuine and sustainable democratic 
statehood, where civil society is the one that prepares new generations, in meetings, 
activities, public discussions, where the art of civic membership is developed and 
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cultivated, and consequently educates generations for the citizenship practices 
(Cohen & Arato, 1995).  
Freedom is a determining premise of the ability of individuals to define membership 
in an organization. The liberated individual is the product of the many loyalties of a 
liberal democratic state and benefiting from engagement in civil society. Organization 
of interests, as a product of spontaneous freedom, is a proper feature of a country 
where 'precisely because of the diversity of interests and attitudes organized freely 
and independently, where the developed civil society is conducive to these processes, 
and not there is dominance by groups of inertia on society, in the group of 
democracies or the rights of individuals and other or public groups. '  (Madison, 1961). 
There are several functions by which the civil society impacts the development of the 
democracy. However, despite the fact that some of these functions are easily 
identifiable, this does not necessarily mean that there is a broad consensus among 
the different scholars regarding the precise definition of the concept of civil society. 
Different scholars see different meanings in the definition of the notion of civil society. 
Their opinions differ when discussing the definition of this notion. It is obvious that in 
most of these discussions the most commonly mentioned issue is that of 
differentiation between the state and civil society and the state, and the notion is 
more observed as a multifaceted concept. In the above context, my study 
concentrates on analyzing the concept through which civil society is seen as 
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autonomous from the state, but its relations with the state and society are regulated 
by a legal acts from the state authorities. That is, the concept of civil society which 
promotes good practices and ideas for the development of democratic processes, by 
being cooperative and trustworthy and as such not seen negatively or opposed to the 
state. 
 
1.3 Media and Democracy 
Media are often identified as the “fourth power” in a democracy. Media play a central 
role in democracy. Media identify problems in democratic societies and serve 
information to the people so they can hold the Government accountable. 
Media exercises influence over us, and that is how public opinion is generated. When 
the environment is polluted, media are the sounding alarm for citizens. If there is no 
information about artistic trends, the culture will degenerate, if there is no information 
democracy will corrupt and business will collapse. Media provides information on 
various social, political, economic and cultural activities happening around us. This 
ensures that citizens make responsible choices and not act as a result of 
misinformation. They serve as ‘watchdogs’ for the governments because they supply 
information based on which voters make their decisions. Civic education is closely 
related to the media as one of its core resources. Citizens through media 
consumption develop their feelings about the development of different national 
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political processes and other global developments. Therefore the media sector 
support is crucial and extremely important for the development of civil society 
(Murphy, 2007).  
It’s impossible to think of a democracy without media. Thomas Jefferson has been an 
extraordinary advocate of the free speech and media. In one of his speeches 
regarding the principles of free expression he emphasized: ‘If it were left for me to 
decide whether we should have a government without newspapers or newspapers 
without a government, I should not hesitate the moment to prefer the latter.’ 
In general, democracy and media coexist through a process of negotiation, aiming to 
develop a consensus for the public interest (Boyd, 1950). 
In post-conflict societies, the role of the media in the above context remains critical. 
There is a tendency for news to become more entertaining than informing. Political 
news has become more about personalities than political programs. Just like in the 
case with voters’ opinion politicians and journalists are equally influenced by the 
media. The media influences the criteria by which voters evaluate political candidates 
and their programs (Murphy, 2007). 
In the restored democracies controls from state authorities are not the only 
challenges for free and independent media. Media operations are also pressured and 
influenced by monopolistic ownership. Media in liberal democracies make the 
political power more 'visible' as they serve as mechanism that is capable to expose 
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important information to the public. However, this media function (known as 
‘watchdog’) has not always been present. 
 
1.3.1 Media as civil society 
Whether media are a business, none commercial or a part of the civic sector, its 
identity represents one of the most important potential stakeholders in the creation 
and functioning of the civil society. The media can serve as an instrument through 
which it is easier to introduce the principles of civil society and put them into action. 
 They help to create the direction of social change. Because of their characteristics, 
media plays an extremely important role for the democratization processes. Media 
can reach a wider audience compared with any other means of communication. This 
can involve the transmission of information from the different political actors to the 
public as well as from the public to the actors. Within this context, media are 
considered to be one of the core pillars of civil society because they act as a 
connection between the civil society and institutions of the state. These messages 
take the form of demands, which society expects the government to convert into 
political decisions. While representatives of civil society use media to place and 
communicate their demands to state authorities, government officials also use the 
media to inform civil society for their decisions related to these demands. Thus, the 
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processing of information that media receives from institutional officials is a major 
component of the democratic process (Easton, 1965). 
 
1.3.2 Characteristics of Kosovo Media and Resulting Problems for Civil Society 
Development 
Despite some improvement in the Western Balkans, the development of independent 
media has been influenced and continues to be affected by the consequences of the 
past deriving mainly from post-armed conflicts and post-communist transition 
challenges. Consequently, the development of media relations with politics and 
businesses remains complex. In this context, media continues to suffer from the 
'protocol journalism ‘and effects of relationships built on clientelist basis (Taylor, 
2009). 
Among other, the poor level of media development in Kosovo determines relations 
between journalists and politics. Current economic and social conditions negatively 
affect the development of media in Kosovo. Most of the time, journalists in Kosovo 
go to editor's offices without new ideas. They only await the assignments given by 
news editors (Andresen, 2009). As a result of this operation, conferences and 
speeches organized by institutions replace relevant topics and potential investigative 
stories. Because protocol events are mostly easy stories news teams are assigned 
more than one stage events per day. Consequently, journalists do not take the 
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initiative to pursue additional sources of information by focusing only on the 
coverage of protocol events (Taylor & Kent, 2007).  
The limited willingness of the Government to give out information and the readiness 
of most of the media to practice protocol journalism puts both the Kosovo 
Government and most of the media in comfortable positions. It means fewer critiques 
for the Government and less complex work for journalists. Under such circumstances, 
it is difficult for even a small number of quality media outlets to play the role they 
theoretically should play in order to support the development of civil society. The 
resulting problem is that the public does not learn about what choices may be 
available, what decisions are made, and so remain politically naïve.  
Apart from political conflicts as a factor affecting the quality of journalism, the 
phenomenon of protocol journalism in Kosovo is mainly a result of the poorly 
developed legislation, economy and socio-cultural aspects (Taylor, 2009). 
The development of civil society is negatively affected by the prevalence of the 
protocol journalism in Kosovo.  Simultaneously this represents an obstacle for the 
creation of public opinion on important issues of the public interest. 
 
1.4 Civil Society and Media in post-communist democratization 
By exercising check on the state with an aim of dispersing power in the society, civil 
society can foster democracy in different ways. There are very few cases when in 
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post-communist societies an active civil society emerged if it had no previous history 
of developing civil society (Miszlevitz, 1999).  
Many authors point out that civil society in South Eastern Europe is underdeveloped 
by referring to it often as an 'illusory civil society'. In most of the cases, the number of 
CSOs is impressive compared to individuals who participate in the activities organized 
from the civil society. CSOs are financially dependent on international donors that 
inevitably impose themes that are more closely related to donor agendas rather than 
to the concerns of the local population. Most CSO activities in these cases are 
organized around topics such as human rights, corruption, etc. These topics are 
mainly initiated by the international donors operating in post-communist states. 
A large number of these CSOs have very little social and political impact as they are 
usually build from one or two people and generally represent what is identified as 
'one-man shows'. Civil society politicization takes on momentum as a significant 
number of civil society representatives get involved in politics after a short period of 
their activities within the civil society (Hann, 1992). The relations between civil society 
and the state directly affect the democratic processes and have therefore attracted 
the attention of many authors and philosophers from the Enlightenment period up to 
the modern contemporary history. Southeast Europe has had a special history in 
terms of transitioning from the communist dictatorship to democracy. An anti-system 
form found applications in these states by dissident leaders because of communist-
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era, such as in the case of Vaclav Havel, Lech Walesa. Characteristic in these post-
communist countries was that these leaders were put in leadership of the state and 
for many authors this marked a victory of democracy. In spite of this, some others 
consider that when civil society and the state come together as in these examples, 
there is a structural disruption of civil society. For this, irrespective of the regimes, 
countries that applied the anti-system model during communism were qualified as 
having an anti-state and anti-constitutional civil society. This was believed to be true 
of civil society in these countries after the fall of communism (Mudde, 2003). While in 
Western Europe, civil society includes voluntary or cultural social organizations in a 
sphere of social autonomy, in post-communist European countries, civil society 
organized in groups offering political alternatives, which were formed to resist the 
state, and which in many cases represent civil society organizations leading the 
opposition to communism in these states, yet they cannot be considered as opposing 
the state itself. Often they play a role in consolidating new democracies, because of 
joining to the state's efforts in this regard. A search of origins and the effects of these 
organizations or civil initiatives in post-communist countries with focus before and 
after communism enable knowing different perspectives of civil society in the present, 
in these countries (Shills, 1991). 
Civic mass media in the democracies in transition are a reflection of the appearances 
and condition of the civil society institutions. A western democratic state in this 
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regard, means a democracy with a diminishing role of the state, and an increasing 
role of the market in the media system. This is not the case with the majority of post-
communist states, where 'public broadcasters' are the successors of 'state media' 
which only officially were resold as the national media of these countries and did not 
allow them to be essentially transformed. With this new name, they continued to be 
controlled by the state. This influence of state institutions in the public broadcaster is 
a typical case where the media in post-communist countries in Eastern and 
Southeastern Europe, with little exceptions, constitute the greatest means of 
manipulating the masses. While these manipulative publicity media are easily and 
directly formally controllable, private broadcasters are controlled indirectly by 
discipline, using levels of competencies, from broadcasting to broadcasting frequency 
allocation (Habermas, 1989). The practice of transforming state broadcasters to a 
public broadcasting service is a practice practiced by Western Balkan countries, just as 
in other post-communist countries in Southeast Europe, where the authorities of 
these countries have influenced this transformation and thus all over the country's 
media development. The struggle to influence the media and the ongoing clashes to 
influence the masses  through public broadcasters have caused ‘media to stay 
between politics and business, caused by undue  influence and pressure but often 
also  due to benefits, thus willingly choosing this place, where they are a stretch of 
politics or an annex of businesses. This situation is directly related to the fight of 
 24 
 
authorities to influence the media, dating back from the transformation of state 
broadcasters to public ones, and which is not a long period, for most of the Western 
Balkan countries’ (Lani, 2009). The change in control methods and the change of 
ownership over the media is often a change that does not contribute to the 
democratization of a country or to a positive transition because it often becomes a 
simulation of change and not in order to change the truth. 
Southeastern and Eastern European countries shared many similar features. If we 
compare the level of state control over the civil society in the East and South Europe, 
the situation is different from country to country. The 'Solidarnost' movement is a 
good example of how civilian resistance managed to address and even advance the 
labor rights for almost a decade before finally outmaneuvering the communist 
regime in Poland. There were dissident groups in both Czechoslovakia and East 
Germany, but not as in the case of Poland. Various social activities undertaken by 
these groups and movements during the 1980s have resulted with alternative political 
and cultural elites (Mudde, 2003). On the other hand, Hungary has had a certain 
degree of the private sector development, while this sector has been inexistent in the 
countries of South-East Europe such as Bulgaria, Romania and Albania. In these 
countries, dictatorial communist regimes have proven to be very aggressive.  ‘If 
viewed from today's perspective Western Balkan societies are disappointed with the 
transition processes that took place in their countries. Their initial optimistic 
 25 
 
expectations were not met as most of their countries have not been transformed 
from dictatorships into democracies. After the fall of the communist regimes they 
became authoritarian regimes’ (Lani, 2009). 
Manipulation with nationalist politics and the communist legacy negatively impacted 
civil societies in the early stages of transitions in most of the Balkans countries. 
Among others, these have been some of the reasons that were posed as serious 
constraints for the development of democratic civil societies. 
Western Balkans has undergone multiple and complex transformations since the 
1990s: ' Many of these fundamental transformations are difficult to explain through a 
single model as the democratization process took place in parallel with other 
processes such as state-building and/or European integration processes.' (Jano, 
2008). 
In general, the development of a civic- based democracy in the Balkans was heavily 
pressured from the histories of nationalism and hatred which impacted negatively the 
processes of transformation. History matters in the Balkans and Kosovo makes no 
exception within this context. 
 
CHAPTER II 
History of Kosovo 
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For generations, Kosovo has been a territory disputed between Serbs and Albanians. 
Much of Kosovo's problem was based on myths. Many books written by local authors 
for the history of Kosovo devoted considerable space to myths. Albanians claim that 
Kosovo is their ancient land and they are descendants of the ancient Illyrians. 'In his 
publications in the 1854s J.G. von Hahn advanced the idea that Albanians are 
descendants from Illyrians' (Wilkes, 1995). Some Balkan historians also believe the 
Albanian people are descendants of the ancient Illyrians, who, like other Balkan 
people, were subdivided into tribes and clans (Stipcevic, 1977).  
Serbian historians argue this theory by saying that Kosovo is their Jerusalem and the 
cradle of Serbia. Before Kosovo was conquered by Serbs in 1913, their power base 
was outside of the territory of Kosovo, where they were settled in the 7th century, so 
the claim that Kosovo is the "cradle" of Serbia is untrue ‘(Malcolm, 2008). 
 
2.1 The Kosovo myth 
Nemanjic’s Serbian Dynasty seized parts of Kosovo in 1180. In the period (1241-1455) 
Kosovo was absorbed into Serbia. After Nemanja's dynasty, two historic battles took 
place that characterized this period.  On June 28, 1389 the first Battle of Kosovo 
occurred,, with a force lead by Serbian commander Tsar Lazar and supported by 
other populations of Balkans against Ottoman Empire. In October 1448 the second 
Battle in the field of Kosovo was fought, this time between a Hungarian force led by 
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John Hunyadi on one side, and on the other side, Ottoman army led by Murad the 
Second (Vasiliev, 1980). 
The First battle is very important. In 1389 the Serbian army was defeated. Tsar Lazar 
was commanding with Serbian army in this battle and Murad I was in charge of 
Ottoman forces, while Milos Obilic in Serbian or Milos Kopilici in Albanian was a 
soldier under the command of Tsar Lazar. In this battle Tsar Lazar was slain and 
Murad I was killed by Milos Obilic. ‘Although Serbs and Albanians consistently 
commemorate the importance of the battle (and in some cases even Bosnians), it is 
only the Serbs that developed their powerful national myth based on the defeat of 
this battle’ ( Magas, 1993). 
The Kosovo battle defeat and military humiliation were used by Serbia to produce a 
so-called “Heavenly Serbia“as their dominant national myth. The concept of ‘Heavenly 
Serbia’ represents a poor copy the Byzantine culture. In the Byzantine culture there 
was a link between the celestial and imperial spheres. 
 ‘In Byzant the local population imagined the Heavenly Kingdom and the God as an 
enlarged replica of the imperial court of the Constantinople. In this aspect, Byzantine 
differs from Serbia because the imperial court was seen as heavenly, while  Serbs 
considered 'heavenly Serbia' everywhere where Serbs lived, as they conferred 
heavenly status to their nation as a whole’ (Anzulovic, 1999).  
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Despite the centuries of foreign culture dominance, the myth influenced the behavior 
of Serbs in their modern history of violent attempts to create a Greater Serbia. 
 
2.1.1 The Albanian National Movement 
After the end of the Russian-Turkish War in 1877-78 and the signing of the Treaty of 
San Stefano, Albanians found themselves in a difficult situation. As a result of this 
Treaty, Bulgaria became autonomous while Serbia, Montengro and Romania gained 
independence by expanding into territories that previously belonged to the Ottoman 
Empire. Albanians were found surrounded by the hegemonic appetites and territorial 
claims of their neighbors like Serbia, Montenegro and Greece. As a response and 
prior to the Congress of Berlin, Albanians established 'The League of Prizren' on June 
10, 1878. 
The Congress of Berlin assembled in June 1878 in the German capital with the 
declared object of revising the Treaty of San Stefano, which had been imposed the 
year before by a pan-Slavist Russian negotiator (Skendi, 1966).  
The ’League of Prizren’ was formed to organize political and military resistance 
towards the Ottoman Empire, Serbia, and Montenegro. For the first time, Albanian 
leadership began to organize its activities on a significant scale. In the beginning, the 
league sent letters to Great Powers opposing the decisions of Congress of Berlin.  
Later they realized that diplomacy would not achieve their goals, and that most of the 
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Albanian territories would be seized by Serbia and Montenegro and that some will 
remain with the Ottoman Empire. As a consequence ‘The League’ organized military 
action not only against Ottoman Empire troops but also against the Serbian and 
Montenegrin armies. ”The national self-determination of Prizren’s League as an idea 
of liberation from the Ottoman Empire was based on the same premises as, for 
example, the American Independence from British Crown….” (Reka, 2003). 
 As a result of the Congress of Berlin decisions, most of the Albanian inhabited 
territories that use to belong to Ottoman Empire were given to Serbia, Montenegro, 
and Greece. Albanians declared independence in 1912. Great powers recognized 
Albania’s independence with today’s borders to be determined later. This was 
achieved because Austria-Hungary was increasingly striving for the independence of 
Albanian regions still under the Ottoman Empire in order to stop the expansion of the 
Slavic states towards the Adriatic cost (Skendi, 1966). 
For the same period of history, Serbian historians and historiography describe 
Albanians as those who lobbied and fought on behalf of the Ottoman Empire aiming 
to maintain the territorial integrity of the Empire. 
 
2.1.2 The Kosovo Myth, Balkan Wars and World War I 
The Myth of the Kosovo battle continued to form the essence and the political 
platform of the Serbian national movement, becoming stronger after 500 years. Just 
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prior to the Balkan Wars, the Kosovo myth was a political poison used by 
irresponsible Serbian chauvinists.  After the Ottoman Empire left the Balkans Serbia 
became a kingdom, and started to re-conquer areas referred to as “ancient lands of 
Serbia”.  'Among other, the Kosovo battle was interpreted as an exclusively Serbian-
Ottoman affair with the justification that in Kosovo settled Albanians as usurpers of 
the Serbian territory. On the basis of the Kosovo myth the Serb-Albanian conflict was 
generated' (Magas, 1993). 
On June 15th in 1914 in Sarajevo, the Habsburg Archduke Franz Ferdinand was 
assisted by a local Bosnian Serb Gavrilo Princip who had been inspired from the 
Serbian stories for Milos Obilić . it is difficult to be denied from any historian that the 
cause for the beginning of the First World War were the Serbian irresponsible 
chauvinists  ‘It was natural that the reaction in most European capitals was to hold the 
Serbian Government in some way responsible for what occurred. It was not difficult to 
characterize Serbia as a peasant Kingdom, an awkward appendage to civilized 
Europe…’ (Robbins, 2002).  
This event also determined the alliances and concrete steps that Great Powers would 
undertake before the start of the war. Serbia had Russia's pledge of support but was 
also aware that Germany would give support to Austria in the case of war. Initially this 
involved four powers and after armed conflicts began the number of countries 
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involved in the conflict increased. During the war the myth of Kosovo still represented 
a powerful force. 
Once the fighting began, more countries were dragged into the conflict. As the 
battles of the World War, I ravaged Europe, the myth of Kosovo continued to be a 
powerful force. 'During the World War I, Sir Seton-Watson organized the celebration 
of the anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo by reading loud the text for the Kosovo 
battle in twelve thousand schools. Watson stated that the battle of Kosovo was 
decisive for the history of Southeast Europe.” (Anzulovic, 1999). 
Even after World War I ended the effect of the myth continued to be prevalent in 
Kosovo, an area experiencing conflicts between Serbs and Albanians.  'Kosovo was 
not legally part of Serbia. It remained conquered from the Serbian Kingdom from 
1912 until 1918 when it was finally incorporated into the Yugoslav state, but not in the 
Serbian state. ‘(Malcolm, 2008). 
Between the two World Wars, the majority of Kosovo’s population was Albanian. 
‘Kosovo Census Data for 1921 show 64 % Albanians and 21.5 % Serbs and 
Montenegrins. Serbia continuously drafted programs and organized concrete actions 
for the colonization of Kosovo during 1918-1941. Some Albanians resisted and 
thousands left for Turkey between two World Wars.’ (Mertus, 1999). After the invasion 
of Yugoslavia from Germany, under the command of Marshall Tito (Josip Broz Tito) a 
Croat and the head of the Communist Party the partisans led the resistance towards 
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German troops between the years of 1941-1944. The Yugoslav partisans (mainly 
Serbs) had their troops in Kosovo and parallel with their military actions against 
Albanian civil population in Drenica (central Kosovo) they organized a meeting with 
few Albanian loyalists and annexed Kosovo to Serbia, respectively to Yugoslavia. 
Albania’s Communist leader Enver Hoxha did not raise Kosovo’s status because he 
needed Yugoslav support to establish himself in power of Albania’s new communist 
regime (Fevziu, Elsie & Nishku, 2017). 31 Kosovo was not granted autonomy by the 
Yugoslav Constitution of 1946. 
Some concessions arrived later for Albanians in Kosovo. Kosovo gained autonomy 
with 1974 constitution and became an equal constitutional unit of the Yugoslav 
Federation.     
 
2.2 History falsification, impact of the myths and segregated system of education 
Education is considered as one of the most important means for the development of 
any society. Good education of new generations brings political and economic 
prosperity and stability to every society. Education is the foundation of society and 
being thus it is especially important for developing societies. Integration of myths and 
history falsification through school curriculums has had negatively impacted 
education of new generations in Kosovo. Kosovo's curricula historically were designed 
outside of Kosovo.  
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During WWII, for the first time in their modern history, Albanians in Kosovo were 
allowed to establish schools without being exposed to Serbian influence, although 
not totally independent as they were under the Axis occupation. Kostoviceva finds 
that 'Under the German occupation of Kosovo the Albanian schooling was sanctioned 
for the primary and secondary level, while Serbian language learning was 
compulsory.' 
The struggle between Albanians and Serbs for control of school buildings and 
education in Kosovo came to an end after World War II, once Italian, German and 
Bulgarian troops had left the country and partisans had entered.  At this point, control 
returned to Serbia (Kostovicova, 2005). 
The story of the development of the  Albanian system of education for the population 
in Kosovo includes periods of  gradual and slow gaining of some  rights to education 
that originally followed after the Second World War and which do not mark not 
significant improvements until 1968. The first period where Kosovo was a region 
between 1946 and 1968 [the Yugoslav Constitution of 1946] was a dark period in 
terms of education. Even the period after Kosovo became Autonomous Socialist 
Province, where e Albanians from 'national minorities' were determined to become a 
‘nationality’ having a legal base in the Constitution of the SFRY of 1963, and which 
was a result of the determination of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia 
(PFRY) to become the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), did not bring 
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much quality for the life’s of Albanians. Repression and discrimination were a constant 
state of affairs for almost all aspects of public life for Albanians living in Kosovo. In 
addition to the constitutional changes, the 1968 Kosovo Albanian student 
demonstrations brought about a more positive move toward addressing the 
perspective of Albanian majority population in Kosovo. Some progress was made in 
the mass education of Albanians in socialist Yugoslavia. This in many terms was a 
result of Rankovic's fall. After Rankovic, some kind of control over Kosovo's education 
issues was enabled, supported by legal norms of Serbian legislation. Again this was 
not enough to develop an independent national culture for Albanian intellectuals 
(Lukic, 1996).   
The Communist Party of Kosovo in this period gave priority to education and this 
resulted in a more comprehensible and qualitative progress, with the peak in 1970 
with the “opening of the University of Prishtina, where the teaching was in Albanian 
and Serbian language, and this new open road to Albanians, now in equal position 
with the Serbs in terms of education was utilized well, with a mass education of 
Albanian students "(Kostovicova, 2005). Although in the post-Rankovic period, where 
Albanians gained these rights, the progress in the province could not be considered 
as good enough for a qualitative public life. In this case, the Yugoslav authorities, 
aware of this, tried to make some substantial investments in the province, such as 
establishment of large automated industries, mining and energy, but they were 
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insufficient to reduce unemployed, which still remained high in comparison to other 
SFRY countries (Klemencic, 2004).   
The real change for Albanian education begins with the upgrading of Kosovo's legal 
status, with the new Constitution of the SFRY, in 1974.  With this Constitution, Kosovo 
and Vojvodina, which had so far been a constituent part of Serbia, now were 
established as autonomous provinces, with the rights and obligations of federal units 
of SFRJ. Kosovo and Vojvodina were now allowed to participate in the new collective 
presidency, as the 1974 Constitution guaranteed full equality to republics and 
autonomous provinces. The Yugoslav presidency consisted of the President of 
Yugoslavia, members of six republics and members of the two  autonomous 
provinces. The new status of Kosovo together with that of Vojvodina as a part of the 
Federation, with the Constitution of 1974 meant that both of these two autonomous 
provinces were 'de facto' allowed the status of sovereign republics in almost all 
aspects, except for the right for separation from the Federation, as a difference from 
the six republics which enjoyed this right. "(Mertus, 1999).  
The Kosovar Albanians in the so-called "late Tito period”,   between 1974 and 1980, 
advanced in the development of their national, political and cultural identity within 
the education system, due to a greater space and greater freedom for Albanians in 
this period. One of the main challenges of education during this period was the 
tendency for maintaining the education within Yugoslav ideology, which was a 
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priority of many federal mechanisms and a way of Serbian authorities to fight against 
the idea that Kosovo Albanians have a true independent education system and which 
they pursued by accusing Albanians of irredentist and separatist movements, which 
they managed to do in the schools in Kosovo. By using this as a pretext, the Serbian 
government insisted that Kosovo should give up on the rights guaranteed in the 1974 
Constitution, and this could only be achieved if the government caused barriers at the 
federal level. "The general guidelines for educational policy were subject to a federal 
agreement. However, l the republics and provinces through the 1974 constitutional 
decentralization were in possession of their education policies and were independent 
to establish curricula, network and school structures '(Kostovicova, 2005). The 
breaking point and place were the Serbian authorities begun this war, were precisely 
the schools and universities, where they insisted on exercising legal control over 
them. Much of the political prisoners from Albanians came from schools and 
universities, thus marking the largest number of political prisoners at federal level. 
"Although the public expression of political disagreement in Yugoslavia was pressed 
throughout the state, the number of Albanian political prisoners from Kosovo was the 
largest in number, during the years 1971-1981" (Mertus, 1999). Yugoslav society 
between the 1981 and 1989 turned into an arena of animosisities, following the Tito's 
death. It seemed as if „all of the sudden “different types of expressions found ground, 
from predictions of injustice that will befall those who do it, from those who 
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encouraged the plans of ethno-nationalists, while Belgrade was consistently 
attempting to take power from the six republics (Kostovicova, 2005). 
 
2.3 Abrogation of Kosovo’s autonomy (1989-1999) 
Slobodan Milosevic's plan to abrogate Kosovo's autonomy, as in historical expression 
would be the re-conquering of Kosovo started in 1988. This was the year of 
promotion of Serbian hegemony. The first steps were to launch his campaign against 
Albanians with propaganda that it is the Serbian population who needs to defend 
themselves against the 'Albanian nationalists and separatists’. His calls which were 
feeding animosity between Serbians and their Albanian neighbors were aided with his 
visits to Kosovo, were Milosevic was addressing the masses.   During February and 
March 1989, within four weeks, Milosevic crushed Kosovo's autonomy. Lives of over 
hundred Albanians were taken in violent demonstrations (Sell, 2003). 
Milosevic's tactics were both of legal and political contexts. His statements before the 
communist chiefs of republics were clear that he decided to revoke Kosovo's 
autonomy.  Legally he first had to amend Constitutions of the Provinces, because the 
Constitution of 1974 did not allow that amendments are made related to the status of 
autonomous provinces. When amendments were proposed in the Kosovo assembly, 
majority of Albanians delegates refused to vote for amendments. Still the Serbian 
police had sent special police units who surrounded the Kosovo Assembly and ‘On 
 38 
 
March 23, 1989, under the state of emergency, without a quorum, counting the votes 
of the persons who were not deputies and who were in the hall, the Serb president of 
Kosovo Assembly proclaimed the approval the amendments of the Constitution.’ 
(Bieber & Daskalovski, 2009). 
It is arguable that any legal act that is subject to political pressure, or it is approved 
under threats, by bypassing the will of the people, must be considered void. In this 
spirit, the decision of the Assembly of Serbia of March 28, 1989, was considered void 
by Albanians. In response to the decisions of the Serbian Parliament, they wrote and 
approved the Declaration of Independence of Kosovo on the 2nd of July 1990. The 
Declaration preceded the approval of the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo on 
September 7, 1990. Delegates were allowed by Serbian police to enter the parliament 
building, therefore the Declaration was approved by delegates in front of the Kosovo 
Parliament. '(Bieber, Daskalovski 2003). Following the abrogation of the autonomy 
and installation of Milosevic's regime in Kosovo, life for Albanians became 
unbearable. Consequently, they organized themselves politically within the so-called 
'civil resistance' against the regime of Milosevic.’ (Bieber, Daskalovski 2003). 
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Chapter III 
Civil Society in Kosovo between the 1989- 1999 
 
3.1 Legacies of communism and ethno-nationalism  
Discussions for civil society in Kosovo during the 1980s were weaker in their intensity 
if compared to other republics in Yugoslavia or almost inexistent, if compared with 
republics like Slovenia. The legacies of communism have had a negative impact on 
the development of civil society. In general, in the countries of the South East Europe 
the communist system has isolated individual rights and freedoms by strengthening 
collective obligations for the state. The majority of the countries under the communist 
rule developed little from the tradition of mediation and cooperation between the 
 40 
 
state and the citizens, thus losing the opportunity for the development of an active 
and functional civil society. 
The authoritarianism that was installed throughout the Balkans during the 1990s was a 
direct consequence of nationalism which has influenced the prevalence of the 
intolerant political culture and applications of the government controls in various 
institutions, media and private businesses in order to discipline them. One of these 
examples is the politics of Slobodan Milosevic who, being a nationalist leader used 
the former communist apparatus in order to ensure his absolute political power. 
Milosevic and others who copied him constructed the political life by focusing on 
national questions, rather than on civic ones. Consequently, in such situations any 
kind of interaction outside of this concept has resulted in conflicts and polarizations 
of different natures (Bugajski, 2001). 
Legacies of communism combined with nationalist manipulative policies complicate 
and delay the development of a fluid and diverse civil society. The way how myths 
have influenced directly in shaping human behavior is best illustrated with the case of 
Kosovo. Many authors and political analysts in Kosovo agree that the political collapse 
of ex-Yugoslavia has started with the manifestations organized by Milosevic's regime 
to mark the 600th anniversary of Kosovo battle in 1389. However, even after the 
installation of Milosevic's regime in Kosovo, and after the fall of communism in 
Europe, the beginning of the 1990s marked the entry of the discourse for civil society 
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in Kosovo. The concept of civil society in Kosovo was different compared with that of 
the former communist countries in Europe where the main purpose was to turn down 
the communism and start the process of democratization, because in addition to this, 
civil society in Kosovo lobbied internationally for Kosovo's independence from Serbia 
(Kipred, 2005). 
 
3.1.1 Civil Society from socialism to pluralism 
During the 1980s in Socialist Yugoslavia began discussions of civil society. It was 
evident that through these discussions not only alternatives to the authoritarian 
socialism were intended, but it was implied that to such socialist system the dead end 
was close. Gradually it became clear during the 1970s and 1980s that such a system 
was going to collapse and that the possibilities for its evolution were reduced. 
Yugoslav Socialist ideology failed in its attempts to orient the transition from rural 
society to an urban society because of its logic of the anti-civil models (Golubovic, 
1995). Although discussions about civil society involvement appeared in Yugoslavia 
these were fewer compared to those that took place in some of the Central European 
countries. Intensified discussions on the development of civil society began only after 
the disintegration of Yugoslavia (Ingrao & Emmert, 2013). The first such discussions 
came from Slovenia where the Slovenian intellectuals and publicists sought 
theoretical reaffirmation of civil society. Ideas about the depoliticisation of the public 
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sphere and the introduction of multiparty system that came as a result of these 
discussions, published in various journals, found no support from the other Yugoslav 
centers. They were largely rejected by strong republics like Serbia (Frane, 1987). 
Discussions for civil society in Kosovo during the 1980s were weaker in their intensity 
if compared to other republics in Yugoslavia or almost inexistent if compared with 
republics like Slovenia. 
During the 1990's in Serbia, nationalism became the only alternative to communism. 
However, some of the ideas, such as the establishment of the Association for a 
Yugoslav Democratic Initiative (UJDI), which required the development of a Yugoslav 
pluralistic and democratic system, did not receive wider support. In Kosovo, UJDI 
failed naturally and conceptually as its membership consisted of only a few Serbs and 
hundreds of Albanians. Compared to the UJDI, the Writers Association of Kosovo, by 
the end of the 1980s, became an influential organization for the Kosovo Albanians. 
The Kosovo Writers' Association tended to promote intellectual freedom for 
Albanians throughout Yugoslavia and addressed the violations of the fundamental 
rights that the system did to Albanians in the former Yugoslavia. 
In 1985 the representatives of this association faced accusations of encouraging 
separatism from the Yugoslav Federation. Accusations came after the Association 
presented drafts on Albanian programs, which openly expressed Albanian aspirations. 
After a few years in the office as the head of the Writers Association, Ibrahim Rugova 
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was elected as the president of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), a powerful 
political movement of Albanians that was founded in December 1989. As the leader of 
LDK Rugova became the main voice of Kosovo for the domestic and international 
politics and media (Clark, 2000). Within the Kosovo’s public discourse after the 1989 
many scholars and political analysts in Kosovo agreed that the disintegration of 
Yugoslavia started with the brutal intervention from Serbia and abrogation of 
Kosovo’s autonomy. 
 
 After the abrogation of Kosovo's autonomy, the disintegration of the communist 
party and as a result of the institutional vacuum new initiatives took place. The first 
civil society initiatives date after 1989. However, under the Milosevic’s regime, 
pluralism was impossible. Consequently, civil society organizations founded after 1990 
joined to the efforts of the Albanian political parties within the peaceful civil resistance 
and to the so-called ‘united front’ against the Milosevic’s regime (Kipred, 2005). 
 
3.2 Civil resistance movement in Kosovo 
In the early 1990s, Serbia started to build a system which for many international 
observers was similar to the apartheid in South Africa. Different organizations for the 
human rights protection continually documented the discrimination of Albanians and 
violations of human rights in Kosovo. They reported on persecution of Albanian 
politicians, unexplained cases of the death of Albanian prisoners, on the poisoning of 
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Albanian children in March 1990, about suspicious processes against "separatists," on 
the massive exclusion of Albanians from public institutions and on the unexplained 
cases of the deaths of Albanian recruits in the People's Army of Yugoslavia (Clark, 
2000). 
The regime in Belgrade started to apply restrictions over press freedom, persecution 
of Albanian journalists, expelling ethnic Albanians from public life including the legal 
system, education, and health systems. More and more Albanians were driven to 
misery and many abandoned the country. Particularly disturbing was the news on the 
distribution of weapons to a Serb minority in Kosovo, the powerful presence of the 
People’s Army and the appearance of illegal Serbian armed gangs (Zeri, 2000). 
Faced with this development Albanians step by step drew back to their parallel 
society. In September and October 1989, a group of well known Kosovo writers and 
intellectuals agreed to establish a political party that would articulate political 
demands of Albanians and would become the initiator of pluralism processes in 
Kosovo. The party was named The Democratic League of Kosovo, and the initiative 
came from the writers Xhemail Mustafa, Mehmet Kraja, Jusuf Buxhovi and Ibrahim 
Berisha . After many conversations, they engaged Coordinator of the initiating 
Council, Jusuf Buxhovi, who took over contact with other intellectuals and drafted the 
program and party statute. The Initiative for the Establishment of the Party 
immediately was supported without reservation by Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, Ramiz 
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Kelmendi, Ali Aliu, Ajri Begu and Basri Chapriqi who with their signatures accepted to 
become members of the Initiative Council for the establishment of LDK. The initiating 
Council met from time to time and talked about the future outlines of the party. 
Regardless of the beginning and the time difficulties, it was decided that other 
intellectuals of different profiles would be involved in the further establishment of the 
party (QIK, 1993). 
The initiating Council consisting of eleven (as foreseen by then federal law on citizens' 
associations) met several times during October and November in 1990. Meanwhile, 
from the middle of November and the beginning of December party program as well 
as the statute was written. The day and place of holding the founding assembly of the 
Democratic League of Kosovo were to be set. Circumstances were really tense, but 
after much scrutiny, the date was scheduled - December 23, 1989. The founding 
assembly was decided to be held in the premises of the Association of Kosovo 
Writers, where usually all the social and political booms were developed. The police 
did not announce that it would ban the founding assembly of the Democratic League 
of Kosovo, but did not even consent to it. The situation was therefore tense. It should 
be noted that the then-printed Albanian language newspaper (controlled from the 
regime) did not publish any news for the day and place of the LDK founding 
assembly, even though the initiating council demanded this be done (Zeri, 2000).  
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The President of LDK was elected Ibrahim Rugova. The program of LDK, as the law 
required it was sent to the provincial police and court bodies (to be registered in the 
register of independent associations as there was no federal law for political parties), 
and it was sent to the US Embassy in Belgrade, the Embassy of U.K. in Belgrade, to 
the German Embassy in Belgrade, as well as to the French Embassy in Belgrade. 
Translated into English, the program of LDK was sent to all of the world's largest 
agencies and Tanjug (Forumi Shqiptar, 2015). 
The first statement from LDKs program in 1989 was focused in the imminent right of 
Kosovo and its population to freely express their reorganization and redefinition of 
the relations with the peoples of Yugoslavia, and be able to establish their position 
and interests free and equal with all other peoples of the state. The LDKs program 
basic orientations and values of political action aimed respect and cultivation of 
European, world-wide progressive ideas, values and principles, human 
rights, of the dignity of the individual, of equality, of tolerance and of equality, of 
tolerance and understanding, of the sovereignty of the people, of the juridical state 
and of the judiciary independence, solidarity, resistance to oppression, to violence 
and to the terror of any form. The LDK through this program was committed to 
democracy, which would ensure full legal and political equality of all citizens, 
regardless of national, gender or religious affiliation and for the legal state that 
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respects the constitution and democratic laws adopted by democratic procedures 
that exclude the political and party arbitrariness (QIK, 1993). 
The first Assembly of the Democratic League of Kosovo was held on 5 May 1991 when 
they made it clear their orientations for non-violent and peaceful resistance. Its 
elected President Dr. Rugova held a speech in this assembly and stated: ‘The 
Assembly of the Democratic League of Kosovo after a year and a half managed to 
mobilize people around a political platform, which was born in very difficult times for 
Albanians. For this relatively short time, we managed to release the membership from 
a euphoric state, which was at first present, to the rational articulation of the political 
thought of the Albanians. Regarding the peaceful resistance to which today was 
discussed quite a bit; I can say that this path is our option and a European idea for 
solving problems. It is not possible to disconnect from this road like Serbia did’ (Zeri, 
2000).  
The Milosevic regime's response to the rights of Albanians in Kosovo was the 
constant violence and repression. In such a situation on July 2nd, 1990 Kosovo 
Assembly declares Kosovo through the Constitutional Declaration as the independent 
unit and equal within the Yugoslav Federation of Yugoslavia, and as equal subject to 
other parties in Yugoslavia. In the meantime,   Kosovo’s autonomy was abrogated by 
Milosevic, gained by the Yugoslav Constitution of 1974 but on September 7th, 1990 
Kosovo parliament, which was previously abolished by the Serbian side, at a meeting 
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held secretly from Serbian police in Kaçanik approved a constitution of the Republic 
of Kosovo. In a referendum held from 26 to 30 September 1991 the absolute majority 
of Albanians was declared for independence of Kosovo. And from the elections of 24 
May 1992, the winner was LDK. Ibrahim Rugova its leader (1944-2006), whose father 
and grandfather at the beginning of the year 1945 were killed by the Serbian 
Communists was elected head of state. Rugova initiated the   non-violence 
policy which was supported by the majority of the population. On the occasion of a 
visit to London in the mid-1990s, he declared: “We are experiencing a massive 
humiliation in Kosovo but war is not the only form of battle. We are organized and 
operating as a state. It is easy to get on the road and go to suicide, but the wisdom is 
to escape disaster ". Albanians financially supported by their Diaspora in Western 
Europe and in the US step by step built their parallel structures: Albanian schools, 
hospitals, the media, their tax system, etc. and avoided any contact with Serb 
"patrons" (Gazeta Tema, 2015). 
 
 
3.2.1 Civil Society Organizations between the 1989 and 1990 
In addition to the LDK after the 1990, the so-called "Kosovo Alternative" was founded 
which consisted of different political parties. This period also marks the foundation of 
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many civil society organizations, giving even more sense to the development of civil 
society even though in the circumstances of the Serbian apartheid. 
 
3.2.2 Council for the Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms (CHDRF) 
The CDHRF of Kosovo was not a political grouping, but a council of citizens of 
different social profiles, that mainly concerned with the evidence of violence from 
Serbian police. CDHRF monitored and reported the violation of human rights in 
Kosovo and kept the international and local media informed about the cases of 
human rights violations in Kosovo. 
Later it became a pattern, whenever was an incident of violence from Serbian police 
to Albanian civilians, CDHRC would go to the scene to document the violence. On the 
other hand, LDK branches all over Kosovo began to publish chronicles of repression 
in their daily Kosovo Information Bulletin (KIC). Within a year of the abrogation of 
Kosovo’s autonomy, more than 45.000 Kosovo Albanians lost their jobs. Initially, 
Albanian police were dismissed. More than 3.000 policemen were replaced by Serbs 
and Montenegrins. Albanians were then systematically removed from their positions 
in public media, medical personnel in public hospitals, teachers, and professors from 
public schools and the university and industries of Kosovo. Milosevic’s calculations for 
the economy were secondary as he ran the economy by printing money rather than 
taking care of production and industry (Clark, 2000).  
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3.2.3 The Union of Independent Trade Unions of Kosovo (BSPK) 
The Union of Independent Trade Unions of Kosovo (BSPK) was another association 
that was established under the circumstances of major political tensions in Kosovo. In 
such circumstances, workers' rights were only a few of those rights denied to 
Albanians from the Serbian regime. Therefore, by promoting workers rights the 
priority was to protect the national being. The protection of workers’ rights was fitting 
within the context of the Union's mission, which also aimed to promote the state 
identity of Albanians in Kosovo. Because of the circumstances in which functioned, it 
can be said that the BSPK was a political organization, what can be also noticed from 
the permanent slogan of the union: "Without National Freedom, there is no 
Freedom of Association". The Initiative Council was elected at the 
Albanological Institute of Pristina while BSPK as a trade union  was officially 
established on its First Congress, which was held in the city of Gjakova, Hajrullah 
Gorani was elected Chairman, who is also known as the first chairman of the trade 
unions of Kosovo (Bspk, 2017). 
The chairman of the BSPK Initiative Council, Hajrullah Gorani, presented the report 
titled "Independent Trade Unions in the Terms of Political Pluralism", which states that 
these unions did not happen by chance, but as a result of the political resistance that 
workers are doing towards the Serbian illegal state repression. During the discussions, 
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Hajrullah Gorani was taken by the police. During the last discussion on the second 
day, the police came in and interrupted the Congress for several reasons. There was a 
large number of well-known media and guests who participated in the Congress, 
including at that time well-known lawyer Eva Brentli, who had wished for this 
Congress to have the same successes as ‘Solidarnost’ in Poland. BSPK after 
completing the required documentation filed a request with the Federal Secretariat 
for Judiciary and Administration to register and this request was allowed by Decision 
2 / 3-054 / 4-1991-03 as Union of Independent Trade Unions Kosovo, in the 
Registration List no. 80 at the ordinal number 237. According to the Statute that had 
51 articles, there were 15 branches (Zeri, 2015). 
The BSPK on 3 September 1990 organized a General Strike across the territory of 
Kosovo with the request to return to work all Albanian workers dismissed from work 
contrary to the basic human right to work, remove violent and non-constitutional 
measures applied from Serbian regime in all Kosovo enterprises, suspend violent 
illegal integrations of Kosovar enterprises with those of Serbia and return to 
workplaces for all Albanian cadres. The demands of the then strikers were mainly 
focused on the abolition of violent measures from Belgrade and respect of trade 
union rights in accordance with international conventions. ‘This was a powerful 
manifestation of the unanimous demand of Kosovo workers for the protection of 
trade union interests and an expression of energetic protest against anti-personnel 
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and anti-national politics of Serbia's military and police power and against brutal 
ethnic and social discrimination. The strike was a kind of referendum of workers and 
citizens of Kosovo for freedom and independence’ said the President of BSPK Haxhi 
Arifi in one of the local media (Telegrafi, 2009). 
Although the only Albanian newspaper "Rilindja" was closed and Television of 
Prishtina (TVP) was occupied by the Serbian police, this strike was followed by 
information of the media from other Yugoslav republics, which had reported 
according to their political interests. Immediately after this strike, the dismissal of 
Albanian workers had started. The figure of workers removed from work was over 
100.000. The Serbian Parliament had taken a decision on temporary measures in 
Kosovar enterprises in order to destroy the economy. From 5 July 1990 to 31 
December 1991, there were a total of 336 temporary measures. The application of 
these measures continued until July 1992. During this period, several branches of 
BSPK were active, especially the Education Union, SBASHK, the Police Union, the 
Trade Union of Health and the Trade Union of Metalists (Zeri, 2015). 
 
3.2.4 Social Movements in 1990s 
During the 1990s, solidarity among the Albanians has been one of the processes that 
have strengthened the civil resistance movement. In this context, the blood feud 
among the Albanians began to be addressed massively. The Code of Leke Dukagjini 
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was a common custom law that regulated conflicts as part of the blood feud. This 
code provided strict legal rules by which it granted the right of revenge to certain 
families depending on the nature of the conflicts (Gjecov, 1989).  
In similar situations like above, the family would become a target for revenge on the 
part of the victim’s family. 'Thus, these models of blood feud have been passed on to 
generations, being often present today. All those who did not take revenge, as the 
Code foresaw, have experienced social disgrace' (Mangalakova, 2004). 
In 1990 a massive movement for feud reconciliation began when a group of students 
addressed this concern with Professor Anton Cetta, a board member of CDHRF. The 
year of 1990 was declared a year of Reconciliation, every weekend hence students 
would visit villages seeking out families caught in a blood feud so they could follow 
the lead of Professor Cetta in asking the victim’s family for a pardon, and so absolve 
the guilty. Professor Cetta was urging people to free themselves from this stone on 
their hearts and so free young generations (Bujku, 1990).  
Hundreds of families reconciled. Public reconciliation meetings were attended by 
thousands of enthusiastic Albanians coming from all over Kosovo. Serbian police 
interrupted some of them by arresting or beating participants as they were traveling 
to participate in these meetings of reconciliation. One of the biggest reconciliation 
meetings was held at ‘Verat e Llukes’, in the municipality of Decan on May 1st, 1990, 
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where more than 500.000 people participated and in which there were over 100 
successful reconciliations (Zeri, 1990). 
Thus, various initiatives for the reconciliation of blood feuds grew into massive social 
movements which contributed to positive social changes among the Albanian 
community. Civil resistance movement has also been characterized by other creative 
forms of protests against the Milosevic's regime. "At the time of Serbian police 
curfew, hundreds of thousands of Albanians light candles and knocked in their 
windows, symbolizing that they have the key for resolving the situation, despite the 
state of emergency in Kosovo' (Clark, 2000).  
 
3.2.5 The ‘Mother Teresa Association’  
The elements of non-violence resistance were integrated into the identity of 
Albanians and became part of the culture of the civil peaceful resistance. As stated 
above, solidarity has been one of the most important elements of civil resistance in 
Kosovo. The 'Mother Teresa Association' was one of the CSOs that was formed in the 
1990s and has been a symbol of this solidarity by organizing the healthcare system 
for Kosovo Albanians in private garages and houses after thousands of Albanian 
medical personnel were dismissed from the public hospitals. The Mother Teresa 
Association, besides providing medical services, offered social assistance to poor 
families throughout Kosovo (Khdr, 2008).  
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This association mainly focused on providing assistance to families in need, 
contributing a lot also to health and education through multiple activities. Thousands 
of persons in one way or another were supported by this association during the 
1990’s. In 1990 they were 174,000 people; in 1997 the number reached 389,000, while 
in 1999 it was 721,000 people. Also during this period, this association had opened up 
to 100 outpatient clinics all over Kosovo (Mother Theresa Association, 2015).  
This was a unique organization, which set the principle of solidarity, voluntarism, 
charity, and assistance to the highest level during the years of apartheid by creating 
dozens of branches and hundreds of sub-branches, thousands of activists and 
volunteers in Kosovo.  On the 20th anniversary of the establishment of the first 
Mother Theresa’s maternity in a private house in Prishtina the former chief 
coordinator of the Association and Maternity, Palok Berisha, emphasized the 
willingness of all the health workers who at that time did the utmost to help the 
population. “It brought us together an idea, a motive, a goal, to help the people in 
need and to alleviate the suffering of thousands of people throughout Kosovo when 
the danger of extinction from Serbian regime was real ", said former coordinator 
Berisha. On this occasion, Shaban Sfirca, the homeowner who became a maternity 
worker, thanked the health workers for the work done and residents of "Kodra e 
Trimave" neighborhood who provided protection and support for the health 
personnel and the population (KosovaInfo, 2016). 
 56 
 
 
 
 
3.2.6 Kosovo Media during the 1990s 
The printed media in Kosovo were also operating under the circumstances of 
apartheid. Rilindja newspaper "for the first time appeared on February 12, 1945, in 
Prizren as the first Albanian-language newspaper in the former Yugoslavia. The 
newspaper was printed at the State Printing House in Prizren. From November 29, 
1958, "Rilindja" continued its journey as a daily newspaper in Prishtina. Apart from the 
daily newspaper ‘Rilindja’, Kosovo around 1985 had 17 newspapers and magazines in 
The Albanian language. The most-read magazine for the youth was "Zeri i Rinise", an 
illustrated weekly magazine. There was also a magazine for women (Kosovarja), 
students magazine (Bota e Re), for humor (Thumbi), literary magazine (Jeta e Re) and 
some others. There was even a newspaper for agriculture (Bujku-The Farmer). For 
these magazines and newspapers, there is a lot of praise and criticism. There are 
some simple facts that reveal their status and position. All of these magazines had - a 
director. All crushed in one place, almost all prepared under the same roof, because 
so it was easier for the party to control them (Gazeta Express, 2015).   
‘Rilindja’ (Renaissance) was banned by Serbian police shortly after the abrogation of 
autonomy as the paper refused to give its loyalty to the new Serbian management. 
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On August 7, 1990, large Serbian armed forces entered the editorial office on the fifth 
floor of the Media Palace and told to editors and journalists that the newspaper 
should not be published tomorrow. ‘Workers of "Rilindja" opposed this act to the 
Serbian police and continued with the preparation of the number marking the news 
of the violent entry of Serbian police. Then they went to the printing house to convey 
the process of publishing the newspaper. But even here, at the time when the paper 
is inserted in the rotation with all the chronicles of the day which happened in 
Kosovo, Serbian police came and forcibly stopped publishing the newspaper’ (Zeri, 
2000). 
In response, only after four days, journalists and workers of the “Rilindja’ restored the 
publication of the " Rilindja" with other publishing house names, which were not 
included in the decision of the Government of Serbia to be forbidden or sanctioned 
for publication. After the closure in 1990 “Rilindja’ started to be published one day by 
the name of the magazine" Fjala", then of the magazine " Shkendija", " Zeri i Rinise", 
"Pioneri", to stop one day under the name of the magazine "Bujku-The Farmer", 
another newspaper for agriculture within the journalist-publishing house "Rilindja’. 
These magazines, which in a way became daily "Rilindja", were published until January 
1991, when the daily newspaper "Bujku-The Farmer" was launched. So, it was "Bujku-
The Farmer" one day that ‘came out’ of the fields and entered politics after the 
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"Rilindja" closure. For a short time, "Bujku" became the forbidden ‘Rilindja’. "Bujku-The 
Farmer" with some short breaks was published until the end of 1998 (KohaNet, 2015). 
During the 1990’s it was only well-known publicist Veton Surroi, who managed to 
register his daily newspaper “Koha Ditore’ in Belgrade. Regardless of that fact this was 
another newspaper that suffered Serbian police repression. In the 1990s most of the 
Albanian journalists operated illegally in the view of Serbian police, as they refused to 
seek accreditation from Serbian authorities. Consequently, there were other Albanian 
newspapers operating on the weekly or monthly basis (to be closed and reopened 
periodically) depending on the security circumstances and the risk facing Albanian 
editors with the Serbian police (Zeri, 2000). 
The situation was not better with electronic media. It is important to emphasize that 
"Rilindja" and Radio Television of Prishtina were banned by the same arbitrary 
decision of the Serbian Government that of July 5 1990, three days after the 
promulgation of the Constitutional Declaration of Kosovo by Albanian delegates in 
front of the Assembly's premises, after they were prevented from entering the 
building of the Assembly of Kosovo from the Serbian police forces. Serbian police 
closed Radio Television of Pristina (RTP) and dismissed all Albanian journalists and 
other workers. As a response, the Albanian population started to buy satellite-dishes 
as that was the only way to access on Albania’s public broadcaster TV Albania (TVSH) 
and to find out about happenings concerning the fate of Kosovo from the 
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international media. The only TV station operating in Kosovo was TV Prishtina. Its 
broadcast in Serbian was under the strict control of Milosevic’s regime and contained 
perhaps one or two loyal Albanians as part of their staff. TV Prishtina was a tool of 
Milosevic’s regime, and like TV Belgrade helped serve the bloody dramas of the 
Balkans (Clark, 2000). 
As every other aspect of public life, state media in the 1990s were occupied by the 
regime and served to the policies of repression and genocide. In such circumstances, 
Albanians were forced to develop what later became known as “parallel society” in 
Kosovo.’ 'The way how parallel institutions of Kosovo were established during the 
1990s with the help of civil society representatives, among others, was intended to 
exhibit a political will and the existence of the statehood of Kosovo' (Kipred, 2005).  
 
3.3. Albanian civil resistance and parallel system of education 
After the abolition of Kosovo's autonomy, Milosevic's regime began with the 
application of many violent actions against Albanians. One of the most repressive 
measures was dismissal of all Albanian pupils and educational personnel from the 
public schools. As Albanians refused to accept the Serbian curriculum, the regime by 
using this as a pretext ordered Serbian police forces to stop Albanians from accessing 
schools, thus enabling the development of the teaching process in the schools only 
for the Serbs. "Serbian legislative measures in the education system were 
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implemented by Serbian police forces. They were given the task of gatekeepers of the 
schools in order to make sure that Albanians will be excluded from the education 
system ' (Kostovicova, 2005). 
The isolation of Albanians from public life and the repressive measures taken from 
Serbia towards them became unbearable. Albanians were imposed to find a solution 
in order to continue the education of new generations. Thus, they created a parallel 
system of education which became the main pillar of civil resistance movement in the 
1990's. "The new Albanian-funded system of education did not teach anymore to 
their new generations for the stories of the Yugoslav 'brotherhood and unity' or for 
the Yugoslav heroes and figures' (Schwandner -Sievers & Fischer, 2002). Albanians 
approved new curricula through which they promoted and strengthened even more 
the Albanian national identity. This system was referred as the parallel education 
system of Kosovo. Schools and the University maintained the teaching process in 
private houses and garages. 'In addition to the education of younger generations, this 
system aimed to prove the State of Kosovo. This cause mobilized all Albanians for 
which they showed unprecedented homogeneity' (Kostovicova, 2005) .Before the 
1990, the schools and the university were the places where most Albanians and Serbs 
would most likely meet and mix.  The walls of division were strengthened even more 
between the two communities as Serbia by using violence excluded Albanians from 
the public social life. As a result, two segregated education systems were established, 
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which continues to function as such up today. Funding of the parallel education 
system came from the Albanian families who shared 3% of income for the Kosovo's 
Government in exile in order to maintain the education system. Between 1991 and 
1998 Albanians gave their properties and houses free of charge for the University of 
Prishtina and primary and secondary schools. 
 'During the 1990s Dr. Ibrahim Rugova has been referred by an analyst as 'President 
of the parallel schools of Kosovo' instead of his title 'The President of Republic of 
Kosovo'….'... due to the risk of being arrested from the Serbian regime The 
Government of the Republic of Kosovo proclaimed in 1991 was forced to function in 
exile. In such circumstances it was also impossible for the parliament or the Kosovo 
police to function as institutions of the Republic of Kosovo proclaimed by Albanians' 
(Waller, Drezov & Gökay, 2001). 
Kosovo's parallel institutions were a point of reference for national pride among 
Kosovo Albanians, and this model served to LDK as a testimony to the international 
community for the existence of Albanian statehood in Kosovo. The functioning of two 
parallel systems organized by Albanians, those of education and health, to some 
degree enabled them to develop an independent political life from Serbia. 
 
3.3.1 The Student Movement between the 1997 and 1999 
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Despite the crises and the wars in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s, Western 
Europe was changing rapidly and dramatically. The European Union was created by 
the Maastricht Treaty of 1993. The end of the division of the continent through the 
Cold War and the emergence of a global political economy increased political and economic 
integration into the European Union. On the other side, during this period of time 
compared to Croatia and Bosnia (ongoing wars) the model of the civil resistance led 
from LDK and followed from other political parties and civil society organizations 
remained the only option to resist to Milosevic’s regime in Kosovo. 
However, while LDK continued to spread its offices in different parts of Europe, like 
Switzerland, Germany, Belgium (Brussels), lobbying for the Independence of Kosovo, 
proclaimed in 1991, by the end of 1990s’ disappointed with the international 
community that failed to recognize political fruits of the peaceful and civil resistance, 
many Kosovo Albanians became opponents of the civil resistance model by 
supporting emerging “Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)” (Khdr, 2008). 
Up until 1995-1996, the internationalization of the Kosovo issue is an undeniable merit 
of Ibrahim Rugova and of the political and civil society elites that followed him. After 
the Second Assembly of the LDK was held in 1994, many well-known intellectuals that 
surrounded him largely disappeared from LDK.  He had intellectual depths and 
politicians who surrounded him described him with the gentleness of the 'cotton 
man' and of a special charm that enabled him to create very good relations with 
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foreign diplomats who supported the cause of Kosovo. One can say that due to his 
coordination with other CSO’s and other political parties, Kosovo remained in 
correspondence with the geopolitical frequencies of the West towards the Balkans. 
However, with the end of the wars in Croatia and Bosnia and the failure of Kosovo to 
be included in the Dayton Agreement, under the leadership of Dr. Rugova, Kosovo 
entered a total apathy. During these years, people were killed and tortured 
consistently by Serbian police. In a way, it was a war that was not formally declared. 
After the Dayton agreement, Kosovo was not part of the western diplomatic agenda 
anymore. Kosovo’s society became politically inert as the only political event for the 
Kosovo citizens were press conferences held every Friday where Dr. Rugova sought 
independence for Kosovo (Kastrati, 2017). 
In the midst of this collective depression, President Rugova signed the education 
agreement with Milosevic in Belgrade. The agreement was signed on September 1st, 
1996 with an aim to start the gradual release of the occupied school buildings and the 
return of Albanian students and teachers to schools and universities. 
Though Ibrahim Rugova repeatedly reiterated on Friday press conferences that 
"Kosovo's status should be resolved only through the mediation of the United States 
of America as the only guarantee…", the negotiations to reach this agreement with 
Milosevic were launched through the intermediation and under the auspices of the 
missionary man Monsignor Vicenza Paglia an Italian who led with the Italian NGO "St. 
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Egidio" and was known for maintaining good relations with Milosevic. Ibrahim Rugova 
without consulting with other Albanian political factors and without any monitoring 
from the relevant actors in international politics, agreed to sign the agreement, under 
the mediation of a priest representing a humanitarian association, which as such 
except for moral authority had no mechanism influencing the implementation of the 
signed agreement. The agreement saved Serbia from the new sanctions and 
smoothed out the sanctions that had been previously imposed by the US. Through 
this agreement, Serbia wanted to institutionalize the status quo in Kosovo (Bota e Re, 
1997). 
Serbia’s aim through this agreement was to institutionalize the status quo in Kosovo. 
In these circumstances, another civil society organization known as Students' 
Independent Union of the University of Prishtina (SIUUP) reacted. Student’s Union 
came up with a proposal to organized massive peaceful student protests with an only 
aim: the unconditional release of the university premises and facilities that were kept 
by force from the Serbian regime. Student’s movements as part of the civil society, 
mainly presented through demonstrations in Kosovo, were organized in different 
political periods by revealing the differences in the political and ideological contexts 
of the time and leaving traces in society and politics.  
Initially, the Student’s Union leadership during the spring and summer of 1997 began 
organizing meetings with students, professors and intellectuals by addressing the 
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necessity of taking new political actions (peaceful protests) regarding the demand of 
Albanian students and professors for the unconditional return to university facilities 
and not as it was foreseen in the Rugova –Milosevic agreement (this agreement did 
not include the issue of the occupied premises of the University of Prishtina). After a 
few weeks of meetings with students, local and international media, political parties, 
civil society organizations and foreign diplomats, and after the protesting marches 
organized from Students Union, they lacked only the meeting and support from 
President Rugova. In fact, just a few hours before the protest, well known political 
activists Adem Demaçi who spent 28 years as a political prisoner in Yugoslavia had 
asked Student’s Union leader to postpone the protest because he was afraid that 
people would not support the protest after Rugova's reluctance. Despite all the 
hesitations and rejection by LDK and the Rugova office, the protest was held on 
October 1st in Pristina. It was a massive protest as hundreds of thousands of students 
and other citizens joined. As expected, Serbian police used tear gas, beat it and 
arrested hundreds of students among them the Student’s Union leadership (Dugolli, 
2013). 
The 1st October Student Movement, as it became known in the public, organized two 
other massive protests against the Milosevic’s regime, on 29 October and December 
31st, 1997. 
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By observing the growth and the influence of the Student Movement as a civil society 
organization, the other side of the political process, the LDK, began to engage again 
"Saint Egidio", and renegotiated with Milosevic the issue of the return of the Albanian 
students and professors at the university facilities. This agreement was rejected in 
several meetings by the Student’s Union Presidency, and finally, on behalf of the 
Student Union, it was formally rejected in a meeting organized by the Italian Embassy 
in Belgrade, where the ambassadors of the Contact Group and the representative of 
"Saint Egidio" were present. The agreement was rejected by Students Union because 
it envisaged only the partial return of the Albanian students and professors to 
university faculties. On the other side, it became obvious to students that Milosevic 
regime wanted to buy time through this agreement as Kosovo was entering in a new 
political situation as a consequence of the international pressure (Kastrati, 2017). 
After many protests and activities organized by the students, Students Union became 
more than a civil society organization as it brought back the international attention to 
Kosovo. International media reported on the Student Movement and the political 
status quo over Kosovo that was created between the 1992 and1997 was broken. 
During 1998, Student Union organized their own protests but as well other protests in 
coordination with the political parties and other civil society organizations against the 
Milosevic’s regime. 
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In January, February and March 1998 Students Union leaders met several times with 
President Clinton's special envoy for the former Yugoslavia, Robert Gelbard, with 
Nicholas Hill, First Secretary of the US Embassy in Belgrade, with Wilfried Gruber, 
Germany's Ambassador in Belgrade, with Gerard Favuveau, First Secretary at the 
French Embassy in Belgrade, with Jan Kickert, First Secretary of the Austrian Embassy 
in Belgrade and many other diplomats of the Contact Group accredited in Belgrade 
at that period of time. Western diplomats wanted to be reassured that the peaceful 
character of the protests would continue, and within that function, they arranged for 
the Students Union many visits to Europe and US where they supplied the 
organization with materials about the important historical peaceful movements of the 
world (eg the offices of the Student Union were full of materials for Martin Luther 
King, etc.). ( Bota e re, 1999). 
After the widespread support of the public and of the international diplomacy 
regarding student’s protests and other activities organized from the Students Union, 
they experienced an ad-hominem discourse from the LDK and their offices across the 
field. In the meantime, LDK organized the National and Presidential elections on 
March 22, 1998. Contact Group Representatives recommended elections in order to 
legitimize the political leadership of Albanians over the talks that were planned with 
Serbia. At this stage Student’s Union opposed this idea with the justification that 
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elections were not held throughout Kosovo (in central Kosovo, following the attack on 
Jashari family, the war had already begun). 
Gradually because of the circumstances, the Student Union from a powerful civil 
society organization in 1997 was transformed to some degree into a political 
organization. Consequently, in the weeks and months to come, they had a serious 
impact on political developments in Kosovo. While LDK made another attempt to 
take the situation under control by signing another agreement for education with the 
representatives of the Milosevic’s regime in Pristina on March 23rd, 1998, Students 
Union rejected the agreement. Following the signing of this agreement, the next day, 
March 24, 1998, came the next "gift" from Milosevic when Serbian police forces 
attacked the village of Gllogjan by spreading the frontline throughout Kosovo. 
Student’s Union representative resigned from G-15 (a group founded from Dr. 
Rugova for peace talks with Serbia) because Rugova's proposal came without logo 
and signature, and in that document, the President demanded that the G-15 should 
prepare the platform for the secret talks with Milosevic. Students Union considered 
that there was no need for secret talks. This was unacceptable for the Students Union 
because they considered that Kosovo needed completely transparent talks like those 
of Rambouillet that happened later. All, in the end, Students Union supported peace 
talks of the Rambouillet Conference. When the NATO bombing began, Students 
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Union leadership was dispersed trying to survive the 'Apocalypse' of 1999 (Dugolli, 
2013). 
Student Movement from a civil society organization became a powerful political 
organization between the 1997 and 1999. By organizing protests against the 
Milosevic’s regime they came up with the idea of breaking the political status quo, 
breaking the ice or in other words the type of the ‘union’ that was built under the 
leadership of LDK between the 1992 and 1997. As a result of the fear from Milosevic’s 
regime reactions, this was a type of the ‘union’ for solidarity and unification among 
Albanians so to feel expelled, excluded, and marginalized. To escape from such a kind 
of ‘union’ that led the society to a strict isolation and perhaps to dementia, they 
sought a new type of union. This was the type of the union and solidarity on the basis 
of the ideal for a more active civil resistance towards Serbia. Finding themselves in 
front of the Students Union civil disobedience and active protests against the 
Milosevic’s regime, LDK was before the dilemma: to continue with the intention of 
self-preservation of their political power or to change the course and to sacrifice 
some political power for the benefit of the majority. The issue was to have or to be. 
LDK chosen the option of ‘having’ (meaning having the political power) and the 
Students Union have chosen the option of ‘being’ (meaning to exist). This second 
option found the strength and potential under the conditions of a minimum of 
human existence because people sought to overcome isolation caused from Serbia 
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through this type of the new union in order to resist actively through the protests 
against Serbia’s regime (Kastrati, 2017). 
The 1997-1999 Student Movement pushed Kosovo out of political stagnation and 
apathy. They broke the myth of the invincibility of Serbia in Kosovo. As a civil society 
organization, they provoked debate in society. In a later stage as a result of powerful 
students protests, Kosovo was back to the political agenda of the West.  Once again 
Kosovo became part of the geopolitics of the West from which it was forgotten for 
several years. In the political context and of the logic of events and not in terms of 
any mere mechanical link, Student Union became a bridge between the Civil 
Resistance led by Dr. Rugova and the emerging KLA.  
 
3.4 Civil or Political Society and the end of the war of 1998-1999 
In early 1998, a "Contact Group on Kosovo" consisting of representatives from United 
States, United Kingdom, Germany, France and Russia, unified the joint  United States 
and Western Europe stand towards the Kosovo issue. 
After March bloodshed in Kosovo Albanian inhabited villages, Madeline Albright then 
the Secretary of State, addressing the Contact Group openly accused Milosevic of 
violence. In October of the same year, NATO was ready to launch air strikes if 
Milosevic would not meet the UN Security Council demands, which Milosevic 
managed to avoid by agreeing to allow UN observers in Kosovo and to withdraw the 
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military forces from Kosovo, allow 1800 UN observers into Kosovo, and over flights by 
NATO planes, however, he conditioned them with the lifting of the air strike 
authorization. In mid-February, a conference to negotiate an end to the conflict was 
held at Rambouillet in France, under the supervision of the Western allies, and with 
the participation of parties in conflict: Serbia and representatives of Kosovo 
Albanians-both military and political leadership. The conference ended up with an 
agreement that on one side required Milosevic to withdraw military and police forces 
from Kosovo, and for the KLA to start the process of complete demilitarization, and 
NATO forces to be sent to the ground in order to enforce the agreement (Zeri, 2000). 
The Rambouillet agreement was signed by the Albanian delegation and was rejected 
from the Serbian side. Although the NATO bombing had the purpose to stop ethnic 
cleansing and the massive killings of the Kosovo Albanians when the  bombing 
started Milosevic ordered even more severe attacks targeted towards KLA and 
Kosovo Albanian civilians. Serbia was bombed for 73 days. Its infrastructure and 
economy suffered a great loss and this finally made Serbia yield to a new agreement, 
on 5 June 1999, between NATO and Serbia. Among other, the agreement provided 
an international armed presence through the NATO troops participation under a UN 
resolution. ‘This was the end of war and beginning of the international interim 
presence with an aim to provide substantial self-government for Kosovo’ (Nato, 1999). 
 72 
 
The aftermath of the political processes such as the Rambouillet negotiation process 
was the birth of new political wing emerging from KLA troops represented at the 
Rambouillet Conference. LDK image was damaged during the war. Mr. Hashim Thaqi, 
the Political Director at the KLA headquarters took the lead of the process as the 
Head of the Albanian delegation in Rambouillet. After the KLA demilitarization, Mr. 
Thaci founded his political party Partia Demokratike e Kosoves (PDK) and his political 
rival was Mr. Rugova from LDK. In the years to come, the two parties competed in the 
local and national elections organized from OSCE and UNMIK, until later in 2002, 
when a third political party was found from another KLA commander Mr. Ramush 
Haradinaj although not as powerful as the other two.  
If compared to societies with other countries from the communist bloc, the civil 
society in Kosovo has had a different trajectory of its development. In most of the 
societies that belonged to the communist bloc, the transition from the one-party 
system to democratic and plural system, among other, was made possible because of 
the valuable contribution of their civil societies, whereas in Kosovo the distinction 
between political and civil society was minimal. The reasons behind it has a logic 
because civil society representatives in most of their actions and activities have joined 
to the same political front with Albanian political parties in order to resist to the tense 
political situation that was caused as a result of the brutal intervention of Serbia in 
Kosovo. Even though they operated under the umbrella of civil society, most of the 
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CSOs before the war were highly politicized by consistently supporting the efforts of 
the Albanian majority for independence from Serbia (Sterland, 2006). 
It is thus clear that the civil society in Kosovo had a different path of development 
compared with the post-communist societies because it took form in conjunction 
with the civil non-violent resistance in Kosovo. 
In the circumstances of such political pressure coming from Milosevic's regime, 
Albanians chose peaceful and non-violent civil resistance. This kind of the political 
determination and organization of Albanians came due to important reasons. Living 
in a ghetto and experiencing an unprecedented public isolation caused from Serbian 
regime, the civil movement served to the Albanian community to fill some of their 
basic educational and medical needs. On the other hand, by identifying all of the 
political activity as peaceful and non-violent, Albanians attempted to avoid brutal 
intervention of the Serbian police although this was often impossible. Third reason 
behind it is that they were not ready to provoke an armed conflict with the regime 
therefore by organizing civil non-violent movement they also demanded to exhort 
the attention of the international community for humanitarian and political support. 
Civil resistance during the 1990's that was led by LDK represents first phase of the civil 
society development in Kosovo. 
 'The peaceful endeavor of Kosovo Albanians to avoid an unequal war that would 
inevitably lead to the tragedy resulted in cooperation of both urban intelligentsia and 
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village patriarchs during the 1990s and thus became the modern Albanian identity ' 
(Clark, 2000). 
As a result of the NATO intervention and the rapid change of the political 
circumstances in Kosovo, the second phase of development of the civil society began 
after the war of 1999. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER IV 
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NGO sector under the international administration and in the Independent Kosovo 
 
4.1 The raise of NGO sector after the war of 1999     
 
After the end of the NATO bombing in 1999, security and political circumstances 
radically changed in Kosovo. In the aftermath of the conflict Kosovo entered a period 
of international administration that was followed by numerous contradictions mainly 
related to Kosovo's final status and treatment of the Serbian minority. Consequently, 
Kosovo's society became a laboratory for the international community where different 
formulas peace-building and reconciliation were proposed and experimented. 
In the first months after the Kosovo war ended, there was a lack of institutions and 
among others Kosovo was going through a public chaos. Once the Serbian police 
and military forces withdrew in 1999 international community faced a severe 
humanitarian situation in Kosovo. Leading international organizations, like NATO and 
UNHCR that actively dealt with the conflict were the same involved in managing the 
very first days of the post-conflict situation. The end of the war in 1999 found Kosovo 
with the heavy presence of NATO military forces and the beginning of the process of 
establishing the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).  
As a result of ethnic cleansing during the war of 1998-1999 over 700,000 Albanians 
were expelled from Kosovo and 12,000 people were killed. During the war, thousands 
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disappeared, and despite the local and international commitments, the fate of a large 
number of missing persons is still unknown today. In 1999 most of the people of 
Kosovo were refugees expelled either outside or within Kosovo’s territory. Kosovo 
Albanians were displaced in Albania, Macedonia, and Montenegro, in the United 
States, throughout Europe and in many other countries in the different continents of 
the world. After the war of 1998-1999 Kosovo was almost completely destroyed in 
terms of infrastructure, there were thousands of completely devastated houses, 
schools, and many destroyed towns and villages (KMLDNJ, 2017). 
NATO bombings forced Milosevic to accept the conditions of peace by withdrawing 
his troops from Kosovo and accepting the United Nations Security Council Resolution 
1244, adopted on 10 June 1999, which authorized both civil and military international 
presence in Kosovo. The Security Council decided and called on all sides to seek 
solutions to the Kosovo crisis within 1244 resolution. While the Secretary-General 
appointed the UN Special Representative to implement the international presence in 
Kosovo. 
The Council mandated the political role of UNMIK to organize and establish 
institutions of the self-government in Kosovo, while on the other hand called on all 
international organizations to assist with their presence for the economic and social 
reconstruction of Kosovo. 
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Among other important authorizations mandated to UNMIK from the Council was to 
gradually prepare the process for defining Kosovo's final status. . Based on the 
Resolution the Rambouillet Agreement signed by Kosovo delegation and refused 
from the Serbian delegation, should be taken in consideration when future status 
talks will take place (Security Council Press Release, 1999).  
Based on the Resolution 1244 The Kosovo Force (KFOR) was established in Kosovo 
since June 1999. The operation mandate comes from the United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1244. KFOR’s original objectives after the war of 1998-1999to 
establish a secure environment, supervise the process of the demilitarization of the 
Kosovo Liberation Army and coordinate with the UN and other international presence 
in Kosovo. Once the UNMIK was established, some of these roles were given to the 
UNMIK structures (Nato, 2017). 
With deployment of UNMIK in June 1999, the United Nations took on a governing 
role over Kosovo. The UNMIK Regulation 1999/1 on Authorizations of the Interim 
Administration in Kosovo established that:  That UNMIK should have all the powers in 
Kosovo, starting with the legislative and executive powers (including the judiciary 
system) and all powers should be exercised from the UN Special Representative. As 
far as legal infrastructure is concerned, it was decided that laws before the NATO 
intervention (before March 24, 1999) should be in force as long as they are not in 
conflict with UNMIK regulations or mandate only UNMIK will be authorized and have 
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the legal power to issue regulations and other legal acts in Kosovo and the same 
legal acts will remain in force except in cases when replaced by UNMIK authorities or 
by institutions deriving from the political agreements as defined in the 1244 
Resolution. With the approval of Resolution 1244 by the Security Council the 
regulation came into force, on 10 June 1999 (Unmik, 2017). 
This regulation entered into force on 10 June 1999, the date of adoption of Security 
Council Resolution 1244 (1999) of the United Nations. 
Starting from the definition and categorization of UNMIK's nature through the 
Security Council resolution and the above regulation, it is hard to find a unique 
agreement among scholars as to what UNMIK’s mandate represents within the 
international relations. Some scholars view UNMIK’s mandate as a "normal UN 
peacekeeping mission" while others as a “Peace Implementation Operation" or as a 
"moderate model of guardianship system of the UN” However, by demonstrating the 
exercise of a much wider scale of authority and of the power compared to any 
previous UN peacekeeping missions, UNMIK became one of the most major structure 
of UN in the area of the international administration (Reka, 2003). 
Within the above context, the interpretation of the mandate of UNMIK in Kosovo 
based on the UN 1244 Security Council Resolution can be viewed between the legal 
and political perspectives. The resolution has been designed and implemented being 
strongly influenced by principles of the legal and political aspects of the international 
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law and international relations. While it is clear that Resolution 1244 constitutes the 
legal and political basis for establishing UNMIK in Kosovo, then the question arises as 
to what is the legal base of the Resolution 1244? Legally, the resolution has been 
adopted within the framework of Chapter VII of the UN Charter but adopting the 
resolution to establish UNMIK in Kosovo has been preceded by a long and extremely 
complex process, dominated by principles of the international politics. In other words, 
the creation of UNMIK has been preceded by an international humanitarian 
intervention executed by NATO, while the humanitarian intervention has been 
preceded by another political process, the Conference of Rambouillet. Consequently, 
during the drafting of the Resolution 1244 both legal and political dimensions has 
been considered (Stavileci, 2000).  
UNMIK's activity and the immediate management of the post-conflict situation in 
Kosovo was a very complex process. UNMIK’s mandate was represented through its 
governing component that has been achieved by exercising his executive, legislative 
and judicial authority. This implies that the immediate activity of UNMIK after the war 
in 1999 refers to the tasks it had to decide while consolidating its authority and 
establishing its own management structures. In the beginning, UNMIK had to 
establish its logistical infrastructure in order to start managing the post-conflict 
situation effectively, which among other activities implied the provision of social 
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services and other services regarding the consolidation of the rule of law and public 
order (Zeri, 2000). 
Once a more or less secure environment and a sort of public order were created we 
saw the gradual beginning of the establishment of the international civil presence. In 
these circumstances, UNMIK started the implementation of the first phase, 
respectively, the placement and the consolidation of the authority of UNMIK and the 
creation of structures managed by it. In the meantime, UNMIK started with the   
consolidation of rule of law and simultaneously with programs related to social 
services. 
 In the implementation of this phase, UNMIK has exercised full governing authority. 
UNMIK in post-war Kosovo (the emergency phase) exercised its primary authority 
governed by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG). The 
international military and civilian structures had a very intensive coordination in order 
to serve to their common objectives, while UNMIK was also supported by various 
international organizations and agencies. One aspect that refers to UNMIK's 
specificity is the extent of collaborative dimensions with other international 
organizations and mechanisms in Kosovo.  In this context, UNMIK can be considered 
to have served as a precedent for other UN missions, because for the first time in 
peacekeeping history, four organizations cooperated within an UN-led operation. 
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Kosovo was administered by the UN, and sub-administered by the EU, OSCE, and 
UNHCR, and protected by NATO (Reka, 2003). 
Among other objectives within its mandate deriving from the resolution 1244 to 
establish the civil administration, the rule of law, reconstruction; repatriation, building 
democratic institutions of self-government, etc, UNMIK undertook another important 
duty, that of developing a functional civil society in Kosovo. The process of building a 
new democracy required the creation of a legal base and the issuance of specific 
legal acts that would enable the development of civil society by treating it as one of 
the main factors that would impact the development of democracy in Kosovo. "Unmik 
and other representatives of the international community saw civil society as one of 
the main contributors for the development policies  believing that a diverse civil 
society will be the pre-condition for the development of a pluralist democracy in 
Kosovo" (Kipred, 2005). 
At this stage the role of the international community was of an extraordinary 
importance for initiating and starting the development of the civil society in Kosovo. 
Many international organizations established a wide access and network between 
them and local NGOs in Kosovo. 'Strong international organizations and NGOs 
started their activities related to different public spheres in Kosovo. Most of them 
formed local NGOs acting as partners in the search for donations for their specific 
projects. Since this was the case, many of these local NGOs were influenced by the 
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orientation and aims of the international organizations that created them '(Kosovo 
2.0, 2017). 
Under the international administration after the war of 1999, Kosovo can be identified 
as one of those societies (it was not a state) across the developing world 
characterized by poor governance. The difficulties of promoting long-term structural 
change because of a decade under the Milosevic’s regime have led to the recognition 
of the role of CSOs within the good governance agenda promoted after 1999 by 
UNMIK. This chapter will focus mainly on NGO sector, which in contrast to the civil 
society as a broader concept is a more descriptive and recent term into political 
discourse. The term as such was introduced mainly thanks to the developmental 
policies, which underline how important the independent local organizations are for 
the development of the pluralist democracy and the development policies 
The debate about the nature of 'nongovernmental organizations' (NGOs) has been in 
progress as the civil society is discussed through a variety of terms like: 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), voluntary associations, religious associations, 
the nonprofit sector and charitable organizations. As elaborated earlier, the term 
NGO is very broad, because apart from those involved with their activities in public 
policies, development policies or democratic change NGOs are considered also other 
groups that deal with music or sport activities. In spite of the differing differences in 
defining the term NGO, in general, it is accepted that NGOs are civil society 
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organizations but at the same time it cannot be said that all civil society organizations 
are NGOs (Cleary, 1997).    
NGOs serve as a facilitator of citizen’s participation and have several functions in the 
society. They work towards development aiming to bring a positive change in the 
society by promoting pluralism and diversity to strengthening cultural, ethnic, 
religious, and other identities. In general wherever they operate worldwide, NGOs 
carry out various activities and services that, amongst other things, target human 
wellbeing. 
 Through the implementation of various activities, NGOs positively influence the 
building of trust between people and communities by pushing them to work together 
for common goals, thus increasing the social capital. As such, NGOs operating on 
behalf of civil society become very important subjects that affect the public decision-
making of state institutions by exercising pressure for certain public issues on behalf 
of various groups of society towards the government. In general, NGOs address 
complex issues and needs for society, thus contributing to the development of civil 
society as a whole (Pellumbi, 1992). 
NGOs facilitate the 'bottom-up' communication serving as 'messengers' in the midst 
of people and government representatives. They are perceived to be able to do 
something that national governments cannot or will not do. However, they are not 
only important players in the democratic set-up, but they also contribute to 
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advancing science, promoting art and culture, protecting the environment and 
supporting all activities in order to make a vibrant civil society, The nature of the 
activities and the way in which the NGOs operate consistently motivate citizens to act 
independently from the centralized state institutions by also creating flexible service 
alternatives (Salamon, 1993). 
Scholars emphasize in continuity the role and the power of NGOs to influence 
individual behavior and the institutions that are responsible for the public decision-
making processes. Very often over the last decades, NGOs emerge as irreplaceable 
supporters for citizens, especially in those areas where the state is weaker and fails to 
offer adequate development policies for society. 
 Depending on their functional areas and their organizational features, NGOs have 
been defined based on their legal status, economic and/or financial considerations 
ranging from local to international NGOs, community-based associations to those of 
an informal nature. 
 NGOs impact not only at local levels; they also influence a sustainable development 
of various policies at the international level while they act both as international actors 
as well as shapers of national policies (Hulme, 2012). 
In keeping with the above context, in the sections below only the interaction between 
the NGO sector and the institutions of Kosovo will be analyzed, by leaving more 
space for other civil society representatives and CSOs in chapter five. This is because 
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the investment of international donors was focused mainly on NGOs and this notion 
in Kosovo became almost replaceable with the term civil society. 
After the war in Kosovo, NGOs were considered one of the most influential factors in 
formulating the development strategies. 
Even though civil society in Kosovo played some role during the apartheid in the 
1990s, the development of the modern civil society concept began after 1999. 
International development organizations placed great interest in activities and joint 
projects with local NGOs with an aim to increase what is called the participatory 
development. These international organizations established local NGOs, funded 
projects, and recruited local staff to implement their projects. UNMIK was forced to 
issue regulations that would regulate the scope of a large number of international 
organizations that came to post-conflict Kosovo. Consequently, in the period after the 
1999 international community gave high priority to the development of the local 
NGOs. 'Immediately after the end of the war, various projects for reconstruction and 
humanitarian assistance were directly influenced by the large number of international 
organizations and NGOs that came in Kosovo' (USAID, 2008). 
NGO sector as essential part of the civil society in Kosovo has received the most 
support and funds from the international donors after the war. The after-war new 
reality in Kosovo represented the so-called 'easy funds phase' as a result of the large 
international presence. For UNMIK and the international administration and later for 
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some political parties and local institutions, the NGO sector had a special role to play 
in influencing their political agendas. As stated above, Kosovo was largely affected by 
the mass arrival of the international organizations in order to provide humanitarian 
aid and reconciliation after 1999. 
From the local perspective, this situation created favorable conditions for the growth 
and development of local NGOs that have mainly implemented projects in 
reconstruction but also in the field of human rights with the focus on multi-ethnic 
reconciliation. 
The INGO ‘boom’ as it was often referred because of the rapidity with which INGOs 
have appeared after the war in Kosovo, impacted the massive development of the 
NGO sector.  These were all types of NGO’s for various purposes, from those dealing 
with the rule of law projects, socio-economic reforms, human rights and protection of 
minority rights, environment pollution, training programs for local businesses, 
educational programs, media trainings, to those NGO’s dealing with refugees, 
religions, agriculture programs, handicapped people, medical trainings and what not 
(USAID, 2004).  
Most of these types of NGO’s did not exist before the war. In the post-conflict phase 
of the NGO development around 500 international donors operated in Kosovo. 
After 1999, millions of dollars of humanitarian aid that came to Kosovo, created 
thousands of non-governmental organizations. NGOs often consisted only of a PC, its 
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owner, and his bank account. 'The number of NGOs that operated in Kosovo 
between 1989 and 1998 was less than 100, whereas four years after the war in 2004, 
2300 NGOs and local organizations were registered with the UNMIK authorities.' 
(Kipred, 2005). 
The rapid development of the NGO sector it is not only a result of the radical change 
of the circumstances in post-war Kosovo. Although under the Serbian apartheid, 
some of the independent organizations of that time experienced "some kind of 
pluralism" even though they followed the political course of the Albanian national civil 
resistance. In this context, it cannot be said that those organizations representing 
what was called civil society in Kosovo have been totally inexperienced with the 
concept of pluralism (Clark, 2000). 
However, most of the pre-war CSOs as in every other ex-Yugoslav context were 
linked to nationalism. As we have seen in the previous chapter, because of pre-war 
circumstances, independent organizations representing civil society in Kosovo were 
intimately linked to nationalism. 'Civil society has undergone a fundamental 
transformation as a result of internationalization of the Kosovo problem, especially in 
post-conflict circumstances. Afterwards, civil society organizations quickly realized 
that pre-war complaints articulated on ethnic grounds and in historical facts had no 
support from the West. Consequently, they began to think about a reinterpretation of 
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Kosovo society's needs based on the concepts of human rights, democracy and the 
humanitarian concerns' (Strazzari & Selenica, 2013). 
NGOs established after the war developed under the heavy interaction and influence 
of the international organizations. As a result, most of the international donations 
targeted those NGOs that focused on the reconciliation of the communities. This 
approach by international donors led to the so-called "top-down" concept where 
local NGOs would implement the agenda of international organizations. The public 
started to see the partnership between these local and international NGOs with 
skepticism because they thought they were more driven by financial motivations than 
about addressing local concerns (USAID, 2008). 
Because of the new socio-political context, most of the civil society organizations that 
were functional before the war were forced to adapt to new reality by going through 
a reconfiguration process and simultaneously expanding within the new context. 
Many professionals who had worked and contributed within the concept of civil 
resistance before the war in their capacity as leaders of the independent 
organizations, teachers, professors or heath care personnel found themselves 
integrated into new civil society structures that were international and local 
organizations, established new NGOs after the war and some of them joined the 
newly founded political parties in Kosovo. 
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Both CDHRF and ‘Mother Theresa’, two of the biggest organizations before the war 
had to come out of the pre-war underground concept and redesign their activities to 
conform to the new circumstances. CDHRF expanded its activities and apart from 
lobbying and defending human and minority rights, their expertise was used as input 
for the new Kosovo’s human rights legislation (Khdr, 2008). 
Before the war, those independent organizations representing the civil society were 
always identified with civil resistance movement, whereas in post-war circumstances 
and because of the need for building a new political system they rapid 
transformation. This process was therefore not easy because it radically shifted CSOs 
focus from the activities of civil resistance to politics of peace-building and 
developing democracy (Kipred, 2005). In the post-war environment, the NGO sector 
was forced to adapt to the political language articulated by UNMIK with projects 
related to reconciliation, peace-building and reconstruction. 
Most of the funding from international donors was dedicated to projects related to 
the above topics. New socio-political reality after the war of 1998-199 enabled to 
many of the international organizations and NGOs to foster cooperation and 
partnership with local partners by developing Kosovo-based NGOs. 
 Involvement of the international donor organizations in building and developing 
local civil society capacities was very dynamic in all aspects. 
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 By creating their own ‘parallel society’ during the 1990s Albanians responded to the 
Serbian regime and the spirit of the civil society survived. After the war, this 
represented an advantage for the international community but the question is 
whether the international community has made use of this asset (Sterland, 2006).  
When they understood UNMIK and foreign donor’s agendas, most of the local NGOs 
organized meaningless conferences, roundtables and sometimes trainings on topics 
that were mainly related to the problem of reconciliation between Serbs and 
Albanians. The focus was mainly on the benefits of donations rather than the 
realization of project goals (Khdr, 2008). These NGO’s would apply to get funds to 
implement different projects of a multi-ethnic character where they would invite few 
Serbs and Albanians (irrelevant numbers) to participate because the majority of them 
would refuse to cooperate between themselves, as war memories were very fresh. 
They would implement these projects just to show “the success” to the donors and 
sent the message to the public that ‘coexistence and tolerance among two 
communities are possible. These would be any kind of projects from establishing a 
small farm where one Serb and 5 Albanians would participate, other projects where 
2-3 Serbs and 5-6 Albanians would work together in reconstructing a bridge in a 
village, and projects that will invite a couple of Serbs and Albanians to attend for 
example a training how to establish a small business,  or other projects where few 
Albanians and Serbs will be invited to receive some funds for their NGO’s in order to 
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establish a multiethnic radio station or even workshops with participants from both 
communities on how to save water in order to avoid water restrictions. Different 
international donors would also sponsor visits of a group of young Albanians and 
Serbs to see Brussels, other places in U.S and Europe and attend conferences with the 
themes for the development of the multiethnic societies of U.S and Europe. Usually, 
by the end of the day participants of similar conferences will get tired of lectures and 
speeches and go to sleep on separate floors and rooms. In their fancy hotels paid by 
international funds, they could have some drinks and sing to their Serb and Albanian 
national heroes before they get back next morning in the same conferences to hear 
stories for the functional multiethnic societies of Europe and U.S. (Zeri, 2000). 
In a word, all types of NGO’s and associations would do any kind of projects of any 
kind of nature if the grant was given to them by international donors or from UNMIK 
and as long as they would apply for a project of a ‘multiethnic character’ that would 
promote reconciliation, chances to get the grant would be bigger.  
As previously underlined in this sector, the activity of the majority of local NGOs was 
followed with a public skepticism as the impression was that most of their projects did 
not address the authentic needs of the Kosovo’s society but of the international 
donors. Consequently, most of these NGOs were relevant in their capacity as civil 
society representatives only when UNMIK or any other international donor needed to 
implement their short-term projects (Kipred, 2005).  
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Immediately after the war, precisely in 2000, the Interim Administrative Council (IAC) 
was established. The IAC was led by the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General (SRSG).'The IAC consisted of three main political representatives of Kosovo 
and three leaders of the main pillars of UNMIK'.  
In addition, IAC also had a representative of the Serbian minority with the right to 
vote, while the civil society had a representative with the status of a observer. The 
head of the pillar I (UNHCR) would have observer status, as well as a representative of 
Kosovo civil society’. One of the initial steps of UNMIK administration was to attract as 
many NGOs as possible for close cooperation with its administration in order to give 
to those NGO’s grants to promote projects of reconciliation (like the ones that were 
described above). Civil society representatives were also appointed within the UNMIK 
administrative structures, although compared to three political leaders they had less 
impact in policy-making (Brand, 2003).  
4.1.1 NGO sector: From Relief to Development 
As underlined in the previous section immediately after the war in 1999-2000 the 
international community in Kosovo provided a great support to civil society focusing 
mainly in the NGO sector. This was identified as the ‘emergency phase’.  
 In order to fulfill its mandate regarding the executive and legislative powers, UNMIK 
shortly after its deployment in Kosovo faced with a complex political and legal 
environment. The process of reconstruction and as well as  the democratization of the 
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society, which had been dominated by one discriminatory and oppressive legal 
system, required extensive legal reforms before transferring power to the local  of self 
– government institutions. 
 By May 2001, the UNMIK established the Constitutional Framework for Provisional 
Self-Government (PISG). Apart from the local elections that were organized based on 
the UNMIK regulations the years of 2001 and 2002 were the electoral years organized 
based on the Constitutional Framework as their legal base (Reka, 2003). 
National elections produced Provisional Institutions of Self-Government which have 
been established as national governing institutions. For the first time after the war, 
they represented the people of Kosovo and operated under the mandate of UNMIK. 
Government and Assembly’s competences were under strict control by the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG). However, over time, UNMIK started 
delegating to local institutions some of the responsibilities related to the internal 
affairs such as public administration, local administration, transportation, economy, 
education and culture. 
Despite their democratic legitimacy, the powers of the PISG in the political decision-
making processes were limited and subject for the UN Special Representative (Chiodi, 
Martino & Vanoni, 2008). 
The reconfiguration process of civil society was intensified after the establishment of 
the Kosovo institutions in 2002. Most of the local NGOs that had been integrated 
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within UNMIK structures were removed from those positions and had little or no 
influence on further policymaking. This was the time when challenges for the NGO 
sector began because the Kosovo society was moving from the emergency phase to 
the development phase (Atrc, 2008). Most of those civil society organizations that 
were functional before the war and were registered as NGO after the war were largely 
tied to political parties. These connections guaranteed to them advantage in the 
government resources as opposed to other post-war NGOs. 
 Some of the pre-war associations like 'The Mother Teresa Association' was more 
connected to the LDK because of the pre war history of cooperation. On the other 
hand, the Association of War Veterans that came out from the disbanded Kosovo 
Liberation Army was affiliated with the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) and the 
Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK), both of these parties were formed after the 
war. During 2003 and 2004 most local NGOs began to face a new problem. Their 
financial sustainability endangered after a serious decline in the international 
donations. 'Because of the huge reductions in the access to the international 
donations, many of the local NGOs didn’t manage to survive. From the nearest 2200 
to 2300 NGOs registered according to different observers no more than one third of 
them were anymore active’  (Kipred, 2005). 
In this period, Kosovo's civil society began to lose homogeneity, an essential element 
that characterized it during the pre-war circumstances. This mainly came as a result of 
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antagonisms within the NGO sector but also as a result of the profilization of some of 
the NGOs. Antagonisms had the source in the historical roots of development of 
many NGOs but also in their aggressive competition for the domestic and foreign 
funding. 
Most of the NGOs failed to comply with basic obligations deriving from UNMIK 
regulations as they had no governing structures or appointed board members. While 
international funds were declining, generating funds from Kosovo institutions was a 
very limited opportunity. Consequently, this led to the aggressive struggle between 
NGOs for fund-raising and their co-operation was reduced (Freedom House, 2007). 
After Kosovo institutions began to function, NGOs were not organized based on the 
nature of their activities or forms but on the basis of their political linkages with the 
government structures on one side, and NGO inter-linkages on the other. The NGO 
sector was divided into several groups, from those predating the war to the smaller 
ones that were established after the war in Kosovo. 
The first group consisted of organizations that were affiliated with LDK supporting 
civil resistance activities before the war and other associations that came out as a 
result of disbanded KLA. The second group consisted mainly from NGO’s that were 
formed after the war, which developed a better relationship with the international 
donors in Kosovo. As a direct consequence of this kind of division, NGOs failed to 
build more of their constituencies and identity as representatives of the civil society, 
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but preferred to create 'cliques' with political parties and local institutions or with 
particular international donors. These 'cliques' through their access to specific 
networks were intended to benefit from international donations or financial support 
from local institutions. People inside the 'cliques' were aiming to get rid of their 
opponents during their direct competition for the funds (Kipred, 2005). In such 
situations animosities became permanent situations between the NGOs. It was almost 
impossible for the NGOs as representatives of civil society to have a unified voice 
towards the Government in addressing public concerns and needs.  The same 
animosities were shown in the relationship between NGOs and Kosovo institutions as 
in most of the cases this cooperation depended from individuals and not from 
projects offered (Khdr, 2008). 
During this period Kosovo was governed by UNMIK and KFOR continued to be 
responsible for the security in Kosovo. 
 International administration aimed at priorities which consisted of preserving stability 
and maintaining peace, while the UN-sponsored talks for Kosovo’s final status began 
in February 2006.  Since February 2007, Since February 2007, Martti Ahtisaari, a Finish 
diplomat, in his capacity as Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General, offered a plan 
to resolve the final status of Kosovo. 
Kosovo was expected to gain independence and not being governed any longer by 
UNMIK, but by accepting a different form of international supervision. During 2006, 
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Kosovo formed its Unity Team for the negotiation of the plan. Unity team under the 
leadership of President Rugova (after his death was replaced by President Sejdiu) 
engaged with the representatives of the Serbia's delegation in negotiations that were 
held in Vienna. 
Representatives of the United States and of other European Union members after 
many ongoing efforts, discussions and negotiations in the United Nations failed to 
secure Russian backing for the Ahtisaari's plan for supervised independence. Martti In 
2007 Martti Ahtisaari finally made public his package for the future status of Kosovo 
and offered his idea by defining: “…based on the concept of citizenship Kosovo 
should become independent as democratic society. 
Based on the Ahtisaari Plan, Kosovo declared independence on February 18th, 2008. 
However, civil society's role remained weak during the negotiation process. During 
this period of time civil society was not as active as it was expected to be. This is 
probably because of the next transformation that was going on to the political 
system: moving from UNMIK administration to Kosovo institutions. However, their 
lack of activism with issues of great importance related to governance and in relation 
to the negotiation process in Vienna indicated a fragile civil society in Kosovo. The 
negotiation process for the final status once again showed that the civil society was 
not in the right level of its engagement and maturity. During this process, civil society 
representatives were not so active in streamlining their activities by seeking more 
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transparency during the negotiation process and did not intensify their efforts to 
address important issues in all levels of government. ‘In 2006 the norm was that the 
representatives of the civil society were caught unprepared for this process. This was 
justified with the arguments that there should not be organized many activities 
related to 'hot topics' such as corruption, as this could undermine the negotiation 
process for the Kosovo side. However, this was not a convincing argument to justify 
the poor role of civil society over this important process for Kosovo’ (Freedom House, 
2007). 
This poor reaction from civil society was preceded by antagonisms between the NGO 
groups mentioned in this sector and the lack of proliferation for a great number of 
NGOs as they were moving from the so-called ‘emergency phase’ under the UNMIK 
administration towards the development phase under the Kosovo institutions. One of 
the key factors that contributed to this situation was donor influences because the 
struggle for donations during this phase became very aggressive due to the fact that 
donations from international organizations started to decrease.  Although there were 
some anticorruption activities like those conducted by The Organization for 
Democracy, Anticorruption and Dignity (Çohu) organized protests against corruption 
in front of the Government building but these were not enough to keep governments 
under the expected pressure from the civil society (Khdr, 2008). 
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The international community and UNMIK in Kosovo failed to develop a vibrant civil 
society which would have played an important role in developing a democratic 
system of governance in the years after the independence. At the most important 
time for Kosovo, the NGO sector was characterized with animosities, fragmentations, 
and antagonisms. ‘If compared to pre-war circumstances civil society in Kosovo 
managed to become more diverse and plural, but nevertheless, on its actions it 
lacked independence and sustainability. During this period, NGOs were more 
characterized as the opportunity for financial incomes rather than opportunity to 
make positive changes in society. The profile of most of these NGOs as underlined 
earlier in this section was much generalized as they would consistently address issues 
related to human rights, democratization or minority positions (Freedom House, 
2007). 
As long as the fragmentation prevailed in the relationship between the civil society 
representatives, on the other side, the government structures felt comfortable and 
they did not undertake any initiative in order to increase their interactivity with the 
civil society. 
 As a result, NGOs had limited access to the political system and their contribution 
and input in the policy process with an aim of developing a democratic system of 
governance was greatly constrained. 
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4.2 Legal basis relevant to the civil society 
Before analyzing the cooperation of the civil society with the institutions in Kosovo, it 
is important to get acquainted with the legislation on the basis of which 
the cooperation between the Kosovo institutions and representatives of the civil 
society in Kosovo is developed. This facilitates easier evaluation of the capacities of 
civil society, depending on with which institutions they interact. 
In general, Kosovo has approved legal acts that are in line to the European and 
international standards, but there are problems in implementation and this mainly 
comes as a result of the lack of the institutional capacities. The Freedom of Speech is 
a constitutional right, while both the Freedom of Assembly and Freedom 
of Association are constitutional rights and regulated by specific legislation. 
Participation of the representatives of the civil society and the citizens of Kosovo in 
the work of the public institutions is also a constitutional right. Nevertheless, despite 
of the broad legal framework that enables such a thing, the participation of the civil 
society and the citizens of Kosovo in the public decision making processes is not in 
the desired level ‘In terms of regulatory framework, inclusion of the civil society 
representatives in decision-making at the level of the government has seen some 
progress, in particular through the adoption of the Regulation on Minimum 
Standards on Public Consultation Process. However, the implementation of the 
existing legal requirements remains a challenge.’(Tacso, 2014).  
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The legislation relevant to the civil society in Kosovo consists of a considerable 
number of legal acts. Apart from the Constitution as the highest legal act, the 
legislation relevant to the civil society in Kosovo consists of a significant number of 
other important legal acts, such as: Law on Freedom of Association, Law on Access to 
Public Documents, Law on Prevention of Money Laundry. All of these laws are 
followed by secondary legislation, Law on Legislative Initiative, Law on Local Self 
Government, Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo, Rules of 
Procedures of the Government, Regulation on Minimum Standards on Public 
Consultation Process and Law on Public Gatherings (Tacso, 2016). Every country that 
claims to build a genuine democracy has a Constitution which, inter alia, guarantees 
the basic human rights. In this context, the Constitution of Kosovo guarantees 
freedom of speech, freedom of association freedom of gathering and the right of 
access to public documents under the Fundamental Rights and Freedoms chapter  
(Tacso, 2016). 
Every country that claims to build a genuine democracy has a Constitution which, 
inter alia, guarantees the basic human rights. In this context, the Constitution of 
Kosovo under the Chapter II on the Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, guarantees 
freedom of speech, freedom of association freedom of gathering and the right of 
access to public documents. All these articles in the Constitution provide the legal 
basis that enables representatives of the civil society to be more active and 
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participatory in order to positively influence the public policies in Kosovo (The 
Constitution of (The Constitution of Republic of Kosovo, 2017). 
There are, of course, many laws and by-laws that in turn create a more suitable 
ground  for a more diverse and active civil society. One of these laws is what is known 
as the NGO Law (the Law on Freedom of Association). In this law, CSOs are identified 
with the notion (NGO) which according to the law includes membership associations 
and non-membership foundations. The law defines the minimum requirements for 
the internal organization of the NGOs and sets out criteria for the establishment, 
registration and activity. 
Provisions under this law guarantee important rights for NGOs as they directly deal 
with the regulation of the activities of the civil society organizations and their 
interaction with state institutions. Referring to specific articles of this law, NGO may 
also benefit from the Public Benefit Status. In addition to other advantages this status 
entitles the NGO fiscal benefits. 
The Law requires for non-interference of public institutions in the work of NGOs. The 
Law also requires that all public funds for NGOs shall be given based on 
predetermined criteria (The NGO Law, 2017).  
An equally important law affecting the organization and the way NGOs should 
function is also the Law that addresses the problems of money laundry and financing 
of terrorism. Under this Law, NGOs that potentially receive funds in amount higher 
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than 1000 euro or pay receipts only to one beneficiary in larger amounts are obliged 
to notify in advance the Financial Intelligence Unit of Kosovo. This is part of the fight 
against money laundering, a process that was often done through NGOs in the post-
war Kosovo. 
Apart from the above laws and legal acts, the NGO sector is also regulated by other 
laws that directly affect the development of civil society in Kosovo. Two of these laws 
are the Law on Legislative Initiatives and The Law on Access to Public Documents. 
The first clarifies the procedures and rules on how legal initiatives can be undertaken, 
while the second, besides other legal persons, guarantees also to the representatives 
of NGOs the right to access to the institutional official documents. The Law on Public 
Gatherings is the legal basis for giving citizens the right to organize or participate in 
different public gatherings (Tacso , 2016). 
However, not only the laws regulate the functioning of the civil society in Kosovo. The 
legislation is complemented by other rules and regulations that are very important in 
this respect. Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo, for 
example, guarantees to the NGOs to monitor the work of Parliament as they provide 
that the Assembly and Committee sessions shall be public unless otherwise decided. 
As for the Government -Civil Society cooperation provides that the government 
representatives should present and consult the citizens when preparing a strategy, 
policy or draft laws. There are also two regulations stemming from the above-
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mentioned laws that help NGOs have better access to monitoring the work of 
institutions. The purpose of the Regulation on the Public Communication Service of 
the Government is to develop a more transparent communication system regarding 
decision making processes by informing and coordinating activities with the citizens 
related to the projects and policies approved by the government institutions. The 
Regulation on the Minimum Standards for Public Consultation calls for the 
involvement of all interested parties, including NGOs for the public consultation 
process on any institutional legislative initiative (Tacso, 2014). 
 
4.3 Cooperation between the state institutions and civil society 
4.3.1 Government – Civil Society cooperation 
After the formation of Kosovo institutions in 2002 till five years after the 
independence in 2013, the involvement of NGOs in decision making processes was 
not guaranteed with any clear legal basis and in this regard there have been rare 
initiatives from the governmental structures in order to  increase interactivity with the 
NGO sector. Without such an involvement in decision-making processes for public 
interest issues, NGOs have been unable to convey citizens' interests and inputs 
regarding specific issues for which they have been interested in. On the other hand, 
civil society representatives have failed to organize and coordinate their activities by 
enabling citizens to articulate their needs and requests towards the state through a 
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trustworthy communicating channel. The development of civil society is also an 
indicator of the level of democratization of society, while state authority is also 
indicated by the marginalization of the civil society (Sterland, 2006). Even after the 
delegation of competences from UNMIK to the institutions of Kosovo it stands the 
fact that unless there are established clear policies and strategies for cooperation with 
the civil society, the development of the latter cannot be guaranteed only by the 
existence of the institutions such as Parliament and Government or the existence of 
political parties or organization of the free elections. 
UNMIK's NGO Liaison Unit started to register local NGOs by the end of 1999. The 
office was delegated to SRSG to run with the registration process of NGOs operating 
in Kosovo. Once NGOs completed the registration process they were allowed to 
function legally and apply for the public benefit status. Registration was mandatory 
also for the international NGOs where apart from the regular procedures they were 
obliged to clarify whether they are operating in any other country of the world with 
the same name, and give a detailed description of the activities they plan to 
undertake in Kosovo by also providing the names of their official representatives in 
Kosovo. 
OSCE gave a significant contribution in this direction by providing information 
entitled “Guidelines for NGO Registration in Kosovo” (Unmik, 1999). 
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With the formation of the Kosovo institutions as a result of the elections organized 
from UNMIK, the NGO Registration Office under UNMIK was transformed into a 
division and integrated within the Ministry of Public Administration. As the previous 
office under the UNMIK mandate, The Division for NGO registration under the 
Ministry of Public Affairs accepted and examined the requirements related to the to 
the process of the NGO registration, and their applications for the PBS (Public Benefit 
Status) and recorded if NGOs have met the legal conditions. However, over its ten 
years of operation, the NGO Registration Office under UNMIK and later as a division 
within the Ministry of Public Administration has failed to establish productive relations 
with NGOs or to fulfill any kind of liaison role between government and the NGO 
sector (Khdr, 2008). 
Prior to Kosovo became independent, NGOs whose activities and projects have been 
more oriented towards the European Integrations process have collaborated with the 
Agency for Coordination of Development and European Integration (ACDEI), which 
represented one of the main mechanisms for cooperation with the Kosovo 
institutions. After the declaration of independence and the creation of the Ministry of 
European Integration (MEI), the Agency for Coordination of Development and 
European Integration was integrated into this Ministry. Its activities have been 
transformed under the umbrella of MEI.  When analyzing the MEI policies the TACSO 
report in 2010 emphasized: 'Although the Ministry of European Integration is the 
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main institution and the bearer of responsibilities for project coordination related to 
the integration processes, it has made very few initiatives for cooperation with the 
NGO sector. This ministry has not built enough capacities to assist the NGO sector in 
the EU integration processes, but has worked only with a limited number of NGOs 
that have known them closely (Tacso, 2010). 
Co-operation between the government structures and representatives of the civil 
society over the years was characterized by a very low interaction and in some 
periods it was almost non-existent. In this context, it is not only the government that 
has hesitated to boost this co-operation but also civil society representatives did not 
make much of serious efforts in this direction. Since 2007, a year before the 
declaration of independence and up until 2013 there was little effort by both parties 
to develop intensified relations of cooperation. ‘Apart from the CiviKos Platform, no 
attempts have been made to establish networks or other forms of cooperation with 
the aim of representing the interests of the whole sector. Aside from the training 
organization ATRC, there is no recognized NGO dedicated to promoting civil society 
development and acting as an interlocutor with government and national institutions. 
In greater majority of cases, most of the initiatives have ended with poor results due 
to the lack of capacities, lack of coordination of activities and inability to identify 
common goals and interests. ‘(Khdr, 2008). 
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After the establishment of most of the Kosovo institutions, in spring 2007, several 
NGOs initiated a process of building an institutional platform and strategy for the 
cooperation between the civil society and the  Government and the with an aim of 
transforming civil society into an important actor on building a democratic system of 
governance in Kosovo. ‘CiviKos Platform’ was a serious attempt of some 100 different 
organizations to set out an agenda for establishing institutional mechanisms in order 
to support government-civil society interaction. In 2006, the first initiatives were given 
by the CiviKos platform. CiviKos intended to sign a memorandum with the Kosovo 
Government. The Memorandum of Understanding with the Government came up as 
an idea based on which support will be given to the cooperation between 
government structures and civil society representatives in order to eventually lead to 
the approval of a Government Strategy for Cooperation with the Civil society. 'The 
idea of the memorandum was materialized in 2007 and was signed by the 
Government of Kosovo and CiviKos Platform which represented the civil society. This 
Memorandum of Understanding presented for the first time a platform of 
cooperation between these two parties with the mutual commitment to intensify and 
develop the partnership between the civil society and the Government of Kosovo. 
‘(CiviKos, 2017). 
The article 3 of the memorandum establishes Partnership Commitments between 
the Kosovo Government and civil society. 
 109 
 
The article clearly defines ways through which cooperation between the 
representatives of the Kosovo government and representatives of the civil society is 
expected to take place in Kosovo. Article 3 explicitly defines what action parties 
should undertake during the course of their co-operation in order to finalize the 
adoption of strategy for the cooperation between the central/local institutions and 
the civil society. 
Among other commitments The Memorandum was obliged to promote the policies 
and dialogue that will strengthen the partnership with the civil society organizations,  
to ensure that the ideas and plans proposed for the development policies of the civil 
society will be taken into consideration, to be responsive to the civil society requests 
during the process of cooperation for specific projects and to assist in overcoming 
resource constraints from the civil society sector.  
On the other side, Article 3 clearly states the commitments and obligations that civil 
society must undertake to fulfill the main objectives of the memorandum.  The civil 
society also takes on its obligations through this memorandum. ‘Civil Society is 
obliged that during the cooperation with the government and all other public 
institutions to ensure that in the first instance it will protect the public interest and the 
interest of the community or members they represent. Civil society representatives 
should intensively engage in promoting dialogue with public institutions and broaden 
 110 
 
the network of NGOs in order to motivate them to be more active and participatory 
in the processes related to the public interest '(Memorandum Gov-CivKos, 2007). 
This memorandum represented the first serious attempt to streamline the relations 
between the representatives of the civil society and the government of Kosovo. 
However, the rigid governmental structures consistently hesitated to expand 
interactivity with civil society in order to improve the situation. Consequently, except 
that it was identified as the first, serious and most important effort, the memorandum 
gave little or no result in this regard. In this respect, the rigid governmental structures 
were ‘assisted’ by political circumstances in Kosovo shortly after the signing of the 
memorandum. This was the time when Kosovo negotiated its final statute through 
Vienna's negotiating process based on Ahtisaari's proposal. The Memorandum was 
signed by an administration that departed just before the elections and before the 
big political and institutional changes the Kosovo declaration of independence 
brought in 2008, therefore it was never implemented (Khdr, 2008). 
Although the cooperation between government and the civil society remained weak 
not everything was at the ground zero. Modest attempts and projects compared to 
expectations have been initiated as a result of the joined efforts between the civil 
society and the Kosovo government prior to the declaration of independence. 
The Kosovo Human Rights Strategy (2007) was drafted by the staff of the Prime 
Minister’s Office. The Strategy aimed some priorities and an action plan till 2011, but 
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failed to address all the legal obligations that the Government should have within the 
human rights field, then The Law on Access to Official documents was developed in 
close cooperation with civil society. In 2004, the National Action Plan for the 
Achievement of Gender Equality was initiated and drafted mostly with the 
contribution of women NGOs of Kosovo. The Action Plan for People with Disabilities 
2009-2011 (April 2009) was the result of a consultative and inclusive process with the 
participation of many CSOs (Tacso, 2010).  
Most of the NGO’s have proved to be short-lived and ineffective (with few 
exceptions), other more effective networks of NGO cooperation were established 
over the years the efforts and aim of which were to monitor various government 
projects related to the public interests. “Reform 2004", was a broad citizen coalition of 
more than 250 NGOs which advocated for open electoral lists and the reconfiguring 
of electoral boundaries, a Pensioners Coalition which gave a valuable contribution to 
the drafting of the law on the approval of pension reform, a 15-member anti-
corruption coalition under the leadership of COHU, -Civil Society Initiative For a Clean 
Parliament- organized an awareness campaign for the November 2007 parliamentary 
elections, while 'Democracy in Action' was established to monitor the flow of local 
elections in 2007. ' (Kipred, 2008) 
There have been no other initiatives at the level of central institutions that have 
resulted successfully in institutionalizing the participation of the NGO sector in public 
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policy making. Even in the EC Progress Report for 2008, it is stated that even though 
the government recognized the importance of the NGO sector, it did not take 
concrete steps to build a clearer vision through which the development of this sector 
would be directly assisted (EC Progress Report, 2008).  
Political parties in power claimed that after the declaration of independence in 2008 
they had more urgent priorities and agendas. But in fact, this did not stand as a 
justification because the government structures themselves showed no serious signs 
to involve at least few NGO’s in the important processes of public decision-making.  
According to observations by civil society experts, cooperation between the civil 
society and the government sow some progress at least in some segments. A number 
of ministers, advisers and other institutional officials were recruited from the civil 
society. This trend has had intensification after the declaration of independence 
where a considerable number of people have abandoned NGOs to join to the 
political parties. Some experts have seen this as positive process for the fact that 
political parties need the expertise of those who have worked in the NGO sector and 
have at least learned about management and networking concepts. On the other 
hand, there are experts who disagree with this finding and are skeptical as they see 
this move from the NGO sector towards the government. To their opinion, NGO 
sector representatives by aiming for executive positions in the government, in the 
future, can be reserved with their criticism towards the governance (Khdr, 2008). The 
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poor relations between the civil society representatives and the Government since 
1999 onwards, has only been the result of hesitation for co-operation from the 
government structures. Apart from the CivKos initiative, the NGO sector has failed to 
make any more serious efforts or consistent pressure on the government in order to 
advance this relationship. Among others, this came mainly as a result that the NGO 
sector after the formation of Kosovo institutions onwards has been quite antagonized 
because of their historical roots of development and the decline of donations from 
the international donors (Kipred, 2005). 
As underlined earlier in this section, the post-war period in Kosovo was marked by an 
extraordinary NGO ‘boom’. To have a clearer picture why Kosovo had a large number 
of NGOs after the war statistics must be referred. ‘After the war in 1999, a significant 
amount of international aid was distributed in Kosovo, mainly for humanitarian relief, 
reconstruction purposes, refugee resettlement and ethnic reconciliation. During this 
period between 1999 and 2001, the international aid that entered in Kosovo reached 3 
billion dollars. Most of it was a direct international aid dedicated for reconstruction 
and other nature of assistance for the communities.’ (Konxheli, 2017). 
After the major part of the reconstruction and of the emergency phase was finished 
and the second phase of developing Kosovo institutions began, we saw the decline in 
international donations. A large number of NGOs did not survive as they did not 
manage to develop their own profiles and constituencies. This was a direct 
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consequence of the agenda often imposed by international donors, lacking adequate 
institutionalization and professionalism. The civil society of Kosovo experienced a 
classical feature of donor-driven agendas, and this was one of the important main 
factors that have curved the capacities of many civil society organizations to reflect 
donors (Osce, 2007). 
At this stage where the experience and the expertise of specialized NGOs were 
needed to assist in developing a democratic system of governance, the capacity of 
NGOs that could seriously engage in this process was limited. The capacity of civil 
society was limited not just as a result of the donor-driven agenda but because of 
because it lacked a proper coordination between major donors in Kosovo. 
Coordination between donor activities was not systematically organized, resulting 
often in repeating activities or even with the contradictory projects sponsored by the 
international donors. ‘This came as a result of the lack of a national agenda which 
would coordinate and structure the international funds and financial support to local 
NGOs. Instead, it was left to international donors to decide which projects and NGOs 
they would support. Consequently, international donors supported financially local 
NGOs according to their own priorities and agendas. Until 2009, the Office for Donor 
Coordination in a central governmental level was responsible for coordinating donors 
support. After 2009 this office was integrated within the Agency for European 
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Integration which later became Agency for Development Coordination and European 
Integration '(BCSDN, 2017).  
After the decline of international donations, antagonisms between NGOs grew even 
more. The race became more aggressive as some NGO’s had less and less access to 
the international donations, while others engaged all of their potentials in order to 
absorb donations from certain government structures.  
Even after the declaration of independence international aid continued to support 
development programs in Kosovo, but there was less financial support and donations 
for the civil society organizations if compared to the postwar period.  The Platform for 
Aid Management (a tool that was created by the national institutions for tracking and  
(a tool created by the government for tracking and information sharing of aid-funded 
activities) according to official data available on development assistance since 
Kosovo’s independence till 2015, more than 1.77 billion USD of official development 
aid have been disbursed to the country. Kosovo’s Gross National Income (GNI) varied 
between 5.7 billion USD in 2009 to 7.5 billion USD in 2014 meaning that in average 
the total official development assistance distributed to Kosovo was more than 3.5 % 
of the annual GNI (World Bank, 2017). 
However, after the independence, a very small number of NGOs remained with a 
clear vision, plans or well formulated policies for which they would be able to lobby 
actively. International donors and Kosovo institutions have had essential distinctions 
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for the orientation of their donations and financial support towards local NGOs. On 
the one hand, international donors have been more focused to support those NGOs 
through which they would provide services rather than to NGOs which showed more 
interest in political activism. On the other hand, Kosovo institutions were not 
interested to support financially or with other institutional means either of them. "This 
is because certain rigid governmental structures wanted to prevent NGOs to have 
more access in the decision-making processes" (Khdr, 2008). 
Currently, the civil society in Kosovo in the largest part remains dependent on the 
already decreased international funding. This is due to the reluctance of government 
structures to support NGO’s financially through the projects that could positively 
impact the public decision-making processes. On the other hand, as noted above, not 
only there is a decrease of international funds, but very often bureaucratic and over-
loaded donor procedures are discouraging for many NGO’s to apply for different 
grants. ‘‘For the small NGOs bureaucratic procedures of the majority of donors, as 
well as the large amounts of the donor funds, have made their survival even more 
difficult because they do not have the capacity to apply and implement large projects. 
This has also produced another consequence, that of the distinction between 'small' 
and 'large' NGOs. '(Kscf, 2017). 
During the 1990s, civil society organizations were part of a coordinated strategy with 
the Albanian political parties in order to resist to the Serbian regime and this was the 
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logic of the justification why they had peaceful relations with the official politics. In the 
aftermath of the conflict, these peaceful relations with the government, besides that 
they remind us of the 1990s, they do not contribute to the development of civil 
society. If the government has no interest to support civil society organizations, it 
should be the civil society representatives who should organize more pressure and be 
more active in this regard. Since the establishment of the first provisional institutions 
of Kosovo in 2002 and onwards, the cooperation between the civil society and the 
Kosovo institutions remained weak. There is no coordinated cooperation and most 
meetings are of an ad-hoc nature. This situation was also identified in the European 
Commission's Progress Report for Kosovo 2008: 'The essence of the problem is that 
the Government does not have a strategy for cooperation with the civil society' (EC 
Kosovo Progress Report, 2010). 
NGOs sector contribution to Kosovo's legislation can be considered very modest 
compared to expectations regarding the role that civil society should have in drafting 
legislation and impacting public policy making as a result of the co-operation with the 
government structures. This has been highlighted several times in many progress 
reports released from the European Commission for Kosovo: 'The cooperation 
between Kosovo institutions and civil society is mostly organized on ad hoc basis. 
There is limited governmental public funding for the Civil Society’ (EC Kosovo 
Progress Report, 2013). 
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However, at least a formal and legal progress on the surface was seen only thirteen 
years after the war and five years after the independence. Finally, in 2013 ‘'The 
Government Strategy for Cooperation with Civil Society' was adopted aiming 
amongst other strategic goals to help civil society to be more active and present 
during the process of drafting of the legislation and its implementation on behalf of 
the public interest. 
 
4.3.2 The Government Strategy for Cooperation with Civil Society 2013 – 2017 
In July 2013 the Government of the Republic of Kosovo has approved ‘The 
Government Strategy for Cooperation with Civil Society 2013-2017’. This strategy was 
drafted and finalized as a result of the cooperation and discussions between the 
Office of the Prime Minister with the CiviKos Platform. The strategy was drafted and 
finalized as a result of the cooperation and discussions between the Office of the 
Prime Minister with the representatives of the CiviKos and with the support of the 
staff from the Legal Office and the Office of Strategic Planning in the Office of the 
Prime Minister. Through this strategy, the government is obliged to show concrete 
commitment for the development of civil society in Kosovo. 
The strategy obliges the government to engage intensively and concretely in 
enabling favorable conditions for the development of the civil society by establishing 
institutional mechanisms and instruments for the civil society support. The 
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government is obliged to provide resources to make a proper use of all the 
instruments and mechanisms available in order to organize and support a structured 
cooperation between the two sides. In this regard, the strategy foresees tasks for all 
public institutions and guarantees monitoring mechanisms in order for the Strategy 
to be implemented (Information Bulletin 2014). 
It focuses more on the cooperation between the civil society with the institutions in 
the central level. The timeframe for implementation of this strategy is set from 2013 to 
2017. The strategy outlines four strategic objectives: "Civil Society has secured and 
empowered participation in the formulation and implementation of policies and 
legislation; Develop a public services contracting system for CSOs; Operating system 
for financial the support for NGOs; and Empowers Integrated Approach to the 
Development of Volunteering '(CiviKos, 2017). 
Having in consideration role of the civil society in supporting the development 
of a democratic system of governance, the Strategy addresses some of the basic 
needs for the civil society 'These needs are in fact closely linked to the priorities of the 
Government of Kosovo, such as: increasing public legitimacy, improving public 
policies and accountability. 'Strategy aims to develop instruments and mechanisms 
for cooperation with civil society in order to guarantee equal access and 
opportunities for the development of the civil society organizations. The Strategy 
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foresees to achieve these goals through the observance of transparent rules and 
procedures by both parties. '(The Strategy 2013-2017). 
The implementation of this strategy foresees benefits not only for the government 
and civil society, but in general for the Kosovo as well. The benefits within the 
framework of this strategy can be read clearly through its strategic, political and 
institutional levels on one side and inclusion and equal opportunities and active 
citizenship on the other. When reading the strategy carefully it is clear that this is the 
first time that civil society is treated at this political level within such an institutional 
framework. 
The approved Action Plan is very important for the implementation of the Strategy. 
The Action Plan envisages specific tasks and specific responsibilities for different levels 
of government institutions in order to achieve the objectives within the timeframes as 
set in the Strategy. Whereas, depending on the specific sectors of the civil society 
organizations their equal inclusion and opportunities are foreseen through the equal 
treatment and access to government institutions. Finally, the most important benefit 
is that by increasing the interactivity between the representatives of the civil society 
and of the government it will contribute to increasing citizen involvement in the 
governance.  Active citizenship is very important to help address responses to socio-
political problems during the state building process (Information Bulletin, 2014).  
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The timeframe for implementation of the Strategy has been foreseen for the period 
2013-2017, while the implementation of the Action Plan should be completed by 2015. 
Regarding the scope covered by the strategy, not all specific issues are intended to 
be regulated by the general principles of the Strategy. Strategic objectives were taken 
into account especially when dealing with sensitive processes in public services as well 
as institutional and financial support for the development of the civil society. 
However, general principles of the Strategy can be applied in the future in other 
sectors, to specific institutions or to the civil society groups or when public institutions 
will plan to support any specific initiative that seeks to address certain issues within 
the public policies. In general, the Strategy has designed and defined concrete 
mechanisms and instruments to address the system through which cooperation 
between the two parties will be developed, and after this phase, concrete measures 
and actions will be introduced to functionalize the system. 
'Since the strategy is the governmental approved document, it does not oblige the 
other party, namely civil society, to deal with specific issues or actions of their internal 
organization. The Strategy obliges the Government for the concrete measures and 
actions that the institutions should undertake in order to support the cooperation 
between the Government and the civil society '(CiviKos, 2017). 
The strategy envisages concrete measures for the implementation of each of the four 
objectives as set out in the Strategy. Depending on the nature of the objective, 
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certain measures are laid down. Regarding the first objective, it is foreseen to amend 
the basic legislation that refers to the regulation of the participation of CSO in policy 
development. Measures are then required to set standards of CSO involvement in 
drafting legislation as well as the need for training of civil servants and CSOs for the 
drafting process of legislation and, last but not least, establishing a monitoring system 
for the level of engagement of CSOs in the process of drafting legislation and policy 
implementation. 
Regarding the second objective, measures envisaged require the approval of a 
legislative body which specifically deals with the regulation of procedures for 
contracting of services by CSOs. The same measure also requires the identification of 
areas within the framework of public policies where certain CSOs can be contracted. 
The measure further requires the establishment of standards for contracting public 
services by CSO and obliges the parties to establish a monitoring mechanism which 
oversees the implementation of the offered services by CSOs. 
 Measures with the implementation of the third objective require reforming of the 
legislation and setting criteria for sponsorship by creating supportive environment for 
the donors, then coordination of institutions and civil society regarding the donor 
coordination mechanisms by involving civil society representatives in these 
mechanisms. The issue envisaged in these measures is also the definition of clear 
criteria when it comes to giving grants and not the financial support CSOs: 
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 Measures targeting the fourth objective mainly foresee and require from the relevant 
institutions to identify the needs of volunteering and to build a system based on the 
principles of which the development of volunteering is provided and, like in any other 
objective, to create a monitoring system for volunteerism (The Strategy 2013-2017). 
With an aim of ensuring effective implementation of the objectives as set in 
the strategy, The Office of Good Governance and the CiviKos representatives have 
initiated and established a mechanism through which the implementation of the 
strategy will be monitored. The government took a decision to establish the ‘Council 
for Implementation of the Government Strategy for Cooperation with Civil Society 
2013-2017’. This Council is charged as the main body responsible for implementing 
the strategy for the cooperation between the government and the civil society. 
The Government has decided that each ministry should be represented with a 
member in this Council in order to ensure professional monitoring and evaluation of 
the implementation of the Strategy. Implementation of the ‘Government Strategy for 
Cooperation with Civil Society' and the 'Action Plan' will be solely the responsibility of 
the Council. The Council's structure is composed of 29 members, where civil society 
and the government have their representatives; respectively 15 for civil society and 14 
members are representatives of the Government of the Republic Kosovo (Buletini 
Informativ, 2014). 
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Two parties' agreement on the Council's representation criteria was preceded by 
lengthy discussions. Representatives of both the Government and of the CiviKos 
agreed that the selection process for the representation in the Council should address 
two key criteria, respectively representation, and expertise.  
This would enable NGOs to nominate candidates among them or in other 
marginalized groups and it will define the basic criteria that should be met by the 
nominee as well as the nominee by NGOs. The right to nominate candidates is to 
have all registered NGOs, which are active for at least three years and their work so 
far is in accordance with the mission and the relevant field of activity (CiviKos, 2017). 
The Government's decision on the establishment of the Council also describes the 
aim of the Council which is based on professional cooperation and partnership 
among its members, while the evaluation and monitoring of the strategy is the main 
task of the Council and this is done by discussing proposals and solutions to issues 
they have in the implementation of the Strategy but without bypassing discussions 
and ideas to other issues dealing with the cooperation between the Government and 
the Civil Society. In this context, depending on how the Council assesses it remains on 
its competence to propose new legal acts that will support the development of 
NGOs. The Council is also in charge of considering the proposals and initiatives 
presented by NGOs (Vendimi Nr.04/181, 2014). 
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In coordination with the Office of the Secretary General of the OPM, the Office for 
Good Governance has organized meetings with responsible officials for monitoring of 
every process related to the implementation of the strategy. These are officials who 
will be the contact points at the respective Ministries and at the Council. 
The purpose of these meetings was to inform and prepare the contact points 
appointed in the ministries for the duties and obligations they will have during the 
five-year implementation phase of the Strategy. One of the main duties of these 
contact points was to help the process of functionalizing the Council. Among other 
activities with an aim of better preparation of the implementation of the Strategy 
were organized during 2014-2015. CiviKos platform and Office for Good Governance 
in cooperation with other civil society partners expanded their activities by organizing 
the conference " The Government Strategy for Cooperation with the Civil Society 2013 
– 2017 and Action Plan 2013-2015 " and a Seminar - "Challenges in implementing the 
strategy for cooperation with Civil Society "(Buletini Informativ, 2014). 
The European Commission (Office in Pristina) supported the project through the IPA 
2014-2015 in cooperation with the Office for Good Governance which is the main 
institution responsible for the coordination of the actions that must be undertaken in 
order for the strategy to be implemented.  The aim of the project was to meet the 
conditions and the adequate infrastructure for the implementation of the Strategy by 
focusing on raising capacities for governmental officials in charge of the 
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implementation of the Strategy and providing expertise to the members of the 
Council regarding their responsibilities for the coordination of their work with the 
institutions that represent and support mechanisms for implementation (EC IPA II, 
2014-2020). 
However, regardless of the drafting and approval of this strategy, which was followed 
with the formation of implementing mechanisms (The Council) and many activities 
such as conferences and seminars with an aim of initiating the implementation of the 
Strategy, five years after its adoption the CiviKos and other local and international 
organizations see minimum results on its implementation. 
 
4.3.3 Challenges in implementing the Government Strategy for Cooperation with the 
Civil Society 2013 – 2017 
As highlighted in the section where cooperation between government and civil 
society was discussed, shortly before adopting the 'Strategy for Cooperation with the 
Civil Society 2013 - 2017' in many reports of the international organizations the 
relations between civil society and the government were still seen as weak. The 
European Commission Progress Report for 2013 has assessed the relations between 
the two sides in detail and in this report it has concluded that the cooperation 
between the Kosovo governmental institutions and the representatives of the civil 
society remains ad-hoc (EC Progress Report 2013) 
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Following the adoption of the strategy in July 2013 it was expected that the process 
will improve with the beginning of the implementation of the Strategy. However, this 
was not the case as the implementation of the Strategy was very slow and the results 
were almost to the minimum. From the various reports of organizations and 
mechanisms that monitored the process, the reasons for not implementing the 
Strategy are various and the main responsibility lies with the two signatories, namely 
the Government and the Civil Society. If EC Progress reports over the years are 
compared, it can be seen that there has been some progress from what the civil 
society has been identified as weak in 2008 to the EC progress report in 2015. 
‘However, there is evident lack of systematic involvement of civil society in the 
process of the public policy making, as well as low level of the Government 
commitments towards this sector.’ (Tacso, 2016) 
From the observations of CiviKos and the TACSO office in Kosovo Office, ( an EU 
funded project)  it can be noticed that after the adoption of the Strategy and some of 
its implementation mechanisms, translation of these commitments into concrete 
results has faced significant challenges.  
Lack of political will has been noticed at the very beginning of the process as 
establishing the Council for monitoring the implementing the Strategy has lasted 7 
months. Both sides have accused one another of the delays in the founding of the 
Council. On the other hand, different ministries have failed to invite NGOs in order to 
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analyze deficiencies in legislation and the possibility of their amendment and, where 
necessary, to approve new legal acts. The Government has also failed to define 
minimum standards for public consultations with NGO’s and the legal framework for 
contracting public services by NGOs. When the start of the implementation of the 
strategy was expected in 2013-2014 certain ministers within the Kosovo failed to fulfill 
some of their obligations deriving from the laws that were in force even before the 
Strategy was adopted. Thus, even before the start of the process of functionalizing 
the Strategy for the cooperation between the government and civil society, old 
problems appeared, those of implementation of the existing laws regulating the 
relations between both parties. As mentioned above, the strategy makes it very clear 
which are the government tasks and obligations in relation to civil society. The 
process of drafting amendments related to the civil society is very important and in 
this regard the Government should closely cooperate with the representatives of civil 
society. This requires teamwork with representation from both sides. Unfortunately, 
this was done very rarely. The Progress Reports for Kosovo in 2015 recognized the 
fact that after long discussions and joint work, both sides agreed to approve the 
'Strategy for Cooperation with Civil Society', but it required concrete measures from 
both sides to implement the Strategy. The same report emphasized the importance 
of including civil society organizations in the public consultations by ensuring the 
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effective monitoring of the implementation of the Strategy (EC Kosovo Progress 
Report, 2015). 
In a report conducted from the Kosovar Civil Society Foundation (KSCF) that was part 
of the ‘Working Together’ (project launched from the CiviKos), civil society 
representatives have identified a number of reasons why there are stagnations in the 
implementation of the strategy. Among other, the project identifies: lack of previous 
experience while implementing important strategic documents and policies, lack of 
willingness of the government and the lack of capacity of governmental institutions.  
On the other side, it is not just the Government that is responsible for this situation 
but based on the interviews and data analyzing the CiviKos representatives were not 
sufficiently involved in building models of cooperation and partnership in order to 
approve the strategy. "Representatives of various CSOs that are part of CiviKos were 
informed only via email that the strategy has been approved but this has not been 
followed by any further instruction from the CivKos secretariat' (Working Together , 
2014).  
In the updated version of the 'Needs Assessment Report' for 2016 conducted by 
Tasco, it is reported that the government has failed in many directions to implement 
the Government Strategy for Cooperation between the Government and the civil 
society. Tacso report underlines that after the adoption of the Strategy all levels of 
governance have committed declaratively to cooperate with civil society but little has 
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been done to change the previous stands for governmental institutions with the 
representatives of the civil society. 'While some of the legal acts or policy documents 
have been adopted or initiated, the majority of the planned activities are either at a 
very early stage or not initiated at all. One of the identified problems that have a 
significant impact on the implementation of the strategy is the fact that the civil 
servants are minimally informed for the content of the strategy. Most of them are not 
sure for the concrete obligations they could potentially be given within their 
responsibilities' (Tacso, 2016).  
It should be noted that the implementation of the Strategy not only regulates the 
relationship between representatives of the government structures and civil society, 
but it helps to meet benchmarks of the  "EU Guidelines for Supporting Civil Society in 
Enlargement Countries 2014-2020", which aims to provide a conducive  environment  
for developing civil society potentials and resources. 
Now when most of the general principles of the Strategy are not implemented, in 
societies in transition like in the case of Kosovo, it is expected that the parties accuse 
each other. Most of the different CSO representatives believe that the motivation of 
government officials for the approval of the strategy came as a result of the EU 
pressure and the need for their daily political agendas to present themselves with a 
high democratic culture in front of the citizens of Kosovo. ‘The majority of CSOs did 
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not have a clear idea of how they would be involved in implementing the strategy nor 
had very little information about its content (Working Together, 2014). 
In general, when civil society addresses the problem the lack of political will by the 
government prevails as a reason for not implementing the strategy. However, 
responsibility for failure to implement the strategy is not exclusively the responsibility 
of the Governmental Office of Good Governance. If all the above reports regarding 
the implementation issues of the Strategy are analyzed, it can be noticed that 
responsibility falls not only on the part of the governors, but CiviKos itself is not 
sufficiently proactive during the implementation process of the Strategy. 'The 
relations between the civil society and the Government are not being developed on 
the basis of promoted principles as most of the time cooperation continues to be on 
ad-hoc basis. However, another fact stands that in such situations of non-cooperation 
by the representatives of the Government there is no concrete reaction from the 
CivKos' representatives' (CiviKos, 2017). 
In order to establish a transparent and functional platform for achieving a more 
efficient process of civic participation and to improve relations between the 
Government and civil society in particular, a report conducted from KSCF in 2014 
gave some important recommendations which unfortunately were not followed with 
proper actions, otherwise in 2017 there should have been better results with regard to 
the implementation of the Strategy. The KSCF reported that the CiviKos Secretariat 
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needs to increase pressure through the Office for Good Governance mechanisms 
towards officials who are responsible for implementing the Strategy. 
Besides, CiviKos Secretariat should increase the pressure on the civil society 
organizations in order for them to be more proactive in the process rather than 
expect everything to be initiated by the Government bodies. There were more serious 
challenges (and actions to be taken) identified in this report with regard to the 
implementation of the strategy. Particular importance was given for example to the  
necessity of establishing Task Force and Joint Advisory Council, increasing the level of 
transparency for information  by the government regarding the cooperation with the 
civil society organizations; enhancing institutional services for improving the 
cooperation between the Government and CSOs and the implementing the financial 
service package - as set in the Strategy. There is a lot of ambiguity regarding the 
concept and of functioning of the Task Force as well as the model based on which 
the Joint Advisory Council and Task Forces were designed. The report noted that 
CivKos was not at the level of duty and did not make the necessary contribution for 
building the information system as set in the Strategy. On the other side, receiving 
government services was not facilitated in order to serve to the cooperation process 
and the institutional financial support has not functioned as foreseen by the agreed 
system (Working Together, 2014) 
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However, despite these problems identified in the KSCF report in 2014, even in the 
years thereafter, there were delays in implementation of the Strategy. Although 2015 
has been a more dynamic year in the implementation of the Strategy, almost the 
same problems appeared in the following years.  
As underlined earlier the implementation phase of the Strategy started with 
unexpected problems-delays in establishing implementing mechanisms for the 
strategy up until 2014. However, year after, an Action Plan was approved followed 
with the first annual report about Strategy implementation. According to the updated 
Tacso report of 2016, only 40.3% of the planned activities were implemented during 
2015. By 2017, when the Strategy expires regardless of the clear guidelines for all 
responsible institutions on the activities and results to be achieved the Strategy is not 
fully implemented. ’ Main challenges faced during this period were the lack of 
responsibility by respective institutions for implementation of activities and reporting, 
lack of timely allocation of the required budget for the planned activities, low rate of 
representatives of the civil society in their participation in the Council and its working 
groups. Similar concerns have been raised by the civil society, which also reports that 
even in cases when civil servants participated in different meetings, only a few of 
them provided any qualitative contribution.’ (Tacso, 2016). 
The entire strategy implementation process identifies two main parties that have the 
greatest responsibility for implementing the Strategy, which is the Office of Good 
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Governance and the CiviKos platform. Both have their own and common mechanisms 
that have been established with an aim of implementing the Strategy. However, 
besides these two main parties in the process, there are other governmental bodies 
that may have contributed to the implementation of the strategy (Civikos, 2016). 
In the process of dialogue with the civil society representatives, the Office of Good 
Governance had other institutional partners such as the Department of Registration 
and Liaison with NGOs that functions within the Ministry of Public Administration. 
However, this office has often not been a contributor to the process because in many 
situations they provided different interpretations for the same law. Officials of this 
department has provided very little contribution and institutional assistance to 
drafting the strategy. Their contribution was minimally observed even though the 
department staff participated in all the seminars for drafting the strategy. This seems 
to have happened because of their lack of professionalism and understanding of the 
concept of cooperation with civil society. For this reason, civil society representatives 
have called for dialogue with civil society to be reorganized at a higher institutional 
level within the framework of the Office of Good Governance (Tacso, 2016). 
If we refer to monitoring report for the implementation of the government strategy 
for cooperation with civil society for the period 2013-2016 (the perspective of the 
Secretariat of CiviKos) there has been a difference in the level of implementation and 
quality of implemented activities. ‘According to the evaluation of the Action Plan of 
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the Strategy for 2013-2016 by the CiviKos Secretariat, First Objective (Ensuring 
participation of the civil society in drafting and implementation of legislation and 
policies)  was implemented 70.83 %, Second Objective (System for contracting public 
services to CSOs) 29.16 %, Third Objective ( Financial Support system and criterea) 
41.17 %, and Fourth Objective (Promotion of an integrated approach for the 
development of the volunteering) 33.33 %. 
In the country report for Kosovo authorized from the Balkan Civil Society 
Development Network  and conducted from the project “Western Balkan CSOs for 
Global Development’ although progress is recognized (especially during the 2015-
2016 in approving legal acts) there are still many challenges identified regarding the 
Objective 1 of the Strategy for cooperation between the government and the civil 
society. As for the Objective 1 of the Strategy, a new Regulation on Minimum 
Standards on public consultation process has been adopted by the Government 
during 2016. The continuous efforts in drafting supportive legislation and ensuring 
proper implementation in practice remain huge challenges as the contribution and 
participation of NGOs in meetings of cross-sector mechanisms is not at the required 
level. Most of the NGOs that have participated in the public consultation process 
assess that their comments were partly accepted. In addition, due to the limited 
number of institutions/NGOs dealing with respective areas the public consultations is 
rarely provided or even when provided, it is rarely made public (BCSDN, 2017). 
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A brief summary of the findings of Tacso report for 2016 indicates that there is a low 
percentage of implementation objectives as set in the Strategy for 
cooperation between the Government and civil society.  According to the TACSO 
survey conducted in 2016, only 32% of surveyed NGOs declared to have participated 
in the development of national and local strategies. Only 2% of NGOs that have taken 
part in public consultation processes consider that all their suggestions were 
considered. Regarding the objective 2 of the Strategy, around 40% of surveyed NGOs 
declared to have received public funds during the 2015, while the main improvement 
within the Objective 3 has been noted in the new law on corporate income, adopted 
in September 2015, which doubled the tax exemption for corporate donors to a 
number of public benefit activities (Tacso, 2016). 
According to the evaluation Action Plan by the CiviKos Secretariat some of the main 
challenges up to 2016 for the Objective 1 were:  limited number of institutions and 
NGOs dealing with respective areas, the lack of information for the public 
consultations and lack of trained civil servants who understand the idea and the 
concept of the strategy. For the Objective 2 some of the challenges identified were: 
lack of coordination between the ministries in relation to the contracting of the 
services, lack of budget for analyses foreseen by the Government and failure to 
functionalize the joined bodies for establishing a system for contracting services. For 
the Objective 3 challenges identified were: lack of analyses of the existing legislation 
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by the Government for joint implementation of the projects, no coordination between 
the Ministries for development of the Law on Philanthropy, lack of transparency in 
allocation of public funds for CSOs and lack of willingness and no coordination 
between ministries to create automatic co-funding system for NGOs winners of the 
EC grants. While challenges identified for the implementation of the Objective 4 were: 
there was no meeting organized for the functionality of the cross-sector group for 
volunteering, no budget was allocated by the Government of Kosovo for 
implementation of analyses foreseen by the working plans for 2015-2016 (CiviKos, 
2016). 
Although it expires in 2017 it can be concluded that up to 2016 the Strategy was not 
implemented to the greatest extent. As can it can be seen from most of the reports 
conducted by various international and local organizations that have monitored the 
implementation of the Strategy, the main strategic objectives needed more direct 
involvement and contribution from both the government bodies and the civil society 
representatives or external experts, as there were insufficient capacities for qualitative 
implementation of many measures of the Strategy. 
 
4.4 The Cooperation between the Presidency and Civil Society 
The cooperation between the representatives of the Civil Society and the Presidency 
with the Kosovo institutions are developed through different models and forms of 
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cooperation. The interaction with the Presidency being the highest institution under 
the Constitution of Kosovo it’s very important when it comes to protecting the various 
interests of citizens by addressing their concerns through the civil society initiatives. 
The Presidency is not one of those institutions that have developed many instruments 
and mechanisms for cooperation with the civil society. This is mostly because the 
President by Constitution has a rather symbolic and representative role. However, 
there are at least two ways to give the civil society representatives opportunities to 
seek support from the President and it can be done through advocacy and 
partnership. When referring to the advocacy forms then it should be noted that 
according to the Kosovo Constitution, citizens, or civil society representatives, may 
address the President on various issues affecting their rights or the public interest. 
Civil society has used this right several times over the past years by turning to 
President in their effort to stop entering into force of certain laws. The forms of 
partnerships are mainly developed through the Councils established by the President 
(Tacso, 2016). 
When analyzing the possibilities of advocacy forms it must be admitted that the 
Constitution provides good opportunities for civil society representatives or other 
groups of citizens who have interest in changing any law that may affect their 
interests. From the legal point of view, the interaction between 
the President and the civil society is supported by the fact that the Constitution gives 
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to the President the right to send back to the Assembly a law for amending it 
after this has been adopted. This could be the case upon such initiative is taken from 
the civil society and addressed to the President (Constitution of the Republic of 
Kosova, 2017). 
The President was not very responsive to the calls from civil society. In some cases, 
civil society followed procedures in the Constitutional Court which concluded in favor 
of civil society for one of the laws ‘while two other laws entered into force as they 
derived from the Ahtisaari Plan, and as such those laws enter automatically in force 
because they were adopted by the institutions as a package (Ahtisari’s provisions)’ 
(Tacso, 2014). 
 However, there have been cases when the president has positively responded to 
several requests initiated by civil society regarding certain laws. One of them was the 
initiative of the group of journalists addressed to the President that the Criminal Code 
breached the media freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. The Law was returned 
to the Assembly and it was amended. Even though the President has accepted few 
such initiatives, not always it was decided to return the laws to the Parliament. Such a 
case is the initiative from the civil society which required from the President to send 
back to the Parliament the draft Law on Amnesty for its amendment. ‘The President 
rejected the request and signed the Law. The government’s justification was that any 
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law that derives from the political agreement for the normalization of relations 
between Kosovo and Serbia is mandatory’ (Tacso, 2016). 
Compared to advocacy forms, the President's partnerships with the civil society have 
been developed mainly through the establishment of various councils. Starting in 
2012, the President established three important councils: The National Council on 
European Integration, The National Council against Corruption, and the National 
Council for the Survivors of Sexual Violence during the War. Civil society participates 
in these councils with their delegated representatives (The President, 2017). 
The establishment of these councils cannot be considered a success itself. This is due 
to the fact that in some reports on the work of these councils conducted by 
international and local organizations in Kosovo it has been pointed out that only 
those objectives of the technical nature have been met, while failing to address the 
strategic and political concerns raised by the civil society. CSOs that contribute to the 
National Council on European Integration say that the work of this Council needs 
essential improvement. An analytical report conducted by KSCF for the work of the 
European integration Council recommends avoiding rhetoric’s but engage by 
designing concrete strategies to be followed by concrete actions in order to 
implement tangible reforms. ‘Among other problems the Council has been divided 
politically between different groups which harms the efficiency and makes its work 
often non-transparent’ (Kfsc, 2013). 
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In general, interaction between the Presidency and the civil society in the years 
following the declaration of independence has been characterized through two forms 
of interaction, namely advocacy forms, and partnerships. However, it cannot be 
concluded that the activities and initiatives undertaken within this framework of 
cooperation have had important effects on the society in Kosovo. 
The interaction between the President and the civil society is supported by the fact 
that the Constitution gives to the President the right to return adopted laws back to 
the Assembly to be reviewed. This could be the case when such an initiative is taken 
from the civil society and addressed to the President of the Republic of Kosovo. The 
President was not very responsive to the calls from civil society. There are cases when 
the civil society has sent laws to the President with the justification that they represent 
a breach of the Constitution, but, for example, out of four sent in 2012, only one has 
been sent to the Assembly for revision. The civil society followed the procedures in 
the Constitutional Court which decided in favor of the civil society for one of the laws 
while two other laws had to be adopted without change because they were part of 
the Ahtisaari Plan. The laws deriving from this Plan are unchangeable because they 
have been approved at the Assembly as a package (Tacso, 2014). However, there 
have been cases when the president has positively responded to several requests 
initiated by civil society regarding certain laws. One of them was the initiative of the 
group of journalists addressed to the President that the Criminal Code presented a 
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brutal violation of the freedom of journalists and of the media. This effort has been 
successful because this law was returned and it was amended in the Assembly. Even 
though the President has accepted a few such initiatives, it was not always decided to 
return the laws to the Assembly. Such a case is the initiative of the civil society which 
required the President to send back to the Parliament the Draft Law on Amnesty for 
its amendment. The President did not support the request and signed the Law 
because, according to their reasoning, any law that emerges as part of a political 
agreement between Kosovo and Serbia is mandatory to be adopted (Tacso, 2016). 
 
4.5 The Legislative Process, Parliament and Civil Society  
More meetings and activities with the public need to be organized so to identify their 
needs and to reflect them during the process of drafting the new laws in order to 
support the society's development. In this context, civil society can contribute to 
increasing legitimacy, transparency and accountability regarding the laws that are 
approved. The cooperation of the Assembly with NGOs has marked a continuous 
progress and it was intensified after the declaration of the independence. Notably, 
since the declaration of independence, some NGOs actively participated in the 
committee meetings of the Parliament. However, many international observers and 
representatives of few NGO’s interested in public participation believe that more 
dynamic and intensive cooperation is needed. They have analyzed and 
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recommended some steps that the Kosovo Assembly should undertake through its 
instruments and mechanisms to increase the role of the civil society in drafting laws. 
In this context, concrete recommendations have been given as how to improve the 
co-operation with NGO representatives by giving them greater access to the 
legislative processes in the Assembly/Parliament. This would help in adopting the best 
legislation for Kosovo. Among other recommendations, they have also recommended 
opening an office at the Assembly where citizens are able to voice concerns and 
receive answers to questions (USAID, 2008). 
Since the formation of the Kosovo institutions under the mandate of UNMIK in 2001 
onwards, cooperation between the Assembly and civil society has been regulated 
with a modest legal infrastructure. These relations were mainly developed through 
the Law on Access to Public documents and the regulation on the Organization and 
Responsibilities of Assembly. In order to advance this relationship few years after the 
declaration of independence, more laws and strategies have been adopted aiming to 
increase the interaction between Assembly and the CSOs in Kosovo. In order to 
ensure successful monitoring, adequate advocacy, and necessary transparency, NGOs 
needed to have access to legislative work of the Assembly. After the formation of 
Kosovo institutions, the Law on Access to Public Documents was adopted. 
Article 4 of Law on Access to Public Documents gives access to public documents; 
'......... the Law guarantees no discrimination to all the natural and legal persons in 
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their access to official documents ... . all public documents of the central government 
institutions, including local government, state (Law on Access to Public Documents, 
2017), the Law on Access to Public Documents, and the Law on Access to Public 
Documents. 
To a certain extent the legal base enables NGOs interested to provide input on the 
draft legislation to make major contributions for the legislative process when 
important draft laws are discussed within the Assembly’s committees, like for the draft 
law on the Kosovo budget (budgetary/financial implications), compatibility of the laws 
with the EU legislation, etc. Before the Independence of Kosovo, there were limited 
efforts for the purpose of shaping the engagement of civil society in public policies. 
Among other reasons as outlined previously in this Chapter this also came as a result 
of the lack of experience of the civil servants in the public administration and lack of 
normative regulations that enables public participation (Osce, 2007). 
After the Independence in 2008, in addition to the Law on Access to Public 
Documents another opportunity was given to the civil society to engage in the 
legislative process of the Assembly by approving the Law on the Legislative Initiative. 
'The law gives the citizens the right to initiate new legislation after having collected 
10,000 signatures as support from the citizens .... the relevant committees of the 
Assembly may develop these initiatives after they have received the draft law form 
and continue with the regular procedures' (Osce, 2011). During this period, the 
 145 
 
international organizations in Kosovo have also increased their interest in financing 
different projects of local NGOs in order to intensify their efforts for the participation 
and monitoring of the legislative process of the Assembly. This is because the only 
way to influence the legislative process is to actively participate in the work of 
parliamentary committees and thus to monitor the legislative process. 
However, NGO’s would participate in the legislative process only when that was a 
donor-driven agenda. The participation and contribution of civil 
society organizations in the legislative process of the Assembly was regulated 
by the ‘Regulation on the Organization and Responsibilities of the Assembly’. The 
regulation was a product of the joined work of the international experts, officials of 
the Assembly and of the civil society representatives (Tacso, 2010). Compared to the 
post-war period, after the formation of Kosovo institutions, the Assembly approved a 
solid infrastructure that offered more transparency for the legislative process in 
relation to the public. Through the aforementioned laws and regulations, it was 
offered a better access and cooperation to those NGOs which had a greater interest 
to participate in the legislative process of the Assembly. 
It is important to emphasize that the stages of the Assembly’s legislative cycle offer 
several opportunities that allow NGOs to participate in the legislative process. The 
success of a legislative process is not only the adoption of laws. The legislative 
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process is identified as successful only when the laws are implemented concretely and 
impact directly the development of the society. 
Interested NGO’s can actively participate in public hearings of the Assembly 
committees and there to give their contribution to draft laws for which they have 
interest. On the other side, NGOs can actively participate in the process of monitoring 
laws. Since the process of implementing laws is complex and lengthy, this also 
represents an opportunity for NGOs to follow every detail of this process (Osce, 
2007). For example one of the processes of particular importance and interest to the 
public is the process of adopting Kosovo's annual budget in the Parliament of 
Kosovo. NGOs can make a valuable contribution by participating in budget approval 
process, but to do so they should be familiar with the procedures how the budget is 
drafted and approved. 'All NGOs have this opportunity since they can attend Budget 
and Finance Committee meetings where budget reports are reviewed several times a 
year. One of the most important points in these reports is the report by the Auditor 
General. Since the report serves for the harmonization of expenditures on the basis of 
the approved budget, NGOs can make a significant contribution by focusing the 
attention of the public on the Report of the Auditor General '(OSCE, 2011). 
Despite the advancement of the legal basis the cooperation between the Assembly 
and the civil society needs to improve. There are stagnations and hesitations from 
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both sides, from the Assembly and the civil society, therefore important steps need to 
be undertaken in order to improve the public participation in the legislative process.   
If referred to different reports of many international organizations in Kosovo, like the 
OSCE, (among other specialized in monitoring the parliamentary work the civil society 
development) it can be noticed that that this cooperation is not at the desired level 
from which would benefit both the institutional development of the Parliament and 
the civil society. The reasons are more or less the same as in the case of relations and 
cooperation between the Government and the civil society. On one side the Assembly 
structures hesitate to cooperate with NGOs. The dynamics of cooperation between 
the Assembly and the civil society organizations remains low. Among other reasons, 
this comes as a result of the influence of the international donors. As noted in 
previous sections, most NGOs follow foreign donor agendas rather than what comes 
as a need from the society. The donor-driven agenda is one of the reasons that have 
curved the capacities of the civil society towards reflecting donor’s interest before the 
interest of society in the field of legislation. Consequently, it is the limited capacity of 
the civil society organizations one of the major factors that hinders its engagement in 
the legislative process (Osce, 2007). 
On the other side, like in the case of the Government –Civil society relations, 
Assembly’s did not manage to develop the institutional capacity so to absorb the 
capacities and contributions of the civil society for the legislative process. This is 
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mostly as a result of the lack of experience, because like other Kosovo institutions the 
Assembly is relatively a new institution. While analyzing the institutional capacities of 
the Assembly to absorb civil society's contributions for the legislative process, and its 
legal instruments that preserve the right of citizen to influence policies, as well as the 
level of information available regarding what is regulated by legislation, it can be 
noticed, that Assembly not always uses all its mechanisms to make the parliamentary 
work more transparent and accessible for the civil society organizations.  
In referring to the OSCE-Reference Book for the Civil Society Organizations it can be 
noticed that committees of the Assembly will not organize public hearings for each 
draft law being sent to the Assembly. Another concern raised in this report is that 
they do not inform particular NGOs when particular laws are drafted and often draft 
laws are not posted on the web page. On the other side, NGOs do not lobby 
intensively to be invited to the public hearings unless it is not a donor-driven agenda. 
Receiving written and oral presentations from local experts are important to those 
NGOs or groups that are affected by the implementation of the particular laws.  The 
parliament gives limited effort to ensure that NGOs know better how the laws are 
drafted, approved, implemented and evaluated (Osce, 2011).  
Most of the European Union member states provide sufficient mechanisms through 
which CSOs can integrate with their contributions and boost the public participation. 
The Kosovo Parliament after 2008 (after declaration of the independence) realized 
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that addressing the needs of citizens cannot be achieved only with the participation 
of the legal experts. The legislative process should also receive contributions from 
experts of other fields dealing with public policies. In this context, the Kosovo 
Parliament has invested little more than other institutions to expand the network of 
cooperation with civil society organizations and in this regard it is noticeable the 
improvement of institutional infrastructure. 
Although the relationship between the parliament and the NGO sector is more 
dynamic and functions better compared to the cooperation between NGO sector and 
representatives of the government, there is room for improvement (Khdr, 2008). 
There is no particular model of communication between parliaments and civil society 
that has a uniform application for all parliaments. Depending on the political systems 
and constitutional arrangements, various parliaments in Europe organize 
communication with civil society according to different models. NGOs need to be 
more insistent and more active in their engagement in the work of parliament. This is 
the only way to increase pressure and influence in the legislative process and 
contribute to addressing the needs of citizens through the process. Kosovo's 
parliament before the declaration of independence,  that is, since the formation of 
Kosovo institutions under UNMIK in 2002 up to four years after the declaration of the 
independence (until 2012) has organized the communication with various civil society 
organizations based on the Regulation on the Organization and Responsibilities of 
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the Assembly. During this period the Office for Media and Public Relations of the 
Kosovo Assembly managed the day to day communication with the civil society, 
respectively NGO sector. The regulation offered a legal basis for all civil society 
organizations interested in public participation during the Assembly’s legislative 
process (Osce, 2007). After the declaration of independence, although not in the 
desired level, the interest of civil society organizations grew to follow the work of the 
parliament. By this time it was considered that the previous Regulation on the 
Organization and Responsibilities of the Assembly did not meet the needs for greater 
transparency for the public and better involvement of the NGOs in the preparation of 
the legislation. 
The Kosovo parliament drafted a new document that responded to new 
circumstances in order to advance co-operation with the NGO representatives 
and increase the transparency of the legislative process in the parliament. The 
parliament of Kosovo approved the ‘Information and Public Relations Strategy of the 
Assembly of Kosovo’ in 2012. ‘The Adoption of the strategy has been a longstanding 
need for Assembly for increasing the transparency towards the public, to provide as 
much as possible information to citizens about the work of the Assembly as well as to 
encourage public participation in parliamentary work through monitoring and 
contributions in the legislative process (Kosovo Assembly, 2012). However, the 
Strategy's aim was not only to increase transparency in relation to the citizen but also 
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to try to educate the citizen about the importance of the work of the Assembly 
through press releases, publications, website as well as articles related to the 
legislative process (Osce, 2013). The strategy has envisaged concrete activities and 
procedures on how to achieve these goals by: Increasing the quantity and quality of 
information flow, revamping, improving and rationalizing the Assembly's website, 
creating a greater profile for the committees of the Assembly, updating the website 
based on the on-line agenda, posting draft laws on a separate section of the website, 
improving public outreach through public access, publishing a Monthly Newsletter, 
Info Sheets, organizing a virtual tour of the Assembly and developing videos to 
promote the work and responsibilities of the Assembly (Kuvendi i Kosovës, 2012). 
This strategy has also foreseen ways through which parliament should institutionalize 
the co-operation with civil society, respectively with NGOs which have a greater 
interest in monitoring the parliament's work.  
One of the main components for intensifying communication and relations with the 
civil society is the establishment of the Working Group consisting of the members of 
Assembly and representatives of the civil society organizations but also members of 
the Presidency of the Assembly of Kosovo (Osce, 2013). Within the provisions of the 
'Information and Public Relations Strategy of the Assembly of Kosovo' one of the 
main tasks set for the 'Joint Assembly-Civil Society Working Group' is to intensify the 
dialogue with the civil society representatives at the political level and make 
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systematic efforts for the creation of adequate Assembly’s institutional infrastructure 
with an aim of improving the relations between the Assembly and the civil society. 
'One of the goals is to create a database of CSOs by identifying their expertise and 
resources, to inform CSOs about the committee and plenary meetings and to invite 
the contingent of experts from different CSOs depending on the draft laws treated. In 
addition, there is a plan to invite various CSOs to assist in outreach and educational 
activities on behalf of the Assembly. The Office of Media and Public Relations staff will 
be responsible for administering and updating this database. ‘(Kuvendi i Kosovës, 
2012). 
However, after the approval of this strategy, in many observations of the international 
organizations in Kosovo, it was reported that many parts of the Strategy were not 
implemented. The Kosovo Parliament did not use all of its mechanisms to implement 
the strategy for cooperation with civil society. There is a lot of deficit in terms of 
providing information to the public by the Assembly. ‘The Assembly's Information 
and Public Relations Strategy should address these problems by publishing the 
legislative work and important documents during the legislative process. This 
information should be accessible to CSOs and the public in order to be able to see 
issues that are being addressed within the legislative process and maintain the 
transparency towards the public’ (Osce, 2013). 
 153 
 
Due to the lack of political will, the Strategy was not implemented as it was planned. 
Compared to other aspects at least in one direction, there is better progress in the 
co-operation between civil society and the Kosovo parliament. Representatives of civil 
society, respectively NGO sector, are mostly engaged with their presence in meetings 
of the parliamentary committees. However, if referred to the above OSCE Monitoring 
Report on the Performance of the Assembly of Kosovo for 2013, it can be noted that 
the procedure for NGO participation in these meetings is often complicated and 
NGOs fail without their fault to participate in committee meetings. The Assembly 
formally supports and encourages the participation of NGOs in the legislative 
processes. However, the Assembly staff should be more effective in solving many 
procedural issues related to timely information of CSOs for these processes. ‘The 
outcomes of the TACSO survey carried out in spring 2016, show that only 29.9% of 
CSOs have been consulted for a specific law and from those who were consulted only 
21% declared that all or most of their comments have been taken into account. .....The 
majority of CSOs (52%) stated that when they participate in public consultation 
process their comments and contributions in the committee meetings often are not 
taken into consideration' (Tacso, 2016). 
However, many NGO representatives assess that their comments were partly taken 
into account and the contribution during the consultation process is very rarely made 
public. They stress that Assembly's administration needs to build a better system of 
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information by being more organized and more efficient in disseminating information 
about the work of committees (BCSDN, 2017). 
The Monitoring Matrix on Enabling Environment for Civil Society Development for 
2016 conducted from the Kosovo Civil Society Foundation (KSCF) recognizes the fact 
that most of the recent legal acts have been drafted as a result of an increased 
engagement and pressure by the continuous emphasis of the European Union and 
other international organizations on the necessity of having a more developed civil 
society in Kosovo. 
Within this context, since the Strategy for Information and Public Relations 2012-2014 
was not fully implemented in 2014 another legal act was adopted providing a good 
legal basis for cooperation between the parliament and CSOs. In April 2014, finally the 
Declaration for Partnership of the Assembly with the civil society was adopted, 
followed by an Action Plan which was drafted as a joint effort between the parliament 
and CSO’s. Nevertheless, the adoption of strategic documents was not necessarily 
accompanied with sufficient engagement in the implementation of the commitments. 
‘Despite a number of positive developments, yet many challenges remain, in 
particular with regards to the lack of human and financial capacities dedicated by the 
Assembly for the civil society development, as well as insufficient political will for 
undertaking more substantial reforms in this area’ (Kscf, 2017). 
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4.6 Civil Society and local government’s interactivity 
When compared, the interaction between the central government and civil 
society with the cooperation with the local governments, the later it differs in the fact 
that it has no approved strategy for regulating this sphere. However, this co-
operation has continued over the years by facing approximately similar challenges 
that civil society faces during various interactions with the central government 
structures. 
The legal basis based on which any kind of co-operation between the 
local governments and of the civil society is roughly the same as it was before and 
after the declaration of independence. In general, the Law on Local Self-Government 
regulates public participation, in this case of civil society, in decision-making 
processes. This is then supplemented by other laws which regulate specific aspects of 
this cooperation as well, such as: the Law on Access to Public Documents; the Law on 
Public Financial Management and Accountability; the Law on Local Public Finances 
and the Law on Spatial Planning (Tacso, 2014). 
Despite the existence of the broad legal base it is hard to identify any recent 
distinguished achievement that is a direct result of the cooperation between 
representatives of the civil society and local government structures. There is no 
systematic approach of any municipality in involving civil society and citizens in its 
work. 'It has not been reported even once that civil society representatives and local 
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government in any municipality in Kosovo have developed a strategy improving 
cooperation between the two sides in order to build an appropriate communication 
system.' (Tacso, 2016) . According to the Municipal Transparency Reform Index for 
2015, the situation was far from being positive in the majority of municipalities. The 
cooperation with civil society remains low as local government structures are rigid 
and engage civil society only on ad-hoc basis. This is especially noticed when it 
comes to advocacy initiatives at the local level as representatives of different 
municipalities often hesitate to give access to various NGOs for information on the 
work of their municipalities (EC Ma Ndryshe, 2015). The activity of those NGOs that 
monitor the work of smaller municipalities in Kosovo is modest compared to larger 
cities such as: Prizren, Peja, and Mitrovica, while in Pristina this cooperation is more 
advanced and this is mainly believed due to a greater concentration of international 
donors in the capital. However, recently, the EU has approved a grant scheme that 
has dedicated around half a million Euros specifically aimed at reaching those NGOs 
that have not been traditional recipients of EU funds (Ksfc, 2017). While discussing the 
cooperation between the civil society and the local government, it should be 
emphasized that the low interaction between two sides is also a result of low 
participation of citizens, in addition to the hesitations of the municipal structures for 
cooperation with civil society. According to the UNDP Public Pulse results, citizen 
participation, which most commonly should be exercised at the local level, remains 
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very low. 'During a period of six months in 2015, 91 percent of respondents did not 
participate in any citizen initiatives or in any NGOs' (Undp, 2016). In general, the 
cooperation between NGOs and local governments in Kosovo remains low because 
local authorities hesitate to organize a well-established dialogue with civil society 
representatives, with few exceptions at the sectoral level (Tacso, 2016). 
 
 
4.7 Youth participation in social activities 
The youth are considered to be one of the greatest potentials for Kosovo's future 
development and modernization. About 50% of Kosovo's population is under the age 
of 25 years and about 21% of them are between the ages of 14-24. The United 
Nations Development Program in Kosovo conducted a survey which shows there is a 
very low civic engagement of Kosovo youth. Around 91 percent of youth have no 
wish to participate in any NGO and 93.8% of young people are not identified with any 
civil society organization or project and do not see themselves as beneficiaries of 
these projects in the future (Khdr, 2006). 
After the war of 1998-1998 the Kosovo society has no rich history of civic engagement 
culture and this may be one of the reasons why young people have very low active 
participation. Other reasons include the preoccupation of young people to find a job 
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as the economy in Kosovo is weak and does not provide any good prospects for 
them. 
Youth in Kosovo receive a very small incentive to develop their civic responsibilities 
either at school or at home and many young people do not believe that participation 
is a matter for them. Consequently, volunteering has decreased among youth after 
the war (Usaid, 2008). Volunteering has a unique history in Kosovo; it is a tradition 
that is a direct result of discrimination during the 1990s and of the ethnic solidarity 
towards the Serbian repression. The change in socio-political circumstances has also 
affected the decline of volunteering and volunteering projects. Young people see 
these activities more of a pervasive nature than service to the community.  'Most of 
the interviewed young people around 68 percent of them said that they never 
participated in any volunteering project for the community' (Khdr, 2006). In many 
occasions, Kosovar institutions promote the slogan "this strategy, this policy paper or 
document is prepared through joint work and a broad participation from the civil 
society representatives". Through similar statements, besides others, they want the 
public to have the impression that even young people have been contributors to the 
drafting of these documents. In fact, their inclusion is instituted without clear rules 
and obligations. For example, when it comes to approving an important law they 
should actively participate in different panels and commissions with experts and 
deputies from Kosovo Parliament until the final version of the law is produced. 
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Instead, they may be offered the right to express their views only during the first or 
second public discussion, when the first draft of that particular law is presented for 
media, but not further in the process (EC Kosovo Progress Report, 2009). From a legal 
and formal point of view, the Kosovo Government has drafted and approved 
"KOSOVO STRATEGY FOR YOUTH 2013-2017", although in practice not much of it 
was seen implemented. Most of the young people in local media claim that they have 
not noticed initiatives by the institutions that such a dialogue was offered to new 
generations. Since voluntarism is not a well-established phenomenon in Kosovo, this 
Strategy foresees legal and institutional mechanisms that among others would help 
to develop volunteerism among young people in Kosovo. At the moment in Kosovo, 
volunteering as an activity is not regulated by any specific law. The only legal act of 
relevance Law on Strengthening and Participation of Youth focuses on the ages 
between 15 to 24, but it does not include other youth ages (Tacso, 2016). One of the 
key objectives of the ‘KOSOVO STRATEGY FOR YOUTH 2013-2017’ is to increase the 
government's institutional commitment to the development of youth potentials and 
their orientation towards a more active participation in socio-political activities. For 
this purpose, the Ministry of Culture and Sports has a modest budget but it also 
relays on joint initiatives and donations of its international partners, including World 
Bank, USAID, and UNICEF. ‘This strategic document implies the focus, determination 
and commitment of the Government of Kosovo and other donors and all other 
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stakeholders in the mobilization of all resources, potentials and opportunities to 
create a more favorable environment for Kosovo youth and the commitment of its 
potential in the field of economy but also of other socio-cultural developments' (The 
Strategy, 2013). 
Referring to the obligations that emerge from the Strategy few initiatives have been 
initiated recently with an aim to finalize some legal acts that will lead to the 
development of voluntarism in Kosovo and potentially increase the Activities and 
engagement of young people in socio-economic initiatives. ‘The government has 
established a working group for this purpose which in 2015 decided to establish a 
cross-sectoral group for voluntarism. This group will also lead the planned analysis 
and process for designing models of voluntarism in Kosovo.’ (Tacso, 2016). 
Despite the approval of this already delayed legal framework and the establishment 
of the youth Councils not much of the Strategy has been implemented. As in the case 
of other strategies, this strategy has also followed almost the same problems during 
the implementation process, like the lack of institutional capacity, the lack of political 
experience and will and lack of budget. Consequently, this 'soft sector' has been 
neglected. "Alongside the creation of legal opportunities for participation, the 
challenges of the future consist in finding ways to strengthen these structures 
through various projects and activities, with a view to empower young people by 
motivating and encouraging them with regard to the important contribution that they 
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can give for the development of a democratic system in Kosovo. This, of course, is a 
challenge in itself when considering the decade’s long legacy in which a patronage 
system has prevailed and necessarily influenced their consciousness "(Feltes, 2011). 
 
4.7.1 Donor’s policy and institutional support for NGO’s 
In recent years, one of the biggest challenges for most NGOs is their financial 
sustainability, regardless of the fact that only some of them have created capacities, 
resources and expertise in their fields. With the shift of support from the situation of 
humanitarian support into the support for the development of institutions of Kosovo 
the civil society has received fewer donations and financial support which has led to 
the reduction of their activities and as a result a good number of them officially were 
no longer active. For many NGOs, this period is quite shocking as many of them are 
unable to compensate for international financial shortfall with the local resources. 
Many observers of Kosovar civil society have noticed that most NGOs have weak links 
to constituencies. In order to get more access to international donor funds, terms 
such as advocacy, anti-corruption, and minority rights became very popular in the 
NGOs vocabulary. Most of them were perceived from the public as elitist because 
they did not develop their own constituencies (Usaid, 2008). NGOs were driven by 
donor priorities and in rare occasions they reflected the needs of the society. 
Consequently, many of the NGOs suffered from low legitimacy, which is not good for 
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their public image. ' in couple of first years after the war most of the international 
donors have supported local NGOs with projects that have had little impact on 
society and in other cases they have been completely irrelevant to the circumstances. 
There was an evident lack of a strategic approach by the international donors. They 
did not focus on building of the capacities of the local NGOs in order to ensure their 
long-term sustainability but decided to sponsor only short term projects '(Khdr, 2006). 
However, the development of the NGO sector has been unimaginable without the 
support of international donors; yet, the capacity for local self-support was 
undermined due to this heavy dependence on international funds. Alternatives to 
foreign funding sources are not being developed. The government perceives that 
support for NGOs from foreign donors is sufficient and government support is 
unnecessary or not as urgent, so many of the NGOs depend primarily or completely 
on foreign donor support (Kipred, 2005). 
NGOs cannot support their activity exclusively in international donors as it is evident 
that the situation has changed with regard to the number of donors. International 
donations declined in the period when the transition from emergency situations 
shifted with projects aimed at supporting the development of the Kosovo institutions. 
The subsequent contraction of the financial support after a long period of time of 
generous support had a direct impact on the development and status of many NGOs 
in Kosovo. As underlined in this section, the capacities of many NGOs formed after 
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the war has now been reduced and some of them were imposed to stop functioning. 
A small number of civil society organizations survived during this period as they 
managed to improve and build up their own capacities. This has generally been a 
wining-out of NGOs as a result of the decline in financial resources (Usaid, 2008). 
International support is very important for the development of the NGO sector, but 
the decline of financial support directly affected the development of NGOs and a 
number of them have been forced to change the structure and dynamics of their 
activities. On the other hand, the decline of the international donations is not 
replaced by the support of national funds because the government of Kosovo does 
not have a strategic approach and vision on how to support the sustainability of the 
NGOs sector (Sterland, 2006). In addition to direct forms of the financial support, the 
government can support the development of the NGO sector through other 
institutional forms, by facilitating fiscal burdens or by contracting out NGOs for public 
services. In many European Union countries, creative ways of supporting civil society 
have been designed. Some of them have created the so-called "one percent model", 
through which regular taxpayers can allocate a symbolic share of their taxes for the 
civil society organizations.   Another idea is to outsource different public tasks to 
NGOs. Although not in large numbers there are specialized NGOs in certain areas 
such as education and health where they can provide better service than the public 
institutions themselves. The government could potentially establish models through 
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which transparent and clear procedures are contracted to different NGOs in order to 
perform certain services for the community. These are well-known community 
organizations. However, these ideas and models are missing in Kosovo as tenders for 
the provision of such services are mainly given to private companies and as a 
consequence government support for NGO sector remains poor. In order for this 
situation to change for the benefit of the NGO sector, the government should build 
mechanisms and support instruments for the NGO sector, such as tenders for service 
provision or open grant schemes. Open grant schemes would not make NGOs 
dependant on Government. Apart from their access to international donors, this 
scheme would only expand their financial opportunities. This model proved to be 
successful in many South-East European countries during the EU Integration 
process, where in general the role of NGOs is important to be strengthened (Tacso, 
2010).  
After a drastic decline of the foreign donations, a slight increase in international and 
public donations has been noted after the declaration of the independence. 
According to the KSCF Civil Society Index for 2013, international donations have 
increased from 70.17% in 2011 to 74% in 2013, as well as the public funds from 8.84% 
in 2011 to 20.50% in 2013. Donations on private basis or on membership contributions 
remain at low levels mostly because of the lack of legislation. On the other hand, one 
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thing is certain that most NGOs remain dependent on international donations (Kscf 
Index, 2013). 
One can say that NGO sector in Kosovo is primarily driven by international donors, 
lacking adequate institutionalization and professionalism. However, after the 
declaration of the independence in 2008, few NGOs involved with projects related to 
the democratization processes and those seen as playing a ‘watchdog’ role have 
increased their presence. Although there has been a decline in international 
donations, these particular NGOs continued to be funded by the international donors. 
‘For the period of 2009-2015 has accounted 2.1 billion USD of actual aid 
disbursements, much of it are donations for different local projects implemented from 
different CSOs.’ (World Bank, 2017). 
On the other side, it is not only the decline of international donations the only 
problem challenging NGO projects and activities. Until 2014 Kosovo lacked an 
electronic platform or database that would provide detailed information about the 
active international donors that support NGO sector financially. There have been 
some ideas and initiatives generated mainly from the international donors to develop 
such a database in cooperation with government institutions. 'For example the 
establishment of the Local Advisory Group (LAG) enabled prior consultation between 
NGOs and with the international donors on the programming of funds. These 
discussions were less focused on dedication and amount of funds and more about 
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project goals that what could potentially be supported by international donors. These 
discussions have been aimed at avoiding biased decision-making by many 
international donors who often gave advantages to certain NGOs during the process 
of granting funds and addiction of these NGOs to these grant schemes automatically 
influenced their independence . '(Tacso, 2014). 
 
With the support of the European Union, the Ministry of Integration has established 
the Aid Management Platform (AMP) in 2015 as a tool that will serve both to donors 
and structures of the government to be delivered with the accurate information 
about projects funded by different donors but also to be able to track which NGOs 
have been supported either through the projects or through direct funds, yet this 
instrument has not been supportive as expected in order to coordinate the activities 
between major international donors in Kosovo. Although some kind of diversification 
of donations has begun, external donors remain the largest sponsors of NGO projects 
in Kosovo. Some of the key international donors in Kosovo are: the European Union 
which provides financial support to civil society organizations in Kosovo with the 
grants distributed through the Civil Society Facility (CSF) and the European Instrument 
for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). UNDP is also one of the major donors 
that supports NGO sector in Kosovo mostly in the areas such as empowerment of 
local communities, socioeconomic development, human rights, gender and youth 
employment; United States through the USAID promotes the capacities of civil society 
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to take part and shape the country’s socioeconomic and political development; 
Switzerland is very active in supporting local NGO development in numerous of its 
ongoing projects, either as primary or as a secondary objective;  the Swedish 
International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) as part of its project portfolio 
in democracy support, promotes the participation of the representatives of the civil 
society in the development of the society, for example by supporting the 
development of free and independent media; the Norwegian Agency for 
Development Cooperation (NORAD), through the Norwegian Embassy supports 
through small grant schemes mainly NGOs dealing with capacity building at 
municipal levels and initiatives that are practical as they help directly in the 
development of individuals and local communities; the Finish Development 
Cooperation Agency (FINIDA), through the Fund for Local Cooperation (FLC), 
provides small grants t to NGO sector in the area of Human Development, Income 
generation and Decentralization; and Kosovo Foundation for Open Society (KFOS) is 
one of the foundations that has supported consistently the NGO sector through its 
wide  grant schemes and supporting network (Tacso, 2016). 
 
Very often NGO’s influence is limited as most of them follow more the agenda of 
their donors, rather than what comes out of society. International donors should allow 
those NGOs that have sources to the local society to develop their agenda and 
support their original ideas. They should also recognize the need for NGOs to 
 168 
 
formulate policy agendas at local level in order to secure their self-sustainability in the 
future. On the other hand, international donors need to invest more in the training 
and development of government structures through various training programs in 
order to increase cooperation with representatives of the civil society (Osce, 2013). 
The lack of coordination of the major international donors remains a serious problem 
as it affects the impact of NGO on public policy makings and simultaneously risks 
duplication of the same projects and efforts in the absence of close coordination. 
Most of these serious and powerful donors lack the coordination of their activities 
with local NGOs. ‘Due to the lack of exact data on the amounts of funds, it is 
impossible to generate any final assessments. Some coordination platforms of donors 
tend to share information among them for their support to civil society but there is 
no comprehensive and updated database for their support to the sector.’ (Tacso, 
2016). 
 
 
4.7.2 Legal basis and financial support for the civil society 
Immediately after the war, one of the first regulations issued by UNMIK was the 
regulation on the registration of NGOs aiming to establish a legal status for the NGOs 
operating in Kosovo. This Regulation established the UNMIK's NGO Registration Unit. 
NGOs had to be non-profit. In 2001 UNMIK issued another regulation which 
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regulated the legal aspect for the establishment of the Provisional Institutions of Self 
Government of Kosovo. Among other procedures, the Ministry of Public Services was 
responsible for assisting in the NGO registration process (Atrc, 2008). Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has also worked extensively through 
various projects and programs to assist in the capacity building of the NGO sector.  
 ‘One of the milestones was the establishment of NGO Resource Centers, which 
helped newly formed NGOs to complete the registration process. In July 2004, the 
Ministry of Public Services (MPS) established the NGO Division within the Department 
of Registration Services. Since the establishment of this Unit within the Ministry, 
competences for the NGO registration have been transferred from UNMIK to the 
MPS (Kipred, 2005). Once the "Kosovarization" process was completed, the transition 
between the UNMIK post-war reconstruction and humanitarian phase towards an 
established institutional environment took place. Presented with new circumstances 
over 200 NGOs, in cooperation with all Kosovo's political parties, and representatives 
of minorities, drafted the Law on Freedom of Association in Non-Governmental 
Organizations. This law included procedures for NGO registration and most 
importantly stated the financial reporting requirements for NGOs. 
Regulation 99/22 continued to regulate the legal aspects of the NGO sector because 
the aforementioned law did not come into force by UNMIK authorities. 'The law was 
approved by the Assembly of Kosovo in 2005 after some amendments, but the goal 
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has remained the same "to help the development of civil society by providing a 
supportive legal environment' ' (Law No.02 / L-6, 2005). 
The European Commission’s Progress Report for Kosovo (2008) pointed out the lack 
of legislation needed to guarantee the freedom of association is an obstacle to the 
functioning of NGOs. 
The incomplete legal framework caused ambiguous situations damaging the activities 
of NGOs. For example, the Ministry of Finance and Tax Administration required that 
NGOs pay taxes, even though they were previously granted with public beneficiary 
status by the Ministry of Public Services. The new 2005 NGO Law provides for a broad 
range of NGOs to apply for Public Benefit Status, which enables the qualifying NGO 
to take advantage of tax exemptions on earned income and tax incentives to 
charitable giving offered to individuals and businesses. Only in cases where the 
greater benefits are provided free of charge are considered to be of public benefit 
status under the Law (LAW NO.03/L-134). 
The issue of NGO financing and donations under the provisional institutions of 
Kosovo (supervised by UNMIK) needed urgently to address its legislative aspects. 
'NGOs in Kosovo had two options under the legislation. They could choose to benefit 
from self-financing ("income generated from lawful projects and activities") or choose 
to operate on a donation basis that can be absorbed in the form of grants, cash, in-
kind contributions and membership fees'. According to the Regulation on the 
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Registration and Operation of NGOs, all NGOs can organize and implement projects 
on the basis of economic benefits as they serve to the community, to NGO objectives, 
and not to individual interest or to the board members who run the NGO. (Unmik 
Regulation No 2001 / 19). However, all NGOs are required to provide their tax 
registration certificates in order for them to qualify for payment services that may be 
contracted by the government or other public institutions. According to the 
legislation, up to 5 percent of the NGO's taxable profit can be given as a donation for 
other humanitarian activities related to culture, education, health, sports, etc. ' (Unmik 
Regulation No.2002/3). 
Individual NGO donations were considered to be income and therefore subject to 
taxation as for individual donations tax benefits are excluded. Over-taxation is a 
problem due to inconsistent interpretations of the regulation by the Tax 
Administration of Kosovo.  The definition of “charitable” purposes applied in the laws 
regulating personal income tax and corporate income tax was not in line and 
corresponding with the definition of the public benefit status in the NGO Law In 
particular, many issues such as civil society, protection of democratic procedures and 
practices or even economic reconstruction were not included in the two tax laws. The 
NGO financing process has become an increasingly important issue but has not 
received clear answers from the legislation in force. Due to legislative ambiguity, this 
issue was often complicated in practice because there were many cases where an 
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NGO could not receive, for example, non-cash donations. The UNMIK Regulation 
complicated the process because it was in some cases discriminatory in relation to 
different NGOs. As such it was outdated and the need for new legislation emerged. 
Due to the ambiguity in the interpretation of the regulation and VAT law, there were 
situations when public institutions were also asked to treat donations as benefits by 
forcing them to pay the VAT. Such a well-known case for the public has been the 
reconstruction of the government building through donations to the European 
Agency for Reconstruction (EAR). The Tax Administration ruled that companies that 
will do the job should charge VAT to the government, regardless of whether it is a 
donation received by the government (Khdr, 2008). 
A legislative gap affected also registration of certain entities in Kosovo, given that an 
entity can choose between registering as an NGO or business, the latter may end with 
a legally confusing status, in extreme cases by registering as both business and NGO. 
‘Among the many examples of legislative gaps and ambiguities hindering the NGO 
functioning is also a provision obliging organizations to issue an employment 
contract to its volunteers and/or interns. This has legal and financial implications for 
the organization. Clarification of the legal status is necessary for a proper functioning 
of the NGO sector’ (Kipred, 2008). 
After the independence of Kosovo, the legal framework for the public financial 
support for the civil society organizations has improved to some extent. Positive 
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changes in the legal framework regarding the public funding of NGOs were 
identified. However, to make a more favorable financial environment and to 
institutionalize a model for funding NGOs, more changes in the legal framework are 
needed. A model of public funding for NGOs has been adopted by the Government 
in May 2016 and the process of drafting the necessary regulation has been initiated.’ 
Although the general legal framework for service provision is not restrictive, in 
practice these kinds of services become difficult to accomplish. Many NGOs have 
difficulty in providing service provision because they are usually limited only in the 
context of social services and they lack clear procedures in order to regulate other 
issues. The financial reporting formats for NGOs need to upgraded not only by 
addressing the specific needs of the sector, but also by serving as a true source of 
information on the financial state of the sector '(Kscf, 2017). 
The adoption of the Public Funding Model for NGOs has improved the situation to a 
certain degree because earlier according to the Law on Freedom of Association for 
NGOs that was followed with few Administrative Instructions the situation was further 
complicated as many problems appeared while considering what is the proper legal 
basis for public funding. ‘Most of the administrative instructions refer to public grants 
to NGOs as 'subsidies', they lack a definition as to what is considered as a program or 
project, they lack any harmonized criteria for distribution of funds, some of them do 
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not provide the mandatory content of the agreement, and finally do not suggest that 
public calls are the only way to distribute any funds to NGOs.’ (Tacso, 2016). 
As emphasized in this section the available data suggest that the foreign donors, 
followed by state institutions provide the majority of funding for civil society which to 
some extent diversifies funding process for NGOs. However, not all the procedures 
related to the public funding are always transparent and accessible. EC Progress 
Report concluded that the public funding provided to civil society is non-transparent 
and unregulated, thus required from the government to set standards and criteria 
governing public funding for CSOs so as to install transparency, accountability, and 
credibility in the process. 'The lack of transparent procedures during the process of 
public funding for the civil society organizations remains one of the main concerns' 
(EC Progress Report, 2016). 
The process of adopting legal acts in order to make more transparent financial data 
was intensified after the declaration of Kosovo's Independence. Within this context, a 
new law on the financing of terrorism and the prevention of money laundry was 
adopted. In 2013 the same law was amended. The importance of this law consists in 
the fact that the major part of the restrictive provisions for NGOs was removed. ' 
NGOs are very sensitive sector where the money laundry process could easily take 
place. Before receiving funds in higher amounts than 5000 euro NGOs are obliged to 
inform and get the authorization from the Financial Intelligence Unit of Kosovo. Thus, 
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the Law requires from NGOs that in order to receive payments as specified in the law 
they may obtain exemption from these obligations only through the approval of the 
Financial Intelligence Unit of Kosovo. '(Tacso, 2016). 
The public funding for NGOs has had major legislative issues under the mandate of 
UNMIK and during the period of Kosovo's interim institutions. The period after the 
independence and specifically the year 2016 was marked by the adoption of a 
number of important documents related to the civil society operations and 
development; such is the case in the areas of public funding and the money laundry 
regulation. However, despite advances through the adoption of the Model on Public 
Funding for NGOs or the Law on Prevention of the Money Laundry and Financing of 
Terrorism the public funding for NGOs remains the least regulated area with regards 
cooperation of the representatives of the civil society and of the Government. Public 
funds for NGOs are more significantly present but distributed without any defined 
transparency and criteria (Kscf Index, 2013).  
In order to functionalize the model on public funding for NGOs, to improve the 
situation with regard to the tax benefits for NGO donors and improvement of the 
process of the financial reporting from NGOs, more legal acts are needed. Approval 
of these legal acts would further regulate this area and improve the public funding 
process for NGOs. The adoption of the Model on Public Funding needs to be 
followed with the adoption of the specific regulation in the governmental level (not in 
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the ministry level) providing a comprehensive framework to govern the whole cycle of 
public funding for NGOs starting with planning, distribution, monitoring, reporting, 
and evaluation. Until the regulation is adopted and implemented, public funds for 
NGOs continue to be distributed without any clear criteria. On the other side, even 
with this legislation, there are some problems that are of the same nature as those at 
the time of the UNMIK's administration. The regulation tax benefits for NGOs, when 
they undertake economic activity was followed by legislative uncertainty. This is 
especially the case for those NGOs that have not applied for the public benefit status. 
'The main interpretation is that NGOs that engage in any economic activity are 
exempt from the corporate tax if the income destination is solely for the public 
benefit purpose. While the article on tax exemptions mentions only PBOs, another 
article on commercial activities refers to all registered NGOs. This incompatibility and 
ambiguity results in a conjecture in the interpretation and implementation of 
economic activities. '(Bcsdn, 2017). No changes have been made with respect to the 
financial reporting of NGOs according to the Law 03 / L-222 on Tax Administration 
and Procedures. 
With regards to the tax benefits for NGO donors, the main improvement has been 
noted in the new law on corporate income, adopted in September 2015, which 
doubled the tax exemption for corporate donors to a number of public benefit 
activities. If determined by other laws, this tax relief can increase up to 20%. ‘ While 
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the Law on Freedom of Association in NGOs allows for tax and fiscal benefits for 
Public Benefit Organizations, such benefits are ambiguous in the tax legislation and 
are not regulated according to the chapter on the Public Benefit of the Law on 
Freedom of Association in NGOs. Similar provisions are also in the new Law on 
Personal Income Tax. ‘(Tacso, 2016). 
Kosovo institutions need to increase the dynamics of work related to the approval of 
the necessary legislation in order to address problems related to the financial and tax 
reporting formats and procedures for NGOs. In order for these procedures to be 
revised and meet the specific needs of the sector and increase the transparency of 
the public funding process, the civil society representatives have to increase their 
pressure towards the institutions (Kscf, 2017). 
 
4.7.3 The Capacities of the Civil Society 
While analyzing the cooperation between the Government and the representatives of 
the civil society by referring to different research reports from the various 
international and local organizations, one can say that the deficiencies that exist in 
the dynamics of interactivity between the central and local institutions and of the civil 
society have a lot to do with itself with the lack of developed capacities of the civil 
society. Indeed, there are often problems that can be identified on the part of civil 
society, which hampers its commitment in the public policy decision making 
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processes. All of the investments after the war contributed in the creation of the civil 
society structures, especially in the NGO sector, but yet they did not achieve the 
desired level. 
 Based on the research conducted by KODI on behalf of OSCE in 2007, there were 
about 4,000 registered NGOs in Kosovo. For a country with less than two million 
people, this has been an enormous number of NGOs. A considerable number of 
these local NGOs have been formed as satellites of the large international 
organizations. 'Structures really exist, integrated into different local and international 
NGOs, but civil society has failed to make its contribution for developing a 
democratic society by being more active on behalf of citizens so to push ahead  
agendas related to important public interests' (Osce, 2007). 
If we compare these data with the latest data from the Tacso report 2016 it emerges 
that in 2016 the number of registered NGOs has increased as there are more than 
8,500 registered NGO’s. It is assessed that no more than 10-15% of them are active. 
However, the assessment of the capacities of the civil society organizations is not 
measured exclusively by the number of registered NGOs because a large number of 
them are inactive. The capacities of civil society should mainly be evaluated through 
their internal governance, profiling (expertise), constituency building and visibility. 
These are all elements that help to increase alignment of specific indicators as part of 
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the “EU Guidelines for Civil Society Support in Enlargement Countries 2014-2020 
(Tacso, 2016). 
Internal governance is a very important aspect of civil society organizations. The Law 
on Freedom of Association in NGOs determines some minimum requirements for 
internal governance of an NGO. They are obliged under the applicable laws to 
organize their structures and have bodies such as boards and assemblies. All these 
bodies should have clear and organized responsibilities and duties. The law obliges 
registered organizations that besides structures they need to approve important 
documents that regulate financial issues, code of ethics, and possess strategic 
planning. The KCSF Index survey finds that the majority of NGOs have such an 
organization of structures and documentation but the issue is that a very small 
number of NGOs implement them in practice (Kscf, 2013). The 'Needs Assessment 
Report' conducted by Tacso for 2014, concerning the internal governance of NGOs, 
identifies financial management and organization of human resources as one of the 
acutest problems for NGOs. Financial and procurement management is a matter that 
reflects serious internal governance deviations followed by the lack of transparency as 
well. 'Instead of financial officers often founders and leaders of the NGOs execute 
payment to different parties. The issue of human resources remains a problem since 
the in-house staff of most NGOs is recruited only on a project basis and in this regard 
NGOs are consistently dependent on external international funding '(Tacso, 2014). On 
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the other hand, according to the TACSO Survey conducted in Spring 2016, most of 
the surveyed NGOs declare that their internal documents are accessible to the public 
- 57% of NGOs have access statutes, 51% of NGOs have the accessible internal 
rulebook, 58 % of NGOs have an accessible Annual Activity Report, 53% of NGOs 
have access to financial reports and 43% of NGOs have access to financial statements 
that are audited. Overall, the majority of NGOs have serious problems with the 
creation and organization of permanent government structures and the 
implementation of their decisions in practice (Tacso, 2016). In addition to these 
elements, the low citizen's engagement is another factor that impacts the 
development of the civil society capacities. Kosovar citizens remain largely apathetic 
towards public life in general, including low levels of engagement in civil society. Only 
3% of citizens are members of an NGO and less than 4% of them have done any 
voluntary work for the sector (Kscf Index, 2016). Profiling and Networking of NGOs 
were often raised in various reports and researchers of international organizations as 
well as in forums between donors and civil society representatives. The 'can do all 
attitude' as emphasized earlier in this section remains a problem for most of the 
NGOs. 'In general, NGOs tend not to create specific but general expertise, hoping to 
qualify for all kinds of activities and projects sponsored by the international donors 
which caused more harm than benefit to them because lack of specialization in any 
field exposes great risks for their future functioning (Tacso, 2016). In addition to the 
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lack of profiling for NGOs, Kosovo has no accurate database of civil society networks. 
The Kosovo Women Network is one of the oldest networks in Kosovo that gathers 
around 100 women organizations throughout Kosovo. Democracy in Action is a 
national network, which becomes active only when there are local or national 
elections. The CiviKos Platform was established in 2007 in order to support the 
development of cooperation between the civil society and Kosovo institutions. As for 
the Advisory Group, there is only the Kosovo Local Advisory Group which was 
established in 2009 and is comprised of three government representatives, four 
representatives from the international donors, one from the media, and eleven civil 
society organizations. Having in mind that only a few NGOs have clearer missions and 
designed goals, one can say, that profiling and networking of NGOs are not yet on 
the desired level (Tacso, 2014 & 2016). 
If we refer to the reports of various international and local organizations that have 
systematically monitored the development of civil society since the postwar period, it 
is quite easy to identify a nearly similar finding in all of their reports that explicitly 
states that NGOs in Kosovo have failed to build upon their constituencies and 
develop their legitimacy based on them. This similar phrase can be found in reports 
conducted by KIPRED, KHDR or OSCE in 2003, 2005, 2006, 2007 (before 
independence), until 2008 and 2010, 2011, 2013, 2014 and 2016. 'Observing the civil 
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society's priorities it results clearly that they often do not reflect public interests but 
rather those of their donors.' (Tacso, 2014). 
In most of these reports, the reasoning is almost the same. NGOs have failed to build 
upon their constituencies because most are financed by international donors and 
therefore are obliged to follow donor agendas before the public ones (Tacso, 2016). 
The debate is divided between those that think that NGOs don't need to build their 
legitimacy over their constituencies and the contrary. Some consider that civil society 
should be categorized depending on the nature of their activities and actions. They 
cannot be all integrated in one category because some are service providers, others 
do advocacy activities and others are anti-corruption civil society organizations. There 
are even opinions that go further by considering that the accountability has not risen 
from the people, but it belongs to individuals who have also taken the initiative to 
establish those civil organizations. However, it prevails the opinion that the 
representation of citizens by NGOs and their accountability to citizens is very 
important. In this context, membership NGOs makes an exception as they are 
accountable to their members who are defined by their mission and activities. Except 
for membership NGOs in all other activities that are taken on behalf of the public 
interest NGOs should have accountability vis-à-vis the citizens because if these 
projects are implemented for the benefit of the citizen then the responsibility must be 
given to that group of citizens' (Kfos, 2015). If referred to the above analyses of the 
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Kosovo Foundation for Open Society Report in 2015 on the ‘Accountability of NGOs 
in Kosovo’, which is given based on literature and in logical arguments, then it can be 
said that in general the situation has not changed much since the post-war period as 
most of NGOs have failed to develop their relationship with their constituencies. 
There is only a limited number of NGOs that are involved in projects that aim to 
involve citizens and have stronger connections with their constituencies. They are 
organized around the advocacy and lobbying activities or by monitoring the Kosovo 
institutions in order to influence the public decision-making process for the interest of 
the citizen. However, their work is not very visible because in this regard the media 
does not give enough space to these NGOs. Consequently, all those NGOs interested 
in extending their political activism are imposed to operate with limited capacities as 
their activities do not appear in the media. Thus, a large number of civil society 
representatives remain outside of the orbits of government public decision-making. A 
study conducted by Tacso in 2013 on relations between media and NGOs shows that 
the civil society has serious problems with media communication. Their 
communication as two important sectors of civil society is not at the required level. 
Representatives of NGOs argue that the media do not give enough space to NGOs 
because they have more focus on daily political events. ‘Both the media and NGOs 
identify completely different factors when attempting to justify the lack of their 
cooperation and joint projects. This shows that the two sectors are at a very low level 
 184 
 
of cooperation, which means they must first advance their communication in order to 
improve their future relations '(Tacso, 2013). 
It seems that the situation has improved a little bit in the last year, although the 
progress is still modest. If referred to findings of the Tacso Survey from spring 
2016 the public still believes that NGOs are not sufficiently present in the public. 
Respondents’ list primarily similar reasons why they think that NGOs are not 
sufficiently present in the media as 54% of them believe media shows little interest to 
report NGO activities and implemented projects, whereas only 
28% of them say that the lack of adequate NGO activity is the reason for this. 
Citizens believe that civil society is active more on the rights of women, human rights, 
and education, and have less activity related to what they consider that is their 
priority, such are: security issues, employment and fight against corruption (Tacso, 
2016). 
Most of the above-elaborated reasons influence in how citizens perceive NGOs and 
their activities. The relations developed with their constituencies as well as their 
visibility  are main factors that impact on how the civil society is perceived by citizens 
in terms of their importance and impact in the public decision-making process. 
 
4.8 The process of European Integration and the civil society 
4.8.1 The impact of European Integration process on NGO sector 
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European integration is the process where citizens and Kosovo institutions see the 
future of society's development. However, while the euro-integration processes have 
backing of almost 90 percent of the citizens of Kosovo in all EU progress reports over 
the past years it is clearly stated that the institutions of Kosovo need to undertake 
more initiatives and serious reforms in order to achieve integration of Kosovo into the 
EU.  According to recent progress reports from the European Commission the civil 
society is not fully engaged in this process. The EU integration process presents great 
opportunity for the civil society organizations to become more active by using the 
mechanisms and instruments that this process offers. Considering the importance of 
the EU integration process and the fact that Kosovo's society is not fully committed to 
this goal, there is a need for the civil society representatives to get better organized 
and put forth their contribution. 
Apart from other societal factors, the transformation, development and reform of 
Kosovo institutions can also be influenced by the active role of civil society. 
Representatives of civil society organizations in the framework of the EU integration 
process can use important mechanisms and instruments that make their roles even 
more visible. In this context, if the EC Annual Progress Reports for Kosovo are 
analyzed, it is obvious that the reports evaluate the development of civil society, but 
rather direct support for the development of civil society should come from 
governmental institutions. Thus, the Annual Reports require by the national 
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government to invest more in its relations with civil society by giving civil society 
representatives a deserved role in public decision-making processes (Khdr, 2008). The 
civil society representatives should rely on these findings and search for their active 
role in relation to the government. In situations like in the last couple of years, it is 
necessary to intensify the role of the NGOs that focus on political activism in order to 
increase the democratic participation in the political system. 
In Kosovo’s circumstances, these types of NGO’s are primarily considered NGO’s that 
support rule of law projects, socio-economic reforms, public administration reforms, 
human rights, media development and reforms in education, as these are some of 
the basic fields where Kosovo needs to improve faster. Within this perspective, the 
role of NGOs is very important in the whole process, starting from monitoring the 
legislative process and implementation of certain laws, identifying citizen needs, 
active participation through drafting of strategies and policies, and EU compatibility 
check of the laws approved by the Assembly. It is not only the monitoring role for 
public institutions that contributes to the process. Representatives of NGOs should 
insist on becoming a serious cooperative partner with the European Commission (EC), 
in the euro-integration process. Kosovo's NGOs need to work seriously to improve 
their capacities in order to be able to participate actively and impact the public 
decision-making processes (Sterland, 2006). 
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The civil society in the European integration processes plays the role of the partner, 
and in this case the EC is the supporting organization which in its leading documents, 
such as expansion and financial strategies, has provisions that provide support to civil 
society. In a natural alliance between themselves, the civil society process of European 
integration is influenced by each other. One such case is the Baltic States, where EU 
integration has also affected civil society transformation. (Spurga, 2005).  
Kosovo in its EU integration process, as well as other Western Balkan countries that 
work in meeting the conditions for membership, is part of the central mechanism - 
the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) and the implementing instrument - 
the Stabilization Tracking Mechanism (STM), designed to enable them to participate 
in the SAP. This was the only opportunity for Kosovo to engage as separate from 
Serbia in the integration process, although the MPS did not respond to contractual 
questions regarding EU-Kosovo relations, EU has managed to create this special 
framework for Kosovo in these processes (Khdr, 2006). Impact on the EU can be 
exercised using EU instruments and this can be implemented by NGOs as in the case 
above. The problem of access to information, which can be very concerning, is 
regulated by addressing the European Commission, within the European Partnership. 
From there, the EC further through its own contracting authority, addresses the issue 
to the national authority and it will check whether or not the governments implement 
the recommendations, and reports progress on them regularly. The contracting 
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power of the EC in this case is quite large and for this is a proper way of addressing 
these problems (Khdr, 2008). NGOs do a lot of complex and not easy tasks in 
promoting their agendas and taking part in the EU integration process. "Although the 
EU tries to support civil society, the barriers that arise from bureaucratic procedures 
are quite large, and the aid programs that are appropriate are implemented by civil 
society (Raik, 2006). The role of civil society organizations in raising public awareness 
of the integration process consists in the use of EC financial resources and 
instruments, by designing projects and by participating in policy and strategy setting, 
and this has also been a good implementation practice in the civil societies of Eastern 
Europe. Many of the civil society organizations have implemented the monitoring of 
their government, precisely because of this political activism that has made the civil 
society participatory in drafting policies during the integration process. The more 
informed is the civil society, the more it has impact on this process. For this, evidence 
is found in the practices and experiences of Eastern European countries that have 
successfully completed the process followed with the integration into the EU 
(Sterland, 2006). Apart from the general integration process, regarding the 
monitoring implemented by NGOs, it is a process that embraces different 
instruments, depending on the capacity of the country aspiring to integrate. In some 
countries which are in the early stages of integration, the capacity to implement 
strategies and policies is smaller. Kosovo is one of these countries. In these cases, 
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policy-making itself is also monitored. This is particularly the case with the legislation, 
which should ensure that the draft laws are checked; to comply with the standards set 
by the EU and adopted in accordance with the EU established standards and timely 
adopted (Khdr, 2008). The other mode of exploitation of NGOs that participate in the 
integration process through monitoring is to include them in the Committee for 
European Integration, as part of the National Assemblies. The capacity of NGOs, with 
their mechanisms, which can bring rapid and effective results, in particular in the EU 
integration process, is generally neglected by the Government and NGO 
representatives (Usaid, 2008). This can be improved by involving more NGOs, in order 
that they direct their capacities in initiating and implementing public dialogue for 
Kosovo's membership in EU. In this process, publishers should be supported by the 
local media, with a view of providing greater public information about the European 
integration process and making more public campaigns through which more can be 
done to define the needs of citizens. NGOs should be inseparable in the reform 
process, as well as in monitoring the results, and consequently increase the 
effectiveness and reputation of civil society in assessing the effect of strategies, laws, 
and public policies. (Khdr, 2008). 
The EU integration process has been increasing dynamics over the years in Kosovo. 
The EU operates in Kosovo through its political structures such as the European Union 
Presidency, the EU Special Representative and the European Union Office in Kosovo, 
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but it is also present through the EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX). In addition to these 
EU mechanisms, the EU integration process in Kosovo is supported by the embassies 
of different EU member states present in Kosovo.  Like in other Western Balkan 
countries, Kosovo benefits from the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) and 
other EU financial support programs such as TEMPUS program, TAIEX, EIDHR and 
Twinning and P2P programs. 
In order to support the EU Integration process with the special focus on active 
participation in the Stabilization-Association Process, Kosovo has established relevant 
structures such as: Ministry of European Integration, Parliamentary Committee for 
European Integration, National Council for European Integration, Ministry of Local 
Government and Administration European Integration offices in Ministries and 
Municipalities, as well as a number of offices and departments within independent 
agencies and institutions (Kscf, 2017). 
As underlined above, following the declaration of independence, Kosovo moved from 
the STM process to Stabilization and Association Process. The Stabilization and 
Association Process enabled Kosovo to sign Stabilization and Association Agreement 
(SAA) with many difficulties as Kosovo is still not recognized as independent state 
from five EU member states. The process of EU integration in Kosovo has begun to 
take its form through the mechanisms and instruments provided within this process. 
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The participation of the civil society organization's in the European integration 
process is of a critical importance. 
Within the framework of the EU Integration mechanisms and instruments, NGOs can 
contribute in many ways. However, the interaction of the civil society with the Kosovo 
government within the EU integration process is structured only in some of its levels. 
This co-operation lacks a more comprehensive structure where the role and 
contribution of civil society would be institutionally recognized. Both central and local 
officials should identify the potential cooperation with the civil society organizations. 
'The best experiences and models in the region should also be taken in consideration 
in order to be able to build and develop effective forms of cooperation between the 
two sides' (CiviKos, 2017). 
There are established mechanisms for the cooperation between the civil society and 
EU Institutions. NGOs are invited every year to a meeting which is held one day 
before the plenary session of the Stabilization-Association process dialogue, at the 
technical level, there are seven sectorial meetings between Kosovo authorities and 
representatives of the European Commission and NGOs are invited to contribute with 
their expertise depending on the field discussed. Another mechanism for cooperation 
is the contribution of the NGOs on the ECs Progress Report for Kosovo as they are 
invited from EC to give their contribution on various fields which are covered by the 
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Progress Report. Kosovo NGOs can also contribute to programming and determining 
priorities within the financial assistance aim to support the civil society (Kscf, 2017). 
However, a more dynamic approach to the EU Integration process should be 
expected from NGOs. It is of an extraordinary importance for NGOs to give 
contribution to the process within the framework of the dialogue that takes place at 
both political and technical level. 
In general, and as underlined in a previous chapter, the experience of the South-East 
European countries has shown how critical was the role and contribution of civil 
society organizations in the framework of the accession process.   
Chapter V 
The role of educators and religious leaders in their capacities as civil society for the 
democratization processes 
 
5.1 The contribution of civil society actors in capacity building and conflict resolution  
Rapid development of the NGO sector after the war was accepted from the public 
sometimes with optimism and other times with cynicism and skepticism. Because of 
the large number of established NGOs that in many reports of foreign and local 
organizations were referred as 'NGO boom', in Kosovo, as in any other post- socialist 
context the notion of NGOs became interchangeable with that of civil society. This 
was a direct consequence of the approach used by the international donors after the 
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war in Kosovo, as many of them ‘forgot’ that civil society organizations (CSO) 
represent more than an NGO. In fact, CSOs include a lot more than what the “non-
governmental organization" represents as a conventional term. The western type of 
NGOs (non- governmental organizations) elaborated in the previous chapter bring 
people closer to one issue jointly, such as human rights organizations, humanitarian 
organizations, etc. On the other side, CSOs are more than an NGO as they include 
labor market actors (trade unions and federations), economic and social actors, and 
CBOs (community-based organization (Coneccs, 2016). 
CSOs are usually categorized in: Advocacy CSOs (awareness activities) ; Mediation 
(acting as the intermediary between sectors and different groups) ; Service Providers 
(humanitarian, developmental ) ; Evaluation and monitoring (serves as "guard" or 
independent party (Nelson, 2007). 
In the previous chapter, the role and contributions of the CSOs that are part of the 
functional categories such as: Advocacy, Mediation, Service Providers and Monitoring 
were analyzed. In this chapter, the role of organizations that are part of the functional 
categories such as: Capacity Building and Conflict Resolution will be analyzed. In this 
context, contributions of educators and religious actors in their capacities as civil 
societies are emphasized. During the process of providing education, training and 
information educators can give a significant contribution for the developing the 
identity among the main communities in Kosovo based on the concept of citizenship, 
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while religious leaders can act as mediators and moderators in their communities and 
get involved in their efforts to foster democracy. 
 
5.1.1 The impact of education on identity formation in educational settings in Kosovo 
The solutions of interethnic conflicts, taking care that the dominant and minority 
groups have a respectful relationship within a balanced and constructed system, 
based on the principle of non-discrimination, is one of the main preconditions for EU 
membership for all countries in Southeast Europe. The educational rights in the 
Western Balkans were among the most problematic issues in the last decade, and in 
Kosovo's fragile society, the education system is one of the many challenges that 
Kosovo faces. Because of the difficulties in statehood building of Kosovo, which is 
often a painstaking process, and because of the dialogue with Serbia, many of the 
important issues related to education in Kosovo, remain under the shadow of these 
processes. In these circumstances, the education system remains fragmented and 
politicized. Education as one of the most influential elements in the formation of an 
individual's identity, especially in different cultural societies, plays a role in forming the 
identity of an individual,  based on the concept of citizenship, as explained in various 
analyzes of the theoretical foundations of multiculturalism. Education has a strong 
influence on the formation of an individual's identity. Ethnicity, nationality and 
citizenship are only some of the possible identities within the very conception of the 
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individual that are most important to the relationship between the citizen and the 
state (Kostovicova, 2005). Concerning the impact on the formation of ethnic and 
national identity, education has had an impact both on Albanians and Kosovo Serbs, 
often in malicious ways, as a result of counterfeiting of history and keeping myths in 
school curricula. This affects the education of new generations and is often seen as 
threatening for Kosovo's integration in EU, and in general for a peaceful future of the 
country. For decades, younger generations through school curricula and media were 
fed with mythical stories and as a consequence the deception and hatred was placed 
in the public education system of Kosovo, which changed the practice of the common 
educational system of ethnicities that functioned for years after the World War II, 
almost without return. (KohaNet, 2017). 
For a more detailed explanation of the parallel education system, as explained in the 
second chapter, the separate education system implies a system where Albanians 
were educated separately from Serbs, and Serbia had established state curricula for 
Serbs who in the 1990s had an impact on the creation of this fully separated and 
segregated system after the 1998-1999 war in Kosovo. 
 
5.1.2 Promotion of nationalist type of segregated system of education  
The education process in Kosovo is divided into two parallel systems: the first is the 
system of Kosovo institutions where Albanians are educated as a majority and a few 
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non-Serb minorities, and the second is set by the Government of Serbia with their 
funds, where Serbs and some non-Serbian minorities get educated separately in their 
system. This type of nationalist-type segregated system is nowhere to be found in 
Europe. The failure of the international community and institutions of Kosovo to 
provide an integrated curriculum for Albanians and Kosovo Serbs is made even more 
impossible as a result of the constant pressure that Belgrade exercises in the Serb 
minority in order to stop them to integrate into the education system in Kosovo. This 
further strengthens the formation of ethnic-based identity by transforming this into a 
natural alternative for the new generations, and this makes it almost the only 
alternative for these created ethnic and national identities to dictate their political 
behavior as well (Kostovicova, 2005). 
In the history of statehood of Kosovo, the history of education has a major impact on 
the communication of national narratives. This is communicated in continuity to the 
new generations by teaching the children two completely contradictory perspectives 
of the history of Kosovo, where the national narrative of one country offends the 
other, thus producing reciprocal hatred between the new generations and creating 
two new identities on this basis. It cannot be overlooked that the emphasis on this 
kind of national and ethnic identities is the result of the model of national history 
teaching in separate education systems of young generations in Kosovo. The 
resistance of Serbs to contribute to the design of school curricula continues to have 
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the same reasoning that they do not want to be part of the self-proclaimed state by 
Kosovar Albanians. On the other hand, the Albanians who are by majority responsible 
and in charge of education institutions, do not always follow the constitutional spirit 
of a multiethnic state, when it concerns the curricula. With this refusal by the 
Albanians and the Serbs it has deepened the 'status problem' by further damaging 
the process of statehood. This has also damaged the prospect of EU integration, 
where promoting and encouraging tolerance among ethnic groups, guaranteed by 
the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo. Within this context, it is important to 
emphasize that The Constitution of Kosovo has the bases in the concept of 
citizenship as an identity (Kec, 2008). 
Individuals that are strongly identified with Kosovo as a new state, given the greater 
importance to identity values, make up a significantly smaller number than those 
identified by their ethnicity and who consider that at their central level their group is 
more important. Such an attitude reminds us that ethnocentric arguments served 
long as a justification for horrific events such as ethnic cleansing and genocide 
throughout the history of Balkan. The root of failed democratization of Kosovo 
among many other reasons is also in the education system, a system of 
contradictions, overwhelmed by the force of ethnic identity. Among the ethnically-
divided schools, it is difficult to make the right democratization and to establish a 
natural connection between Albanians and Serbs within the new state of Kosovo 
 198 
 
(Kastrati, 2016). What may be the role of educators should be reflected in frame of the 
above discussion. 
In a multicultural society that is evolving, still far from the ideals it seeks, one can ask 
how Serb minority education can help the bicultural identity through its education. 
Approaches such as reforming legislation, drafting strategies, or redesigning 
education policies of the education system are not often promising and sustainable 
solutions. According to Terrice Bassler, the context of education is contradictory 
across Southeastern Europe "and triumphs of chance, as he describes them consist of 
reaching peace agreements, beginning a national education reform process, 
approving laws or any new program, and adopting texts or projects. In all of the 
above the entire Ministry of Education or the Government moves in line with these 
approaches. "(Bassler, 2005).  On behalf of such experimental reforms of the 
education system, the international community and the institutions of Kosovo have 
made many steps in the country. These reforms did not touch the core of the 
problem, which is the education of younger generations in the extreme nationalist 
spirit. Such education that strengthens the nationalist ethnic identity has its effect on 
society and the state, and this effect cannot be avoided by applying reforms that are, 
in their nature, quantitative, formal and technical. The root of this phenomenon is 
from the Second World War, which continued after the war in Yugoslavia, while in the 
Milosevic era deepened even more and it was passed also during the UNMIK 
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administration and in independent Kosovo.  During the administration of UNMIK lack 
of work with educational institutions and schools to develop positive feelings of youth 
identity and development of inter-ethnic youth programs in order to reach and 
deepen understanding among them has had its consequences. UNMIK authorities 
argued that the separation or traditional type of isolated education for the Serb 
community from the main society should be allowed (KEC, 2008). Kosovo, from its 
institutional design, is a state based on citizenship, where all citizens are equal before 
the law and by Constitution is a multiethnic state with elements of individual 
liberalism (more or less Christian Joppke’s concept of citizenship). 
It is based on the fact that citizenship rights are achieved through universal ones, 
traced through documents, strategies, state poetry and laws, namely the Constitution, 
and on the other hand, 189 schools continue to educate younger generations in the 
extreme nationalist spirit and hatred and demonization of the other party. The 
ethnocentrism that this approach creates increases even more with educating the 
youngsters that their race is more superior to the other race and that ethnocentrism 
is spread in all aspects of public life. The formation of national and ethnic identity is 
influenced by the divided system but also by the education system related to Albania 
for Albanians and Serbia for Serbs. This does not serve the EU perspective when it 
comes to a climate that shapes Albanian and Serbian youth in that manner so that 
they “stand ready to wait for the historical moment" to show the accumulated hatred 
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over the years because of these ultranationalist kitchens (Kastrati, 2016). Given the 
great role of national and ethnic identity in political behavior, apart from preserving 
ethnic identity and culture, Serbs as a minority should learn to be part of coexistence 
models, to integrate with the prevailing culture in Kosovo. A good model for Kosovo 
Serbs is the bicultural model. The bicultural model includes bilingualism and 
acceptance from the mainstream society without being disconnected from their 
cultural community. The tasks of the institutions of Kosovo, in this case the Ministry of 
Education are to start a public dialogue included and recognized in the school 
curriculum. In this context, with their role, educators are the foundation of society. 
They possess tools to bring prosperous social change and political stability. One 
cannot imagine a development of good human beings without education. As far as 
Kosovo is concerned, one cannot even think of a multicultural society without 
intercultural understanding. It is in the hands of Kosovo institutions to think about the 
impact that the education system has and to see if they will succeed in changing its 
role in the post-national era. As far as Kosovo and Serbia are concerned, it will take 
time to demonstrate the distinction of their national systems under the pressure of 
international convergence and in a world of international political organizations and 
global markets. 
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5.2 Islamic religious leader’s convergence among civil society: roles and contributions 
for the stability and development of Kosovo’s society 
The differences between scholars regarding Islam and democracy consist in their 
concerns about the functioning of democracy alongside freedom, knowing many 
cases where democracy appears only in its outer form, in a great number of Muslim 
societies, when in fact authoritarian regimes are still in action in those societies. 
Knowing that without a functional civil society that finds an extension even outside 
the political sphere, one cannot talk about the existence and functioning of 
democracy in certain country. In Kosovo, although religion (in this case, Islam) has 
never replaced ethnicity, though it was often a self-identification factor, still it cannot 
be overlooked. It has its impact on the daily lives of people and politics, though the 
characteristics of development of Islam in Kosovo throughout history are quite 
different from other Muslim societies around the world. Non-immune to the global 
change, Kosovo faces the challenges that these global changes in Islam had brought 
to the country. In Kosovo, the institution of the Islamic Community, with its leadership, 
is of great importance due to the involvement of Kosovo youth in the ISIS front, 
despite those religious leaders rarely have been part of the activism as part of civil 
society to bring about changes in the policies and public sphere. On the other hand, 
it is almost impossible to monitor or timely control the networks of radical groups 
that operate in Kosovo and threaten security in the country. The potential to 
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strengthen peace in the country or the opposite to prevent efforts to build it and the 
potential to help democratize the country is also in the hands of religious leaders who 
are part of civil society, depending on their tendency and will and the ways they 
engage (Kastrati, 2016).  In its complexity, the relationship “Islam –democracy” has 
brought many questions that continue to be discussed in academic circles and 
studied via scientific articles. One of them is whether Islam complies with the very 
concept of democracy or any form that empowers citizens and restricts authoritarian 
leaders? In today's world, different processes of Islamic modernization and extremism 
are as exclusive and contradictory reciprocal. Some scholars refuse to accept any link 
between democracy and Islam. On the other hand, there are scholars who see this 
potential relationship within "marital relations" of Islam and democratic ideals 
(Diamond, 1988). Depending on the country the relationship between Islam and 
democracy has its own specifics. In countries where the system is not defined as 
Islamic, and where Muslims make up the majority population different specifics are 
developed.  Historically, if and when Islam may be   closer to the West, is through its 
shared Jewish-Greek and Greco-Roman heritage, meritorious to the formation of 
modern Western civilization. From a political perspective, Islam is seen as 
misguidance for liberal democracy. According to Muslim doctrine, historically viewed, 
the Islamic state implements God ruled polity. The holy law is in this case the very law 
of God, and a holy army belongs to God, thus it automatically creates the enemy that 
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is directly God's enemy in this worldview (Lewis, 1993). The interpretation of the 
Islamic laws that play a great role in these aspects, in some of the Islamic states is 
made by the governing body of clerics. These states where the political power has 
been hijacked by Islamic extremists there can be no discussion of interpretations from 
legislative institutions in secular political systems emerging from free democratic 
elections and the will of the people. In such situations, there is a confrontation with 
the fundamental principles of the Platon and Aristotel of ancient Greece and of the 
fundamental concepts of the developed democracy from Thomas Jefferson and 
James Madison. The right to elect and the right to be elected as individual 
fundamental rights of the citizen in democracy is a crucial individual right. Still, civil 
liberties, freedoms and human rights outweigh the importance of just elections and 
the formal institutions (Diamond, 1988).  Again, it can be argued that in any case 
where fundamental rights and civil liberties that derive from the concepts of 
democracy are in conflict with the principles of a country where the law is interpreted 
by a body of clerics that is governing body, a change from religious authoritarianism 
into any form of modern secularism of Islamic democracy is not possible, in any case. 
At this point different scholars conclude that the complex relationship between Islam 
and democracy is immutable. These scholars are determined not to abandon their 
arguments in the face of the disagreement of other scholars who insist that Islam 
embodies democratic values and are in constant effort to find the arguments that will 
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validate their theses. One of these arguments is that a country can create its own 
model of independent religious democracy if it there is no occurrence of the 
abduction of political power by religious extremists (Esposito, 1999).  Although these 
debates occur within academic circles, in societies such as Kosovo, which consists of a 
Muslim majority population and where the political system is not Islamic or even 
defined as such, all the arguments discussed in these circles regarding the relation or 
the inconsistencies of Islam with democracy have an effect on religious, political and 
political leaders in the state. Here the role of civil society, which is also composed of 
religious leaders, can be influential, depending on their involvement and activism.  
 
5.3 The role of Islamic religious leaders in preventing religious radicalization  
This danger which threatens the Euro-Atlantic perspective of Kosovo and which 
derives from recruitment of youngsters to fight in Syria and Iraq continues to remain 
a challenge and an alarming situation, in spite of the strong pro-Western orientation 
of the absolute majority of citizens of Kosovo and the adoption of the Law on the 
prevention of Kosovo citizens to join to any war outside of Kosovo. Serbia and other 
countries who oppose Kosovo's Independence have used the argument that Kosovo 
is a country with terrorist activities, to the world, using examples of recruitment of 
Albanians from Kosovo, in the Iraq and Syrian war. The topic of Albanian youngsters 
from Kosovo who were recruited and involved in the war in Iraqi and Syria was 
brought and discussed many times before the Security Council.  As international 
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agencies and western governments report, there are no direct threats from radical 
groups in Western Balkan countries, although the governments of these countries 
report on pressure from fundamentalists. However, it is not possible to overlook these 
pressures, which may take the form of direct violence or terrorist attacks in the future. 
These pressures may easily take the form of promoting interethnic conflicts. As a 
result, U.K. has turned Kosovo into the list of countries that have potential to have 
terrorist attacks (The Telegraph, 2015). Event such as the cancellation of the concert of 
July 4, 2015, in honor of the Independence Day of the United States, which is 
organized every year, for security reasons indicates that these issues should not be 
overlooked. It is not only the reputation of the new state that calls for urgent 
response, but the rescue of  Kosovo's youth by preventing their departure in wars 
such as Syria, Iraq and elsewhere in the future. It is worrying that the religious leaders 
in Kosovo have not made very strong statements in this regard even after the imams 
arrested. They do not strongly condemn their activities, while the leader of the Islamic 
Community in a TV show stated that: "God has made Kosovo a part of Europe, the 
Islamic community constantly monitors the Imams in their lectures, but so far has not 
found anything about these things. There is no radical and not radical Islam.  Islam is 
a One "(Gazeta Express, 2015). In these cases, the Mufti should clarify his concept of 
Islam, which is one and unchangeable according to him, to the young people of 
Kosovo, in the local mosque and in the media and other public appearances. This is 
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because a radical Islam is being seen in Kosovo. It should also open public debates 
for the practice of Islam traditionally amongst Albanian population, with its 
uniqueness and specifics of forms and spiritual heritage belonging to spiritual 
traditions.  
Discussion from religious leaders similar in nature   as part of the civil society can 
substantially and successfully influence young people who are the victims of Salafi, 
causing them to open their minds. On one side, all of these analyzes contribute to 
academic debates on the probability of coexistence of Islam as a religion with society 
that claims or at least aims to be established as liberal-democratic. On the other side, 
inclusion of Mufti and Islamic Community in public debates as representatives of the 
civil society is of a critical importance. 
In Kosovo, it is vital to develop a contentious discussion on Islamic identity and its 
position in the country's society by its own religious leaders because the lack of a 
proper discussion has caused greater polarization. Islam, according to those that 
abide to the historical perspectives remains and should remain unchangeable, 
because Islamic theology has been born at an unrepeatable specific time in history, 
while they conceptually defend the thesis that Islamic laws that derive from divine 
sources, as God's directives, they do never change, thus they are  absolute. Others 
argue that Islam cannot be dogmatic and that a democratic model that governs 
Islamic beliefs can be built, precisely because democracy has different meanings and 
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is suitable for any culture that has its own specificities. In order to simplify this topic 
for younger generations, religious leaders may start discussing precisely the 
distinction between Islam as religion, faith in God, and practicing with rites and 
lecturing about Islam on the other end.  If they would start from considering the 
religious discourses and  lectures as products of the respective jurisprudence schools 
which qualify as fundamental, absolute and exclusive and are not to be interpreted by 
other religions, then the possibility to distinguish between the concept of Islam as a 
religion and the way it is taught and lectured about it in Kosovo, can become one of 
the way out of the situation which has been created and where the final product is 
resulting in the radicalization of individuals and groups. Also, a distinction between 
lectures in qualitative or quantitative terms in two generally different ways of teaching 
can be a reference point for further clarification (Cranberries, 2016). With active 
participation in civil society, in public, the work of religious leaders may result in many 
benefits for younger generations, by sending clearer messages about the necessity 
that religion and its practice should not be a source of violence but as a model to 
promote stability, peace and development in the country and that there may be 
cooperation with the parties or secular efforts in this regard. This seemingly idealistic 
view remains as an alternative to the best possible way of involving religious leaders 
as part of the civil society in the country, under current conditions and developments. 
 
 208 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER VI   
 209 
 
Summary: Improving interactions between Civil Society and State Institutions: New 
perspectives of cooperation and trust 
 
6.1 The Rebirth of Civil Society 
The civil society has made a valuable and historic contribution during the breakdown 
of many of the communist regimes all over Europe. After the fall of the communist 
regimes in many of the Central and Eastern European countries, representatives of 
civil society filled variety of roles in the process of developing democratic systems of 
government.  It is indicative that the countries that today have a satisfactory level of 
civil society development have had at least basic knowledge for the role of the civil 
society and importance of public participation concept even during the communism. 
Not all the states that lived under the communist regimes have shared same 
experiences, but at least states like Poland and Czechoslovakia have made the 
difference (Kipred, 2005).  
Leaders of civil society like Vaclav Havel or Lech Walesa later during the 
democratization process of their societies became state leaders. The situation in 
Southeastern Europe was different. Although many East Central European countries 
and South East European countries had similarities at this point, like the strict state 
control over the public life, the suspension of the independent private economic 
activities, etc there were some visible differences between them. In some of the East 
 210 
 
Central European countries, like Poland, there was a broad social movement 
(Solidarity), East Germany and Czechoslovakia had structured dissident movements 
and Hungary to a certain degree had gone through a symbolic process of developing 
the private sector. 
 By contrast, in South East Europe the situation was very different; any initiative or 
activity from dissident groups identified by state police was interrupted with harsh 
repression and imprisonment for the group, whereas the private sector in countries 
such as Romania, Albania and Bulgaria was non-existent (Khdr, 2008). 
The shift from totalitarian communist regimes to multiparty democratic systems in 
some of the South East Europe countries was made possible due to the contribution 
and significant role of civil society. Some powerful civil society movements that took 
place during the 1989 sent important signals for changes in the Balkans as well. These 
signals were also captured in Kosovo. 'Joining their efforts with Albanian political 
parties, civil society organizations focused on the organization of civil resistance 
movement, which was manifested through powerful peaceful protests and 
widespread solidarity within the Albanian population (The Kosovo Report, 2000). 
As a consequence of the rapid development of the NGO sector after 1999, civil 
society (especially its NGO sector) experienced another phase of transformation: the 
shift of the pre-war focus from the programs of the humanitarian aid to the support 
for building of new Kosovo institutions (under UNMIK) and later during the state 
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building process. Support and development of newly established institutions needed 
the serious involvement of the NGO sector, in particular of those NGOs with the focus 
on political activism and in policymaking (Atrc, 2008).   
 
6.1.1 NGO antagonisms and their impact for the development of the NGO sector 
The role of the NGO sector is critical during the process of developing Kosovo 
institutions in order to build a democratic system of governance, which is a basic 
requirement for the EU Integration process and very important for the successful 
completion of state-building process. As emphasized in this study, the civil society, 
respectively NGO sector in Kosovo has gone through two different phases of 
development. The first phase was the pre-war period under the Serbian apartheid 
pressures. These were circumstances that are completely unfavorable for a free and 
normal development of a civil society. The second phase begins after the 1999 in 
parallel with the beginning of the process for building the democratic system of 
governance in Kosovo. Consequently, after the 1999 the NGO sector often was 
identified with NGOs that were formed before the war of 1999 and those established 
after the war of 1999. 
Antagonisms within the NGO sector are the result of its historical and philosophical 
roots of development. During the 1990’s civil society groups were very much unified 
while LDK organized civil resistance towards the Serbian regime. This lasted up to 
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1997-1998 when Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was born. From this moment and 
onwards part of Albanian population supported KLA because they believed that KLA 
could speed up the process of liberation of Kosovo from Serbia, while others 
continued to support LDK and their peaceful and civic activism against Serbia. 
Consequently, some major NGO’s that predated 1999 continued to support LDK’s 
political platform after the war, while some other NGO’s supported PDK and AAK as 
political parties that came out as a result of the disbanded KLA. In the meantime, the 
third group of NGO’s that were formed after the war (as a result of the international 
‘NGO boom’) took sides between international organizations and political parties in 
Kosovo (Kipred, 2005).  
Depending on which political party was in power a very good number of NGOs 
would practice the so-called ‘anti-institutional’ behavior. In this context, very few 
NGO’s remained politically independent. Even if they would remain so, competition 
for the international funds and local funds would produce very antagonistic 
relationships between NGOs. In these circumstances, Kosovo experienced the 
prevalence of centralized and rigid party structures in the Government which would 
not allow NGOs sufficient access to the policy process. 
 
6.1.2 Key issues and challenges for NGO sector development 
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In order to be able to influence positively the development of the democratic system 
of governance, civil society representatives and in particular NGOs should address a 
number of important issues and problems that directly impact their development. As 
analyzed in this study, NGOs should be more active in the legislative process and 
should have a particular focus on drafting legislation that regulates their field of 
action. Such legislation would allow NGOs to be able to take part in public decision-
making, in creating and amending policies, monitoring the work of government 
institutions, offering services, and guaranteeing sustainable funding for NGO sector. 
In addition to the international donations and funding, NGOs should also seek 
alternative support from Kosovo institutions in order to ensure their financial 
sustainability. 
They could start with taxation policy reforms, beginning with the revision of the Public 
Benefit Status in order to restore the situation in favor of their development. There 
should be initiatives in order for the taxation policies to favor big companies or even 
small businesses that give donations for NGOs. This would ensure the financial 
stability and self-sustainability for the NGO sector (Tacso, 2016). 
The integration process for the Western Balkan countries is an ongoing effort to 
improve their position and fulfill the conditions for future membership. This process 
requires coordination of actions from all layers of the society, where NGOs as part of 
civil society play an active role in public support for reforms that preceded the final 
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goal. Moreover, NGOs can be considered as key actors whose priority is integration in 
EU, and can become one of the main partners of Kosovo in this process. In order to 
accomplish this successfully, the NGO sector should work more on development of 
capacities for contribution to policy and decision making (Kscf, 2017). The role and 
contribution of NGOs in the process of EU integration in the EU should be 
strengthened and guided by a jointly prepared strategy by the Kosovo institutions, 
the NGO sector and the international community. There are a number of instruments 
that NGOs can apply in this process. In the third chapter, related to this we referred to 
the reports of local organizations. The necessary triangle in this aspect is between civil 
society, the government and the EU. Creating and strengthening sustainable 
networks among NGOs through the target groups is also a necessity. In this process, 
individual interests should be abstraction, in the interest of networking and 
synchronous actions of NGOs in this regard. The network is a priority to maximize the 
potential that in individual capacity is not sufficient, regardless of the programs and 
quality of the NGO. The determination of the NGO that is a viable contributor to EU 
integration consists of greater pursuance and achievements towards targeted groups 
focus on mission and shift of opportunism for donors, towards better actions in 
benefit of integration (Khdr, 2008). 
The other importance lies in the good cooperation which is established between the 
Government and NGO sector in this process, starts with acceptance, recognition and 
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shared values. The work should consist of sharing of responsibilities, financial and 
human resources. The Government institutions will allow for more space to NGO's, by 
reconsidering their exclusiveness in providing public services. The NGO sector can 
and should take more responsibility and perform more activities, and they are 
encouraged to build capacity and professionalism in this regard. Such an NGO will 
duly inform the public for its activism and would cooperate with other NGOs.  
On the other side, the Kosovo Government must gradually become aware that it is 
impossible to address all the challenges of the transition processes in Kosovo, so they 
need support from the NGO sector in order to complement their efforts (Kipred, 
2005). 
 
6.2 NGO approach towards the Kosovo institutions 
UITU represents a concrete example of organizations that have consistently 
organized activities aiming to impact state policies and achieve their goals that have 
often been of political nature. That is why they are considered politically relevant both 
for position and opposition in Kosovo. For example, one of the most controversial 
issues from UITU in relation to state institutions was the process of privatization of ex-
state enterprises. On the other hand, the Teacher's Union has, since 1999, organized 
protests against the government, demanding the increase of the salaries for all 
employees in all levels of the educational system in Kosovo. After the declaration of 
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independence, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) recommended that the 
increase should not exceed 8% due to negative financial implications for the Kosovo 
budget. With the price of annulling the IMF's financial program for Kosovo, the 
Government decided to increase the teacher's salaries. On the other side, we have 
the Association of War Veterans that has very close relations with the government 
channels (Khdr, 2008). 
Both NGOs and Unions that pre-dated 1999 affiliated with LDK (the political party that 
led the civil resistance) and associations that were formed after the war as a result of 
the disbanded KLA (affiliated with PDK), develop and push for ‘anti-institutional’ or 
‘anti-governmental’ models, dependent on whether their preferred political party is in 
power or not. 
With few exceptions, the third type of NGOs that were formed after the war (as a 
result of the incentives from the international organizations) also develops an ‘anti-
institutional’ model of behavior regardless of which party is in power. Their approach 
in most of the public discussions is very anti-governmental and they practice a very 
aggressive criticism towards the government many times without offering concrete 
alternatives for the solution of the problems. Many observers of civil society believe 
that this is caused out of frustration that most of these NGOs have as they were never 
able to compensate with available local and government sources the financial 
shortfall by international donors. In many situations these smaller NGOs identify 
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bigger unions and organizations affiliated with main political parties, thus securing 
advantages over the government funds and political support. On the other hand, 
unions and other large organizations see these small NGOs as being without identity 
and or any specialization in any field of civic activism and serving as implementers of 
particular international donor policies (Khdr, 2006). 
These kinds of antagonisms do no benefit to civil society, as far as political efficiency 
is concerned and that in practice it takes different forms. The civil society and the 
state had different forms of co-operation in time and places. In the West, we can talk 
about close co-operation relations, both in Western Europe and in the United States. 
In Southeast Europe, the main dissidents and other groups chose "anti-institutional" 
behavior, because in these countries civil society was considered to be so in any 
regime. In Kosovo, unlike other SEE countries that this model has immediately picked 
up after the fall of Communism, reports NGO-state institutions on this model were 
built after the fall of the regimes (Atrc, 2008).  
To a great extent, most of the civil society associations, unions and NGO’s (both that 
dating pre-war and those after the war) continue to practice this kind of ‘anti-
institutional’ approach, with exceptions when those in power are friends of a 
particular group of NGO’s. NGO’s that were established after the war also contributed 
to this fragmentation and this is mainly as a result of their aggressive competition for 
international and governmental funds. As a result of this antagonism, many important 
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processes for democracy are not seriously monitored from many NGO’s and this 
harms the political efficacy of the NGO sector. Many of these NGOs see competition 
as a way to eliminate each other, instead of seeking alternative options to increase 
the dynamics of joint projects, thus by fulfilling their aspirations as civil society 
representatives. This kind of frustration also comes as a result of the rigid political 
party structures installed in the public institutions that play favoritism by supporting 
certain NGOs and preventing other NGOs from accessing the decision-making and 
policy-making process (Khdr, 2006). 
 
6.2 Civil society in Kosovo before and after 1999: the relevance for the development 
of the democratic system of governance 
NGOs are an important factor for the development of the democratic system of 
governance. All NGOs are relevant to this process. However, NGOs that have the 
potential to impact and develop public policies as this potential stems from their link 
with strong constituencies could particularly contribute to the above context. All of 
the civil society organizations and NGOs focused on the socio-economic reforms, rule 
of law projects, electoral systems, EU integration, and education reforms - all of them 
representing civil society can play a very important role in assisting the Government 
to build efficient and democratic institutions, not necessarily by reducing the criticism, 
but by being more constructive in their criticisms.  
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In order to do this most of them need to make substantive changes in their strategic 
approaches towards the government. In parallel while identifying challenges, they can 
also give their significant contribution to the policy-making process. In order to reflect 
public needs NGOs should act actively on behalf of citizens and be less dependent on 
the state (Koha Ditore, 2010). 
On the other side, the political parties should apply a more integrated approach in 
relation to the NGO sector in order to be able to contribute to the development of a 
democratic system of governance within a stable and broader political context. In 
parallel with this NGO must overcome their ideological and other potential 
differences that are a product of their historical roots of development. Instead, they 
should represent the role that belongs to them, which is to give dynamism to the civic 
engagement and activism in the society. Only by acting and being articulated on 
these bases they can help the important processes in the new polity (Khdr, 2008). As 
we saw in this study, the civil society groups in Kosovo were factors in the apartheid 
circumstances during the 1990s and could potentially be a force for development and 
democratization in the independent Kosovo. This is not an easy task and implies 
many challenges. However, although it is a challenging process, in the end, it can 
succeed as most of the challenges must be overcome by the civil society itself. 
'Representatives of the civil society can contribute more than other actors in the 
advancement of democratic values. In some countries similar to Kosovo where 
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transition from violence to peace processes takes place, civil society itself does not 
always have an emancipatory role. This is especially complicated when the civil society 
structures themselves need internal democratization '(Fischer, 2006). Kosovo's NGO 
sector needs to get avoid the famous approach of  'a job that everyone wants to 
perform', and insist to develop a certain level of internal democracy in order to be 
able to further contribute to building and developing a democratic system of 
governance in Kosovo. Civic performance in its true character involves the good 
behavior or action of a citizens for a "useful cause" for the interest of the community, 
where it is not implied that it should be  anti-institutional, anti-state or anti-social 
order,  , although often phenomena that appear as anti-behaviors are part of it 
(Warren, 1996). 
The civil society in Kosovo has developed a unique relationship with the state. This 
relationship was otherwise imposed by political circumstances after the 1990s. After 
the Serbian government abolished Kosovo's autonomy in 1989, civil society initiatives 
during the 1990s in Kosovo turned into a civil movement in order to resist to the 
imposed Serbian state institutions. As efforts to build the Kosovo state after the war 
of 1999 continued, more and more civil society organizations and political parties 
were born and various groups from within the civil resistance movement emerged, all 
with the aim of helping build a stable political system for Kosovo. They were not very 
coherent; as a result, not all of them had harmonized ideas and coordination on how 
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to best do it.  Consequently, the main and most essential difference between the civil 
society of Kosovo before 1999 and after 1999 is on its goals. Kosovo’s civil society goal 
before the war was to change the system, and its goal after the war should be to help 
in developing a democratic system of governance. Back in the 1990s, there was no 
confusion as to the goal, which is why they coordinated their full potential with other 
political parties to form a united front called a ‘civil resistance against Belgrade’s 
regime’. It seems that in the current circumstances, many civil society representatives, 
mostly coming from NGOs misunderstand their role in Kosovo. Their role now should 
not be to rise against the political system because we are not in the 1990s, the 
opposite must happen. The sector needs to be much more dynamic and actively in 
support of the development of the system. In the current socio-political 
circumstances there is no room for an anti-system or anti-state approach. This does 
not mean that NGO sector should drop out the pressure towards the government, 
but they do not necessarily have to look at the system like CSOs did in the 1990s 
(Khdr, 2008). The Kosovo society needs those NGOs that insist on the creation of 
mechanisms that would advance the cooperation with the state institutions in order 
to be more efficient while giving their contribution for the development of the system 
of governance in Kosovo. 
 Within this context, NGOs should actively be engaged in supporting the 
democratization process and good governance so to be able to address challenges 
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of transition in Kosovo. A contribution based on the parameters as analyzed and 
recommended in this study is needed from both NGOs and from the institutions of 
the state. 
 
6.3   Enhancing role of educators and of the religious leaders in the civil discourse 
At the beginning of chapter five, it was pointed out that it is not only the NGO sector 
representing the civil society in Kosovo. That is not the case in other countries as well, 
but in Kosovo, this occurred as a consequence of the approach that international 
donors have been using since 1999.  Kosovo's civil society has a classical feature of 
donor-driven agendas, because the   donor’s agenda often bypassed important local 
ideas and initiatives and has invested more in creation of other structures, modeled 
in as western NGOs. Local structures, such as unions, educational 
organizations/institutions, religious councils etc have been left sideways and were 
replaced by those (NGOs) for which the community had less knowledge, and 
needed long adaptation, therefore, the influence of civil society was 
reduced. International donors 'forgot' that civil society has wider representation than 
just through the NGOs (Osce, 2007).  
CSOs are more than just a conventional term of the "non-governmental 
organization". Compared to NGOs that bring people closer to one issue jointly, CSOs 
include other structures like: labor market actors (trade unions and federations), CBOs 
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(community-based organizations) for example educational organizations and 
institutions, youth organizations, family associations and religious communities 
(Coneccs, 2016). 
As underlined in chapter five, NGOs are mostly included in functional categories such 
as: Advocacy, Mediation, Service Providers and Evaluation and Monitoring, but there 
are other CSOs that fall into other functional categories such as Capacity Building 
(e.g. educational organizations) or Conflict Resolution (e.. religious councils). All of the 
contributions coming from educators and religious leaders in their capacity as civil 
society cannot be done exclusively through the NGO sector but within their 
institutions or associations where they function and where they meet with citizens on 
daily basis (Jane, 2007). 
Within the Kosovo's context, the role of educators in capacity building is very 
important. The degraded and segregated system of education where the hostile 
between the two communities and the strength of ethnic identity prevails among 
others has negatively affected the development of democracy in Kosovo. During the 
process of providing education, training and information in their capacities as civil 
society, educators can give a significant contribution for the identity formation among 
Albanians and Serbs of Kosovo based on the concept of citizenship, while religious 
leaders can act as mediators and moderators in their communities and get involved 
in their efforts to foster democracy. 
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An open discussion which would enable religious leaders in Kosovo to explain if there 
are any obstacles in Islam related to lack of legislative deliberation, lack of intellectual 
basis for human rights and constitutionalism all needed for democracy, or they 
should take the stand of supporting other scholars, defend their political thought that 
democracy can be supported through independent interpretive judgment, 
consultation (ijtihad, shurah and ijma).  Many generations have invested in religious 
peace among in Kosovo. An effort from religious leaders to contribute to these efforts 
is needed at this particular period of state-building of a new state which emerged 
from many hardships and whose Constitution also defines the state as secular, based 
on citizenship values, and guarantees equality for all, regardless of ethnicity or 
religion. 
 
6.4 The impact of the civil society in developing a democratic system of governance 
 Challenges in dealing with international and domestic issues, continue to be 
significant even in the 10th year of the independence of Kosovo. After the decision of 
International Court of Justice that the  declaration of Kosovo's independence did not 
violate international law, which made its way immediately in the  global headlines, the 
image of Kosovo was intact in the international arena, until the report of Dick Marty, 
one of the members of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, where 
the Kosovo Liberation Army is charged with criminal activities during and after the 
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war, which seriously threatens to damage this image.  Since five of the EU states have 
not recognized Kosovo's independence, and despite the dialogue between Kosovo 
and Serbia, it can be expected that there will be problems when it comes to its end. 
Meanwhile, Kosovo's government is made up of coalitions that try to be sustainable, 
where in each term they try to show that they have gathered the right potentials to 
fight corruption and organized crime. A special challenge for fulfilling their mandate 
to build a state in which rule of law is strong and the main challenge for both 
international mission and Kosovo government   remains the governance of 
municipalities with majority of Serbian population, in the north of the country.  
Eighteen years after the NATO intervention and nine years after the independence, 
Kosovo has failed to create a society of knowledge. Kosovo’s political system today is 
on one side between the political parties that governed since 2001, most of them 
representing the anachronistic, primitive and semi-feudal side of the society (filled 
with corruption and violence), and on the other side with the ‘Vetevendosje 
Movement’ (LVV) as the opposition, which criticizes but leaves no building path. In 
fact, the alternatives that LVV proposes often are worse than the disease itself. 
Although Kosovo is one of the most pro-western societies in the region, if continued 
with this political course, it is not impossible to experience a wider chaos, where 
corruption on one hand and potential anti-western movements, on the other hand, 
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are crises that in the coming years may emerge as inclusive and cyclical and both 
together can potentially endanger its statehood. 
One could say that in the current circumstances civil society’s role and contribution is 
not in the desired levels. The role of civil society in situations such as this marked by 
political pressures, identity crisis, and corrupted governance is more than necessary 
and irreplaceable. Civil society organizations should offer 
a constructive contribution by acting as partner in their joint efforts with the state 
institutions to build a democratic system of governance in Kosovo. ‘State building 
necessitates integrated approach which involves representatives of both civil society 
and of the government. People representing the society and the state need to 
cooperate and focus on building institutions that enable such developments’ 
(Rittberger & Fischer, 2008). 214 In order to become a force for democracy and 
impact positively the development of a democratic system of governance, civil society 
together with Kosovo institutions must sincerely commit themselves to overcoming 
the challenges as identified in this study. All the challenges that hinder the process 
need to be addressed with concrete measures. All these issues must be answered 
with concrete terms as discussed in the conclusions below. 
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Conclusions 
If referred to the analyses given in the chapters five and the synthesis given in the 
previous chapter, when it comes to the specific terms, there are many ways, 
instruments, and mechanisms that can be used by civil society and Kosovo institutions 
so they could give a significant contribution for the development of the democratic 
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system of governance in Kosovo. Concrete improvements in many areas are needed, 
starting from: implementation of the legislation, improvement of cooperation 
between institutions and civil society, clearer orientation of donor policies, financial 
sustainability, a more active role of NGOs for EU Integration process and 
improvement of capacities of civil society. 
In the near future, all of these improvements accompanied by an increasingly 
democratic culture of the Kosovo’s society can positively influence the growth of the 
civil society in order to become an important factor and contributor for developing 
a democratic system of governance in Kosovo. 
Within this context, in order to give concrete and clear answers to the hypothesis, as 
rose in this study, it is recommended for both civil society and Kosovo institutions to 
address all the above listed issues. Initially it should be started from problems deriving 
out of the current legislation which regulates this sphere. One could say that the 
legislation relevant to the civil society in Kosovo consists of a considerable number of 
legal acts ranging from the highest legal act ‘The Constitution of the Republic of 
Kosovo’, by continuing with a broad range of other laws as listed in the fifth chapter. 
There are fewer problems with the approved legislation but more in its 
implementation. In order to implement properly the legislation, both the institutions 
and the civil society should show more will to be followed by concrete actions. 
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Proper implementation of the legislation and of the institutional strategies would 
secure the enabling environment for the civil society. The enabling environment is 
broadly referred to various economic, political, social, cultural and legal conditions 
that affect the capacity of citizens, whether individually or collectively, to voluntarily 
participate in civil society. Although most of the legislation especially related to the 
freedom of association is in place, in practice, many of the standards are not met yet. 
This is both due to the hesitations from the institutions and because the civil society 
sector seems to be largely apathetic towards public life.  
As elaborated in the chapter four, the interactions between the representatives of the 
civil society and Kosovo institutions has seen improvement after the declaration of 
independence, but still, it’s not at the desired level.  
With regard to improving the cooperation with the Kosovo institutions, concrete 
measures must be undertaken from both sides. The interaction between the President 
and civil society is twofold-through advocacy and partnerships. Although the 
President by the Constitution has the right to return a law to the Assembly for 
changes (after this has been initiated by the civil society) this has been done rarely. 
Consequently, this has lowered the motivation of many CSOs to require from 
the President the amendment of laws in the interest of citizens. President should 
provide a safer environment for making impact in legislation through the work of civil 
society, in the process of reviewing these laws, otherwise, both President’s and civil 
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society’s role can remain symbolic at this stage (Tacso, 2016) .The cooperation 
between Parliament and the NGOs is on a more advanced level, but it was also 
accompanied by problems of different natures. One of the identified problems from 
Monitoring Matrix conducted from the Kosovo Foundation for Civil Society was the 
failure to fully implement the Strategy for Information and Public Relations 2012-2014. 
Consequently, the Parliament approved Declaration of Partnership between the 
Assembly and the Civil Society, followed by an Action Plan for this Declaration. 
Nevertheless, despite some very slight improvements, the commitments expressed in 
this declaration are far from being fulfilled. The adoption of strategic documents 
should be accompanied with sufficient engagement in the implementation of the 
commitments. Human and financial capacities dedicated by the Parliament to the 
development of civil society should improve followed with the sufficient political will 
in order to undertake more substantial reforms in this area (Kscf, 2017). 
Following the declaration of independence co-operation between civil society 
organizations and the government, has been accompanied by an increased 
dynamism in terms of approving strategic documents that advance the interactivity 
between the two parties. The Government Strategy for Cooperation with the Civil 
Society 2013-2017 was the main document setting the cooperation principles and 
measures between the two sectors. However, as outlined in the fourth Chapter, 
according to the evaluation of the Action Plan of the Strategy by the CiviKos 
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Secretariat and findings in the survey conducted from Tacso in 2016 many of the 
objectives set in the Strategy have not been implemented. Concrete measures and 
actions need to be undertaken for improving the cooperation between the 
representatives of civil society and the Government. The Government should inform 
NGOs for the public consultations and invest in training civil servants who understand 
the idea and the concept of the strategy. Better coordination is needed between the 
ministries in relation to the contracting of the services. Ministries should increase the 
transparency during the process of allocation of public funds for NGOs and create 
automatic co-funding system for NGO winners of the EC grants. In general, more 
direct involvement and contribution from both the government bodies and the civil 
society representatives or external experts is needed, as there are insufficient 
capacities for qualitative implementation of many measures that could strengthen the 
cooperation between the government and NGOs (CiviKos, 2016). 
Another important aspect of civil society development is related to the local 
governance. Compared to the above institutions, cooperation   between CSOs and 
local government is poorer. According to the Municipal Transparency Reform Index 
2015, the situation is still far from being positive in the majority of municipalities. The 
strengthening of civil society sector at the local level should be an imperative. Local 
government representatives should consider drafting a strategic document that will 
establish a systemic cooperation with civil society.  
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 When it comes to the advocacy initiatives representatives of different municipalities 
shouldn’t hesitate to give access to different NGOs to information on the work of 
their municipalities (Ec Ma Ndryshe, 2015). 
On the other side, NGOs should be more active in order to build their legitimacy over 
their constituencies. Although accountability of civil society should be categorized 
since some are for example service providers and service provider’s deal with a 
different type of accountability compared to organizations where the nature of their 
action is related to anti-corruption, advocacy or watchdog activities. The 
representation of citizens by NGOs and their accountability to citizens is very 
important since CSO acts as an organized voice on behalf of certain group of people. 
In these cases, when they are not membership organizations, NGOs should give 
accountability to the group by measuring whether the change has been 
accomplished (Kfos, 2015).  
The development of the civil society is dependent especially to the NGO sector, 
among other things; the donor policy and the co-financing of Kosovo institutions for 
NGOs need to change. In chapter four it was emphasized that international donors 
had serious impact for the growth many NGOs and have deeply impacted the 
development of their structure and activities. The situation after the war has proven 
that a good number of local NGOs have rarely developed strategic approaches in 
order to reflect the public's interests but have largely been oriented towards benefits 
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out of the short-term projects driven by donor agendas. Consequently, these NGOs 
have not managed to create a legitimate public image. International support is very 
important for the development of the NGO sector, but the diversity of donors and 
the increase of supporters to NGOs would have a positive impact on the activity and 
commitment of NGOs. In this context, the government could potentially assist NGOs 
both through financial support (outsourcing) and through indirect means (Khdr, 
2008). 
Very often NGO’s influence is limited as most of them follow more the agenda of 
their donors, rather than what comes out of society. International donors should allow 
the local agenda to be set and support issues which are raised from the NGOs that 
are developed around those issues and have their source in society. They should also 
recognize the need for NGO’s to formulate policy agendas at the local level in order to 
secure their self-sustainability in the future. The lack of coordination of the major 
international donors remains a serious problem as it affects the impact of NGO on 
public policy makings and simultaneously risks duplication of the same projects and 
efforts in the absence of close coordination.  A comprehensive and updated database 
for donors support to the civil society should be established (Tacso, 2016). 
On the other side, in order to diversify funding for NGOs the funding of NGOs from 
the institutions is depended on the changes to the legal framework that should take 
place in the near future. EC Progress Report concluded that the public funding 
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provided to civil society is non-transparent and unregulated, thus required from the 
government to set standards and criteria governing public funding for NGOs so as to 
install transparency, accountability, and credibility in the process (EC Progress Report, 
2016). 
In order to make a more favorable financial environment and to institutionalize a 
model for funding NGOs, more changes in the legal framework are needed. Kosovo 
Government should invest in creating favorable environment in order to engage 
more NGOs in service provision and upgrade the financial reporting formats for 
NGOs. Kosovo institutions need to increase the dynamics of work related to the 
approval of the necessary legislation in order to address problems related to the 
financial and tax reporting formats and procedures for NGOs (Kscf, 2017). 
The financial and tax reporting formats and procedures for NGOs should be revised 
in order to correspond with the needs of sector. The Regulation on Public Funding for 
NGOs should be completed and transparencies for the procedures through which 
NGOs are financially supported. Public institutions shall initiate a systematic collection, 
processing, and publishing of specific and relevant data for civil society sector (Bcsdn, 
2017). 
Administrative instructions should define as to what is considered as a program or 
project, they should harmonize the criteria for distribution of funds, provide a 
mandatory content of the agreement, and make it clear that public calls are the only 
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way to distribute any funds to NGOs. The adoption of the Model on Public Funding 
needs to be followed with the adoption of the specific regulation at the governmental 
level. Changes are needed with regards to the financial reporting of NGOs as 
according to the Law tax reporting rules for NGOs are identical to businesses (Tacso, 
2016). 
In the fourth chapter, it was underlined how important it is for the CSOs to engage in  
the framework of the EU Integration mechanisms and instruments, NGOs can 
contribute in many ways. However, there is a lack of cooperation between the civil 
society and the government in the framework of this process. Collaboration develops 
only at some levels as it is not structured properly. A more dynamic approach to the 
EU Integration process should be expected from NGOs (CiviKos, 2017). 
More concretely, NGOs should actively participate in a meeting which is held one day 
before the plenary session of the Stabilization-Association process dialogue. They 
should also be more active at the technical level, and contribute with their expertise in 
the sectorial meetings between Kosovo authorities and representatives of the 
European Commission. NGOs should give their contribution to the EU’s Progress 
Report for Kosovo in programming and determining priorities within the financial 
assistance aim to support the civil society (Kscf, 2017). 
Last but not least, due to the above-elaborated situations, the capacities of civil 
society remain limited. While analyzing the cooperation between institutions of 
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Kosovo and representatives of the civil society various research reports conducted 
from the international and local organizations emphasize that deficiencies that exist in 
the dynamics of cooperation between the civil society and the central/local 
institutions, often have to do with itself the capacities of the civil society. NGOs should 
focus more on developing more aspects and elements of their expertise, networking, 
visibility, internal development, governance and approach to constituency issues. The 
Civil Society index produced from KCSF has identified crucial areas for improvement 
for NGO’s and one of them is Internal Governance, where highlights are lack of 
implementation of internal documents, even though they are all in place.  On the 
other hand, ‘Needs Assessment Report’ conducted from Tacso in 2014 regarding the 
internal governance of NGOs identifies as some of the acutest problems their 
financial management and organization of human resources. Financial and 
procurement management are matters that need to improve their structure and 
organization (Tacso, 2014). Besides these elements, the low citizen’s engagement is 
another factor that impacts the development of the civil society capacities. Kosovar 
citizens remain largely apathetic towards public life in general, including low levels of 
their engagement in civil society. Only 3 % of citizens are members of an NGO and 
only 4 % of them have done any voluntary work for the sector (Kscf Index, 2016). 
NGOs should also avoid a ‘can do all attitude’, usually practiced in order to expand to 
activities which are likely to get more funding that is available from donors. They 
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should develop capacities in their field of specializations, in specific sectors or proven 
capacities. On the contrary they can end up with an undetermined expertise and less 
chances to stay viable and functional in the longer run. 
In a given environment, which would enable becoming a driving force for the 
development of the democratic system of governance by deliberating public 
problems, NGO representatives and Kosovo institutions should address all the above 
problems starting with the legal framework by insisting on the implementation of the 
legislation and coordinate donor policies and address the transparent public funding 
models for NGOs. On the other side, NGO representatives need to be part of 
important process of European integration, through preparation of strategies for this 
process and outreach to target groups. NGO sector should continuously articulate 
the values of political engagement as the obligation of active citizenship by becoming 
the focal factor within the ‘bigger picture’ of building a sustainable community and 
democratic system of governance. 
Apart from the civil society representatives coming from the NGO sector, the role of 
educators and religious leaders to foster democracy should be enhanced. In Kosovo 
circumstances, their role is in parallel important just as important is the role and 
contribution of the NGO sector for the development of a democratic system of 
governance by serving as a watchdog to giving input on public policies. 
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Educators in their capacity as a civil society should equip the new generation with the 
proper knowledge and skills for the future labor market. If they fail to do so, the 
education system which is based in segregation will shape the youth in a prevailing 
ethnic identity model, of belonging only to their nations.  
The new identity of Kosovo as a civic state should be promoted. In the current 
political situation this option is most suitable for Kosovo’s society. This option 
promotes the values of the civic state and helps to strengthen democracy. As Kosovo 
aspires to integrate into the EU, by strengthening its state identity in Line with the 
Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, it will also help the Euro-integration process 
in the future. On the other hand, Serbs will continue to use the problem of "status" in 
Kosovo, denying the state, while most Albanians will refuse the civic character of this 
state. With current attitudes, Kosovo is a constitutionally established state on the 
principle of citizenship with such institutionalized identity, but this identity lies behind 
the petition of ethnic and nationalist identities. This coat threatens the nationality of 
Kosovo, holding hostage to its end. 
Not less important is the role and contribution of the religious leaders for peace and 
development in their capacities as civil society representatives. The institutional 
independence of religious actors, as in Kosovo, may result in greater democratic 
activism. However, this depends on their individual interest. This is a risk that should 
be known because their activism can go from pro-democracy as was in the case of 
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Ayatollah Sistani, or the anti-democracy of members of the Methodist Church, as was 
the case in Fiji. The general and main role of religious leaders as representatives of 
civil society is to prevent the radicalization of younger generations as a result of 
indoctrination, regardless of the other work they do, such as analyses about 
consequences related to the understandings on the concept and objectives of Islam, 
or how Imams lecture about them, fanatically or not, and thesis or discussion about 
the coexistence of Islam and democracy. 
Civil society representatives whether coming from the NGO sector or bigger CSOs, 
whether educators or religious leaders, should be aware of how much they can help 
Kosovo in these fragile political circumstances and how  they can potentially risk  
democracy, if they choose not to become it’s force. Although many would qualify it 
as idealistic or utopian, however the true result of the new relationship, with new roles 
between civil society and the state, where political leaders regard civil society as 
supportive and not a threat, where civil society sees the state as defender, is the 
future of democracy and the true functioning of civil society. This civil society will be a 
"reborn" of the civil society, supportive of the democratic governance system in 
Kosovo. This is the path that Kosovo assigned to take in the long process of real birth 
of democracy.  
Socio-political changes that the new state of Kosovo is undergoing can be 
understood by taking the opinion of civil society on many issues, such as, ethical, 
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political and best institutional practices for the benefit of the country. The free vibrant 
and creative society produces this kind of fantasy. This is not the negative model 
where civil society is only opposing the state, but it is a positive model where through 
mutual trust the civil society and state institutions develop a sustainable democratic 
governance system. It is the only path for the civil society to become the remedy for 
'postmodern' Kosovo’s society.  
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Abstract 
 
Many research studies for civil society development see enormous potential for the 
use of public discourse by civil society as a means to help transitional nations get 
important issues onto the public agenda. For transitional countries, it is essential to 
have an active, effective and responsive civil society. There are great challenges to 
post-conflict countries, and for Kosovo as a new emerging independent state, many 
years of political uncertainty have contributed to these challenges.  The challenges of 
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Kosovo’s fragile society vary from healing ethnic conflicts, political conflicts, building 
infrastructure and economy. The development of sustainable civil society is necessary 
for Kosovo’s society in order to tackle efficiently social, economic and political 
problems. The role of civil society and public discussion should increase in this regard, 
in order to build new and strong institutions. In the case of Kosovo, limited research 
has been conducted on the role of the civic organizations regarding their democratic 
participation and impact for developing the political system. 
 By using comprehensive qualitative research methods this study analyses the role of 
the civil society for developing a democratic system of governance in Kosovo, set as 
one of the central objectives of both international community and of the Kosovo 
institutions. The development of civil society is analyzed thoroughly. The study 
concludes how important is the role and engagement of the civil society as one of the 
key factors in impacting the development of the democratic system of governance by 
assisting in state capacity built and increasing the role of active citizens in public 
decision making. 
 
Key words: Civil Society; Democratic Governance; NGO Sector; EU Integration; 
Educators; Religious Leaders 
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Prošireni Sažetak 
 
Proces uspostave održivog i aktivnog civilnog društva koje djelotvorno i odgovorno 
sudjeluje u demokratskom sustavu upravljanja ključno je za tranzicijske zemlje. Nakon 
godina sukoba i političke neizvjesnosti, neovisni status Kosova predstavlja velike 
izazove. Krhko društvo Kosova suočava se s mnogim izazovima, a razvoj civilnog 
društva samo je jedan od njih. Problemi političke, društvene i gospodarske naravi 
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zahtijevaju povećanje uloge civilnog društva. U slučaju Kosova, provedena su 
ograničena istraživanja o ulozi različ itih građanskih organizacija u pogledu njihovog 
demokratskog sudjelovanja i utjecaja na razvoj političkog sustava. Djelovanje 
organizacija civilnog društva č iji je fokus politički aktivizam koji nastoji proširiti praksu 
građanstva i povećati zahtjeve za pravom javnom raspravom i pokrivenost svih strana 
važnih pitanja - elemenata ključnih za funkcioniranje demokracije - otežava se ako se 
ne spriječ i. Stoga, civilno društvo Kosova još nije uč inkovit i utjecajan partner u 
donošenju javnih odluka. Korištenjem sveobuhvatnih kvalitativnih metoda istraživanja 
ova studija analizira ulogu civilnog društva za razvoj demokratskog sustava 
upravljanja na Kosovu postavljenim kao jedan od glavnih ciljeva međunarodne 
zajednice i institucija Kosova. Razvoj civilnog društva temeljito se analizira.  
 
Početkom devedesetih godina na Kosovu uspostavljeno je niz organizacija civilnog 
društva. U početku, osnovni cilj kosovskih Albanaca bio je ispuniti barem neke od 
svojih društvenih potreba kulture, obrazovanja i zajedničkog javnog života kroz 
civilno društvo i kao reakciju na izolaciju Albanaca iz javnog života uzrokovan iz 
srpeskog režima. Istovremeno, temelje albanskih političkih stranaka bile su 
međusobno povezane, ako ne i izravni nastavak nekih od tih civilnih udruga. S 
raspadom bivše Jugoslavije, te su se političke stranke razvile u nacionalni albanski 
pokret. To je bio početak razvoja ranog oblika civilnog društva koji se postupno 
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organizirao unutar tzv. "Civilnog Otpora" osnivanjem paralelnih institucija Kosova. 
Slijedom toga, razdoblje pod srbijanskom okupacijom dovelo je do stvaranja 
skromnog civilnog društva. Nakon rata 1998-1999 pod Misije Ujedinjenih Naroda u 
Kosovskoj upravi (UNMIK), uspostavljen je ogroman broj malih nevladinih organizacija 
(NGO-a) i lokalnih medija. 
 
Imajuć i u vidu da je odnos civilnog društva i kosovskih institucija prošao kroz dvije 
vrlo različ ite faze razvoja, ova se studija usredotočuje na predratnu situaciju pod 
Miloševićevim režimom i poslijeratnom razdoblju pod međunarodnom upravom i 
izgradnji demokratskog upravljanja u Nezavisno Kosovo. Kao što ćemo vidjeti, razvoj 
civilnog društva bio je snažno pogođen represijom srbijanskog režima od 1989 do 
1999 i radikalnom promjenom okolnosti pod UNMIK upravu koja je pratila rat 1999. 
godine. Međutim, nakon proglašenja neovisnosti civilno društvo se smatra važnim 
faktorom kako bi ispunio različ ite uloge, dok se gospodarske i političke institucije 
Kosova zrele; od služenja kao 'watchdog' do davanje uloga na javnim politikama. 
 
Ova će studija istražiti proces razvitka civilnog društva na Kosovu, od dana njihovog 
nastanka, kroz složene političke situacije devedesetih, do njihovih potencijalnih uloga 
i doprinosa za razvoj demokratskog sustava upravljanja na Kosovu. Studija je 
podijeljena u šest poglavlja, a na kraju slijedi glavni zaključci. 
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U prvom ću se poglavlju usredotoč iti na različ ita značenja i potencijalne definicije 
civilnog društva, kao i na razne postojeće diskurse civilnog društva, dok će se u 
drugom poglavlju uvesti kratka povijest Kosova. U trećem poglavlju opisat ću 
povijesne korijene razvoja civilnog društva na Kosovu prije rata 1999. godine. 
Uključ ivat će razdoblje pod komunističkom Jugoslavijom i godine represije pod 
Miloševićevim režimom. Glavni fokus četvrtog poglavlja bit će proces uspostave i 
razvoja nevladinog sektora u sklopu civilnog društva, pod upravom UNMIK-a i na 
Kosovu. Razlog  zašto  je razvitak sektora nevladinih organizacija biti  posebno 
elaborilan je da ovaj sektor predstavlja onaj dio civilnog društva na Kosovu koji je 
najviše primio podrsku iz međunarodnih agencija usmjerene na razvoj civilnog 
društva, a financiranje donatora posebno je bio usmjereno na nevladine organizacije. 
Slijedom toga, nevladine udruge bile su vrlo relevantne za političke agende 
međunarodnih donatora, a pojam "nevladina organizacija" postala je tako 
prevladavajuća da je na Kosovu, kao iu mnogim drugim postsocijalističkim 
kontekstima, gotovo zamjenjiv s pojmom civilnog društva. 
 
U petom poglavlju analizirat će se uloga i doprinos odgajatelja i vjerskih vođa u 
njihovim sposobnostima kao predstavnici civilnog društva. Ovo je važno uzevši u 
obzir da organizacije civilnog društva (CSO) predstavljaju više od nevladine udruge 
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(osobito u usporedbi sa zapadnim vrstama nevladinih organizacija koje su uveliko 
podržale mnogi međunarodni donatori na Kosovu), kao što su organizacije civilnog 
društva među ostalima CBO ( community based-organizacija u zajednici ), sindikate, 
saveze, obiteljske udruge, obrazovne organizacije, vjerske zajednice itd. Neuspjeh 
demokratizacije na Kosovu među ostalim razlozima može se pripisati sustavu 
obrazovanja s puno kontradikcija gdje prevladava snaga etničkog identiteta. Tijekom 
procesa obrazovanja i informiranja nastavnici mogu dati značajan doprinos stvaranju 
identiteta među Kosovskim albancima i srbima na temelju koncepta državljanstva, 
dok vjerske vođe mogu djelovati kao posrednici i moderatori u svojim zajednicama i 
uključ iti se u svoje napore za poticanje demokracije. Završit ću petu poglavlju 
analizirajuć i da li je moguće omekšavanje autoritarnih tendencija nekih od važnih 
islamskih vjerskih vođa i aktera na Kosovu kroz mogućnosti njihove konvergencije 
među civilnim društvom ispitivanjem u kojoj mjeri su kosovski islamske vjerske vođe 
uključeni u svoje napore za poticanje demokratije. Poglavlje šest će ponuditi sintezu 
analiza o razvoju civilnog društva prije i poslije rata na Kosovu ukazujuć i na izazove 
koje predstavnici civilnog društva moraju prevladati kako bi značajno pridonijeli 
razvoju demokratskog društva. Zaključ it ću naglasivši važnost uspostave održivog 
civilnog društva koje bi moglo igrati pozitivnu ulogu i utjecaj na utvrđivanje 
parametara i kvalitete upravljanja na Kosovu i rizika koje mogu predstavljati kada 
odluče ne postati snage za demokratiju. Studija zaključuje koliko je važna uloga i 
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angažman civilnog društva kao jednog od ključnih faktora koji utječe na razvoj 
demokratskog sustava upravljanja pomažuć i u izgradnji državnih kapaciteta i 
povećanju uloge aktivnih građana u javnom odluč ivanju.  
 
Postoji mnogo nač ina, instrumenata i mehanizama koje civilno društvo i kosovske 
institucije mogu koristiti kako bi mogli dati značajan doprinos razvoju demokratskog 
sustava upravljanja na Kosovu. Potrebna su konkretna poboljšanja u mnogim 
područ jima, počevši od: provedbe zakona, poboljšanja suradnje između institucija i 
civilnog društva, jasnije orijentacije donatorskih politika, financijske održivosti, aktivniju 
ulogu nevladinih organizacija u procesu integracije u EU i unapređenje kapaciteta 
civilnog društva. U bliskoj budućnosti, sva ta poboljšanja uz paralelni progres 
demokratske kulture kosovskog društva, mogu pozitivno utjecati na rast civilnog 
društva kako bi postali važan faktor koji bih dao doprinos razvoju demokratskog 
sustava upravljanja na Kosovu. U tom kontekstu, kako bi se dao konkretan i jasan 
odgovor na hipotezu u ovoj studiji, kosovske institucije i predstavnici civilnog društva 
bi trebalo da se intenzivno bave svim gore navedenim pitanjima. To bi mogao biti tzv 
proces "ponovnog rađanja" civilnog društva na Kosovu.  
 
Demokratija je proces i trebat će neko vrijeme za civilno društvo Kosova, a posebno 
za organizacije civilnog društva da razviju svoj politički aktivizam. Međutim, da bi 
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razumjeli društveno-političke promjene u "New-Born" Kosovu, neophodno je da se 
civilno društvo uzme u obzir kako bi se odgovorilo na mnoga etička pitanja vezana za 
političku i institucionalnu praksu na Kosovu. 
 
Predstavnici civilnog društva koji dolaze iz nevladinog sektora ili već ih organizacija 
civilnog društva, bilo odgajatelja ili vjerskih vođa, trebaju biti svjesni koliko mogu 
pomoć i Kosovu u ovim  krhkim političkim okolnostima i koje rizike mogu predstavljati 
kada odluče ne postati snaga za demokraciju. Iako to može biti previše idealistično, 
ako ne i utopijsko, samo kada se shvate ove uloge, nove generacije nevladinih 
organizacija Kosova shvaćaju će državu kao svojeg zaštitnika, a politički čelnici će 
vidjeti predstavnike civilnog društva kao svoje pristaše, a ne kao prijetnju za sebe , tek 
tada će se stvarno živopno civilno društvo moć i razvijati i podržavati demokratski 
sustav upravljanja na Kosovu. Ovo je fantazija kreativnog, fluidnog i slobodnog 
civilnog društva. To je koncept civilnog društva koji nije negativno definiran kao 
suprotnost državi, ali pozitivno, u kontekstu ideja i praksi kroz koje se uspostavlja 
suradnja i povjerenje između državnih institucija i civilnog društva, č ime se pridonosi 
razvoju doista demokratskog sustava upravljanja postajuć i "postmoderni" lijek za 
kosovsko društvo. 
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